RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
AIR FORCE BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

IN THE MATTER OF:				DOCKET NUMBER:  BC-2007-00885
								INDEX CODE:  100.00
								COUNSEL:  NONE

								HEARING DESIRED:  YES

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APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT:

The credit for a Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG-15) “Probably Destroyed” in aerial combat in Korea on 21 September 1952, be upgraded to a “Confirmed Destroyed.”

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APPLICANT CONTENDS THAT:

In light of new historical evidence, i.e., 1999 eyewitness statement from wingman, Russian records of aerial combat during the Korean War, and Fifth Air Force (5th AF) Intelligence Summary, he should receive aerial victory credit (AVC) for the MiG-15 he destroyed on 21 September 1952.

On the date in question, while piloting an F-86E, Sabre, he engaged a Russian-built MiG-15 in aerial combat near or north of the Yalu River in Manchuria, at an altitude of approximately 30,000 - 35,000 feet.  From an estimated range of 1,800 - 2,000 feet, in a long tail chase that lasted about five minutes, he fired several bursts from his .50 caliber machine guns, scoring strikes in the MiG’s right wing and engine/tailpipe area.  There was an explosion in the engine area and the MiG started trailing a long stream of smoke.  He and his wingman started to gain on the MiG as the aircraft started to descend.  They were being chased by additional MiGs from above and behind, and when they got into firing range, his wingman called a defensive break.  They abandoned the chase and returned to base.  On the ground, his wingman urged him to claim a “Kill” or a “Destroyed,” but he did not since he did not see the enemy pilot crash or eject.  Instead, he claimed and was properly awarded a “Probably Destroyed.”

In 1999, a fellow F-86 pilot, long convinced the circumstances of the 21 September 1952 mission met the criteria for a “Confirmed Kill” contacted his [the applicant’s] former wingman who provided a statement indicating that he always thought the MiG-15 was one of the applicant’s several kills.  XXXXXXXXXX, a ten-victory ace in Korea, concurred with the statement, and took his case to The American Fighter Aces Association (AFAA).  The AFAA, an organization that guards its integrity closely, referred his case to its Victory Confirmation Board, made up of five World War II Aces, who unanimously agreed and awarded him the confirmed victory.  Despite this, the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB was not convinced they should change the official historical record.

In 2004, Russian records of aerial combat in the Korean War were discovered at the National Archives.  The records for the 21 September 1952 mission were translated into English by two competent linguists, and the 5th AF Daily Intelligence Summary containing time of encounter, location, altitude, number of planes in each flight, squadron, and call-signs was obtained.  An analysis of these documents revealed some similarities and some striking differences.  Notably, the claim of another F-86 pilot matched almost exactly with the Russian description of the loss of a MiG-15, i.e., very low altitude, a single F-86 versus a single MiG-15, in the vicinity of Dapu Airfield in Manchuria and that only his claim matched the loss of another MiG-15, i.e., two F-86s attacked two MiG-15s, same general area and time of day, and same time elapsed in the chase from the rear, matched closely with the five minutes specified in the Russian report.  No other US claim, “Destroyed” or “Damaged”, comes close to the circumstances of his claim.  These records were presented to a respected historian, an authority on aviation matters and a curator at the National Air and Space Museum, who opined the geographical locale and the general description of the air combat coincide with his air sortie on 21 September 1952.  

Applicant’s complete submission, with attachments, is at Exhibit A.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS:

The applicant is a retired lieutenant general who served in the Korean War as an F-86E, Sabre, pilot, assigned to the 4th Fighter Interceptor Wing, Kimpo Air Base, South Korea.  During this period, he completed a total of 135 combat missions, totaling 191 combat hours, with four AVCs.

On 21 September 1952, the applicant, flying an F-86E, engaged in aerial combat with a MiG-15 near the Yalu River.  He was credited with a “Probably Destroyed.”

A Fifth Air Force Daily Intelligence Summary, dated 22 September 1952, indicated that during the morning of 21 September 1952, an estimated 16 MiGs were observed by F-86s (four encountered by three F-86s) with claims of one MiG damaged, pending film assessment.  During the afternoon, an estimated 111 MiGs plus one Type-15 (Lavochkin La-168) were observed by F-86s (69 encountered by 43 F-86s) with claims of five MiGs destroyed, one of which was pending film.  In addition, during the afternoon, eight F-84 Thunderjets, encountered four MiGs with claims of one MiG damaged.  An additional two MiGs were observed by an RF-80 Shooting Star.  

Applicant was credited with four AVCs between 5 August 1952 and 28 September 1952.  

Examiner’s Note:

During the Korean War, the valley surrounding the western end of the Yalu River became the focal point of a series of epic dogfights over North Korea, earning the nickname "MiG Alley." 

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AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

The Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA) recommends the application be denied, and states, in part, that while they recognize the applicant’s commendable military career, including four AVCs during the Korean War, since he is unable to produce official documents proving a fifth AVC, they do not support his request.

Far East Air Force (FEAF) Intelligence Roundup,               20-26 September 1952, stated there were five claims of aircraft “destroyed” on 21 September 1952; all the claims were converted to confirmed AVCs; applicant was not included in the five who had filed a claim of destroyed on 21 September 1952; he claimed a “probably destroyed” on 21 September 1952.  In an oral history interview in 1987 and 1988, the applicant stated, “There were pieces flying off him (MiG-15)...that didn’t satisfy the criteria for a confirmed kill.”  Contemporary histories of the applicant’s group and squadron indicated he claimed “probably destroyed” aircraft on 11 July and 21 September 1952.  Within a month of each engagement, FEAF intelligence, with access to mission reports, the original debriefings, gun camera film, and witness statements, reviewed the claims and concurred with the “probably destroyed” assessments.

In 1999, an eyewitness statement was obtained from the wingman, indicating that he believed the applicant destroyed a MiG-15 on 21 September 1952.  Translated Russian document cited by the applicant do not conclusively support his claim.  The Russian document states the MiG-15 went down northwest of the Yalu while applicant claimed the location as near the Yalu.  No altitude was mentioned while the applicant states he was flying at 30,000 to 35,000 feet.  Neither the Russian document nor the 1999 statement from the wingman satisfy the criteria established for verifying AVCs and should not be accepted as official documentation.

In 2000, the American Fighter Aces Association (AFAA), an unofficial, fraternal organization with no connection to the Air Force, notified AFHRA that they had decided to recognize the applicant’s five AVCs based on the 1999 statement from the wingman and issued a press release stating he was an Ace.  However, AFHRA confirms AVCs based on AFI 84-105, Chapter 5, that lists the authority for validating AVCs as: an official order awarding credit, a victory credit board report from the time showing award of credit, a contemporaneous witness statement, gun camera film, and evidence from unit histories from the time of the encounter.

The AFHRA evaluation, with attachments, is at Exhibit C.

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APPLICANT'S REVIEW OF AIR FORCE EVALUATION:

The evaluation fails to render any kind of operational assessment or critical look at his analysis.  In fact, the table submitted in support of their conclusions inadvertently offers strong support for his claim.  In this respect, he notes the Russian evidence coincides or matches closely.  None of the other claims match the Russian evidence as his does.  In regards to the time, the Russian records reflect Chinese time, while all the American reports are in Korean time.  Of the five criteria outlined in the governing AFI as authority for validating an AVC, there is not, and could not be mention of the unexpected availability of the enemy combat records of the time.  While the evaluation recommends denial since he is unable to produce official documents as proof, he notes that although the Russian combat records are not official US documents they are official historical Russian documents.  As an exception to established policy or simply justice, he submits that the wingman’s statement, the judgment of the AFAA, and the availability of the Russian records with the close correlation to his claim and only his claim, give more than enough justification for approval of his request.

Applicant’s complete response, with attachment, is at Exhibit E.

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APPLICANT'S APPEARANCE AT FORMAL HEARING:

1.  The applicant appeared before the Board with two witnesses and testified under oath.  During the hearing the applicant reiterated his previous request that his credit for a Mikoyan-Gurevich (MiG-15) “Probably Destroyed” in aerial combat in Korea on 21 September 1952, be upgraded to a “Confirmed Destroyed.”  Applicant contends the new evidence (Russian document) reflects his confirmed “Probably Destroyed,” on 21 September 1952 was in fact the same MiG-15 shot down on 21 September 1952 over Dapoo and that his record should be corrected. 

2.  The following additional information was provided in response to specific inquiries by the Board members:

	a.  The applicant provided the following opening remarks:  He indicated that he would not have applied, if it were not for the efforts of XXXXXXXXXX on his behalf over the last several years.  He acknowledged that the Record of Proceedings was complete and fair; and the summary from the Air Force Historical Research Agency’s position was accurate and fair.  He was totally convinced the MiG-15 he fired upon was the one listed as a loss in the Russian documents.  He stated, “The Russian documents are so detailed and with numbers of rounds fired but they're just yet inaccurate.  For example, on 21 September 1952, they claimed two F-86s were shot down; however, there was no F-86 shot down.  One was damaged, from being hit in the tail section of the plane.  But where they and our forces including some well-known names claimed five victories that day, all except for one was confirmed on the spot, and the other one was confirmed sometime later.”  Applicant believes we did have five victories – actually, he believes we had six.  The documents may have been exaggerated due to some internal political reason; “the good communist did this but the less good communist did that and the bad communist, they got shot down or maybe they wouldn't admit the losses south of the river because that was more fair territory than north of the river.”  

They admitted two losses, both of which were north of the river.  He did not know XXXXXXXXXX, whose mission or sortie north of the river was a confirmed victory and he claimed it and the Russians admitted it was well north of the River right near the Dapoo Airfield at traffic pattern height.  The other loss they had, the Russians did not specify the altitude where it was at; however, no one else claimed one in that area, which was actually in, what was formerly known as Manchuria.  All the other circumstances of comparing the Russian records to our records are identical to his sortie, with the exception of the altitude and the approximate place of the Russian crash.  The time of day was almost identical, if you allow for the difference in time zones.  The circumstances of the two MiGs versus two F-86’s are identical.  

	b. Response to the question as to if his wingman saw the hits, applicant states, “Yes, Oh, absolutely.”  He states, his wingman asked him, if he was going to claim a kill and stated that he would testify to a large explosion and smoke.  However, he told him that he did not see the pilot eject so he did not claim a kill.  

c. When asked about the debriefing for the 21 September 1952 mission, he stated, “we had our parachutes on, put them away and --- said, that’s a kill, I want you to claim a kill and I will confirm it.”  “I remember, I’m almost positive the wingman was not in there with me I don’t think the wingman went in.  The leader went in to debrief the mission and if there was a claim or something then they contacted the wingman.  But I think the debrief I had with the intelligence guy, I’m almost positive, I was there alone.”

Additionally, when asked about the steps in the debriefing process, applicant stated, “I think that’s basically it.  Either your wingman had to confirm it or somebody else who happened to see what was going on, …and the gun camera film if you happen to have a very good shot of gun camera film and it showed the pilot ejecting; …But it was those three things; wingman, somebody else, or film.”  

d. When asked about official victory credits during the Korean War, this excerpt was read to the Board; “Official victory credits during the Korean War were confirmed by the Far East Air Force General Orders.  Those orders were based on written recommendation from the Fifth Air Force Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation board which was composed of six officers, three from operations and three from intelligence.  The reports that went to the board consisted of individual claim statement and supporting documentation including eyewitness statements, gun camera film, and photographs of wreckage.  The reports noted whether the enemy aircraft was destroyed, probably destroyed, or damaged and whether the aircraft was airborne or on the ground….”  

e.  The panel asked XXXXXXXXXX were there any similar archives maintained by the North Koreans with respect to their planes?  XXXXXXXXXX stated, “We found that the Russians kept more records than we did.  It was amazing what they did. They analyzed every mission they flew, how many bullets were fired, how much gallons of gas, who was on the flight, what happened, how they returned ….  So, we have a complete set of all the Russians flights every day for three and a half years on a disk that we got from Archives II at Silver Spring.”  

Applicant and his witnesses’ complete sworn testimonies and their responses to the Board's questions are contained in the Transcript of Proceedings at Exhibit F.

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THE BOARD CONCLUDES THAT:

1.  The applicant has exhausted all remedies provided by existing law or regulations.

2.  The application was not timely filed; however, it is in the interest of justice to excuse the failure to timely file.

3.  After carefully assessing the applicant's sworn testimony, his responses to pertinent questions, the sworn testimony of witnesses, the evidence of record, and additional documentation submitted, the Board finds that sufficient relevant evidence has been presented to demonstrate the existence of error or injustice that warrants corrective action.  

4.  The Board noted that official victory credit during the Korean War was confirmed by the FEAF general orders; based on written recommendation from the 5th AF Enemy Aircraft Claims Evaluation Board.  With respect to the applicant’s claim, the FEAF documentation confirmed the applicant received credit for a “Probably Destroyed.”  The Board found no impropriety in the review conducted resulting in the applicant’s “Probably Destroyed” credit, on 21 September 1952.  It appears that responsible officials applied appropriate standards in effecting aerial victory credit, and we do not find persuasive evidence that pertinent regulations were violated or that applicant was not afforded all the rights to which entitled at the time of the review.  Considered alone, we conclude the “Probably Destroyed” credit was proper and appropriate and the applicant was credited as others with similar circumstances.  Additionally, the Board noted the comments by the Air Force Historical Research Agency that without contemporary documentation to provide supporting documents HRA must abide by the standards applied during the Korean War and retain the records as they are.

5.  Notwithstanding the above, the applicant provided additional supporting documentation which based on expert interpretation substantiates one incident in which two MiG-15s were involved in a five-minute dogfight with two F-86s on 21 September 1952, resulting in the crash of the MiG-15.  The Board noted the documentation did not reflect the actual altitude and location where the plane went down; however, both the Russian document and the Air Force record confirmed that it was the only five-minute air battle recorded between two MiG-15s and two F-86s on 21 September 1952, and that no other battles with similar circumstances were claimed.   The Board accepts the applicant’s explanation for the approximately one-hour difference between the encounter detailed in the Russian document and the Air Force record as the Russian document was recorded using local Chinese times; whereas, the Air Force record employed local Korean time.  

5.  The Board further notes that based on the new evidence, the statement from the former wingman, sworn testimonies before us, we are convinced the admitted loss reflected in the Russian translated document presented as evidence on the applicant’s behalf is in fact one in the same as the air battle contested by the applicant.  In view of the above findings, the Board recommends the applicant’s records be corrected to reflect the credit for the MiG-15 “Probably Destroyed” in aerial combat, in Korea, on 21 September 1952, properly awarded at the time, be upgraded to a “Confirmed Destroyed” in light of the new evidence.  

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THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT:

The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air Force relating to APPLICANT, be corrected to show that:

		a.  His AF Form 5, Individual Flight Record, Sheet No. 24, Item – Date, Column 13, Line - 21, during the period of 21 September 1952, be amended to reflect “(1 MIG 15 Destroyed)” rather than “(1 MIG 15 Probably Destroyed).”  

		b.  By Competent Authority, he was awarded his Fifth Aerial Victory Credit, for destroying a MiG-15, on 21 September 1952, while serving as a pilot on an F-86E during the Korean War.

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The following members of the Board considered AFBCMR Docket Number BC-2007-00885 in a Formal Hearing on 28 November 2007, under the provisions of AFI 36-2603:

All members voted to correct the records, as recommended.  The following documentary evidence was considered:

     Exhibit A.  DD Form 149, dated 14 March 2007, w/atchs.
     Exhibit B.  Applicant's Master Personnel Records.
     Exhibit C.  Letter, AFHRS/RS, dated 24 April 2007, w/atchs.
     Exhibit D.  Letter, SAF/MRBR, dated 4 May 2007.
     Exhibit E.  Letter, Applicant, dated 22 May 2007, w/atchs.
     Exhibit F.  Transcript of Proceedings.

                                   Chair

AFBCMR BC-2007-00885

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

	Having received and considered the recommendation of the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records and under the authority of Section 1552, Title 10, United States Code (70A Stat 116), it is directed that:

	The pertinent military records of the Department of the Air Force relating to APPLICANT, be corrected to show that:

		a.  His AF Form 5, Individual Flight Record, Sheet No. 24, Item – Date, Column 13, Line - 21, during the period of 21 September 1952, be amended to reflect “(1 MIG 15 Destroyed)” rather than “(1 MIG 15 Probably Destroyed).”  

		b.  By Competent Authority, he was awarded his Fifth Aerial Victory Credit, for destroying a MiG-15, on 21 September 1952, while serving as a pilot on an F-86E during the Korean War.

		Director
		Air Force Review Boards Agency