MEMORANDUM OF CONSIDERATION

	IN THE CASE OF:   

	BOARD DATE:           15 February 2001                   
	DOCKET NUMBER:   AR2000041226

	I certify that hereinafter is recorded the record of consideration of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in the case of the above-named individual.

	Mr. Carl W. S. Chun		Director	
	Mrs. Nancy Amos		Analyst	

  The following members, a quorum, were present:

	Mr. Fred N. Eichorn		Chairperson	
	Mr. Melvin H. Meyer		Member	
	Ms. Margaret K. Patterson		Member	

	The Board, established pursuant to authority contained in 10 U.S.C. 1552, convened at the call of the Chairperson on the above date.  In accordance with Army Regulation 15-185, the application and the available military records pertinent to the corrective action requested were reviewed to determine whether to authorize a formal hearing, recommend that the records be corrected without a formal hearing, or to deny the application without a formal hearing if it is determined that insufficient relevant evidence has been presented to demonstrate the existence of probable material error or injustice.

	The applicant requests correction of military records as stated in the application to the Board and as restated herein.

	The Board considered the following evidence:

	Exhibit A - Application for correction of military 
                records
	Exhibit B - Military Personnel Records (including
	            advisory opinion, if any)

APPLICANT REQUESTS:  That the letter of Reprimand (LOR) dated                 26 November 1996 be removed from his Official Military Personnel File (OMPF). 

APPLICANT STATES:  That the LOR concerned his performance of duty as the Intelligence Support Element (ISE) chief in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia from 14 May to 11 June 1996.  On 1 June 1996, he had completed an 85-page Rear Area Threat Assessment of Saudi Arabia in which he strongly recommended an immediate increase in the U. S. security posture in Dhahran and Saudi Arabia.  The Army Central Command – Saudi Arabia (ARCENT-SA) dismissed his report. However, he redirected his energies (1 – 11 June 1996) to building a stronger case for an increased U. S. security posture.  On 12 June 1996, his security clearance was suspended, he was denied access to all classified files and data bases, and he was ordered to undergo a complete psychiatric evaluation.  The Khobar Towers complex was bombed on 25 June 1996.  On 27 June 1996, he was cleared for duty and returned to Saudi Arabia where he was assigned as the ARCENT-SA Assistant G-1.  

From 1 to 11 June 1996, the ARCENT-SA G-2 accused him of numerous Uniform Code of Military Justice, security, and Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) violations.  This resulted in two separate Army Regulation 15-6 investigations and a SAEDA investigation.  The investigating officers made no findings against him.  The Central Clearance Facility completed a thorough 18-month investigation of his performance to clarify reports “concerning poor duty performance, irresponsible handling of classified information and possible false official statements.”  His Top Secret clearance was returned on 31 March 1998.  Supporting evidence is as listed on the attached sheet.

COUNSEL CONTENDS:  Counsel makes no additional contention.

EVIDENCE OF RECORD:  The applicant's military records show:

After having had prior enlisted service, he was commissioned out of Officer Candidate School and entered active duty on 31 May 1991 in Military Intelligence (MI).  He was promoted to Captain on 1 June 1995.  On 14 May 1996, while assigned to the 297th MI Battalion, 513th MI Brigade, Fort Gordon, GA he was deployed to ARCENT-SA G-2 for 179 days.  He worked as the Chief, ISE, under the ARCENT-SA G-2.

On 31 May 1996, the applicant prepared a memorandum for the ARCENT-SA  G-2 in which he noted the lack of the most basic threat information concerning terrorist activity in the immediate vicinity (i. e., Dhahran and Saudi Arabia).  In light of recent threats and Saudi Arabia’s execution of four extremists that day, he recommended immediate increase in the security posture along with a few other recommendations.  
On 12 June 1996, the ARCENT-SA G-2 gave the applicant a 5-page performance counseling statement summarizing events that transpired since the applicant’s arrival in Saudi Arabia on 16 May 1996.  The G-2 noted that the applicant was very inquisitive from the start in attempting to ensure the applicant was tracking with him.  Not surprisingly, there were some disconnects early on.  The first significant disconnect surrounded the release of the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) on 26 May 1996.  Subsequent to the G-2’s conversations with the applicant on 26 and 27 May, the G-2 attempted to be very specific with him on his requirements.  However, since his assumption of responsibility for the ISE the quality of the INTSUM had significantly dropped as had the quality of the morning briefings.  The applicant was a party to a number of possible security violations that he personally observed or had been reported to him.  The G-2 told the applicant on two occasions to stop talking about classified information over an unsecure line.  The applicant attempted to go secure on a regular phone.  He inadvertently left a brief case containing classified information in the Counterintelligence (CI) trailer.  The G-2 was given a statement to the effect that the applicant carried classified documents to his room but denied it when queried.  He was also given a statement that the applicant edited a classified document in the messhall and then told a subordinate not to say anything about it.  

On 26 November 1996, the applicant was given an administrative LOR from the Commander, 513th MI Brigade, Fort Gordon, GA.  The letter stated that it had been reported that during the period 22 May through 3 August 1996 the applicant engaged in a pattern of misconduct involving his performance of duties while assigned in the ISE, ARCENT-SA.  The 15-6 investigation revealed sufficient evidence for the commander to question his judgment and integrity.  Specifically, the investigation provided sufficient evidence to establish that (a) he made dishonest statements about being involved in an accident on or about 4 June 1996; (b) he did not perform to the expectations and standards of a company grade MI captain when he failed to properly safeguard classified information by discussing it over unclassified lines, not properly safeguarding his briefcase containing classified information, and opening classified information in the dining facility while instructing a subordinate to look the other way; (c) he disclosed information to his brother that he should have known to be classified; (d) he wrongfully removed the only official copy of the 15-6 investigation on his alleged security breaches; and (e) in making the disclosure of that information and allied papers, he attempted to discredit the character and performance of duty of his supervisor, the G-2.  A copy of the investigation was provided to the applicant as an enclosure to this letter.

On 11 December 1996, the applicant rebutted the letter of reprimand.  On         20 December 1996, the Commander, 513th MI Brigade reviewed the LOR and the applicant’s statement and recommended that it be filed in his OMPF.  On    13 March 1997, the Commander, U. S. Army Intelligence and Security Command reviewed the LOR, the applicant’s response, and the brigade commander’s recommendation and directed that it be filed in his OMPF.

The applicant provides several letters of support.  One of them indicates the individual did not know the applicant had a briefcase the day he supposedly left  it unattended.  Two state the applicant secured his briefcase in the CI trailer  while CI personnel were present; however, those two statements contain almost the exact same wording.  Another letter is from an individual who states he     had personal knowledge of the circumstances in Saudi Arabia prior to the         13 November 1995 bombing.  Another letter is from the applicant’s rater effective immediately after his release as the Chief, ISE but says nothing of the incidents during the period covered by the LOR.  Another letter is from an individual who knew of the applicant’s problems prior to going to Saudi Arabia and states that the applicant was set up for failure.  Four letters are from individuals who knew the applicant after the period covered by the LOR.  Three of them discuss the incidents that occurred for which the LOR was given; those statements contain almost the exact same wording.  

Army Regulation 600-37 sets forth policy and procedures to authorize placement of unfavorable information about Army members in individual official personnel files; ensure that unfavorable information that is unsubstantiated, irrelevant, untimely or inaccurate is not filed in an individual’s official personnel files; and ensure that the best interest of both the Army and the soldier are served by authorizing unfavorable information to be placed in and, when appropriate, removed from official personnel files.  In pertinent part, it states that a letter to be included in a soldier’s OMPF will be referred to the recipient concerned for comment.  A letter may be filed in the OMPF only upon the order of a general officer or by direction of an officer having general court-martial jurisdiction over the individual. 

DISCUSSION:  Considering all the evidence, allegations, and information presented by the applicant, together with the evidence of record, applicable law and regulations, it is concluded:

1.  In order to justify correction of a military record the applicant must show to the satisfaction of the Board, or it must otherwise satisfactorily appear, that the record is in error or unjust.  The applicant has failed to submit evidence that would satisfy this requirement.

2.  The Board recognizes all the effort the applicant put into his Rear Area Threat Assessment that may have prevented the Khobar Towers bombing had it been acted upon; however, the Board does not believe that it has a clear bearing on the incidents for which he was given the LOR.  Most of the supporting evidence provided concerns the bombing and not the incidents for which he was given the LOR.
3.  The LOR concerned security violations, making dishonest statements about his vehicle accident, and attempting to discredit the character and performance of duty of his supervisor.  The applicant states that investigating officers in two separate investigations made no findings against him and that the Central Clearance Facility completed a thorough 18-month investigation of his performance to clarify reports “concerning poor duty performance, irresponsible handling of classified information and possible false official statements” and cleared him.  However, he provides only small fragments from those investigations.  One of those fragments stated only that it was determined that he exposed a document in the dining facility but it could not be determined if it was classified or not.  The other fragment is even more ambiguous, stating “Direct attempt…to discredit MAJ ___ and the theft of an AR 15-6 investigation.”  No complete findings to any one of those investigations are provided so the Board presumes that his command’s action in giving him the LOR was appropriate.

4.  Concerning the letters of support provided by the applicant, the Board notes that three of them concern his leaving his briefcase unsecured; however, one of them indicates the individual did not know the applicant had a briefcase that day. The other two state that the applicant secured his briefcase in the CI trailer while CI personnel were present; however, given their almost exact wording the Board questions the veracity of those two statements.  In addition, the Board does not know exactly what security measures were required in such circumstances.  Another letter is from an individual who states he had personal knowledge of the circumstances in Saudi Arabia prior to the 13 November 1995 bombing but says nothing of the incidents during the period covered by the LOR.  Another letter is from the applicant’s rater effective immediately after his release as the Chief, ISE but that individual says nothing of the incidents during the period covered by the LOR.  Another letter is from an individual who knew of the applicant’s problems prior to going to Saudi Arabia and states he was set up for failure but does not elaborate on how the LOR was a result of that “set up.”  Four letters are from individuals who knew the applicant after the period covered by the LOR.  Three of them discuss the incidents that occurred for which the LOR was given.  However, given their almost exact wording the Board questions the veracity of those statements.  

5.  Documents in the OMPF are presumed to be administratively correct pursuant to an objective decision by competent authority.  The Board can remove documents when it can be shown that the documents are untrue or unjust, in whole or in part.  However, the applicant provides no support from the imposing authority or any other person in his chain of command relevant to the time period or incidents involved.  Given the lack of sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the applicant’s chain of command failed to rely on relevant and supportable evidence that showed he did commit the offenses for which cited, the Board concludes that the GOMOR was properly issued and filed.  

6.  In view of the foregoing, there is no basis for granting the applicant's request.

DETERMINATION:  The applicant has failed to submit sufficient relevant evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable error or injustice.

BOARD VOTE:

________  ________  ________  GRANT

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

__fne___  __mhm___  __mkp___  DENY APPLICATION

		    Carl W. S. Chun
		    Director, Army Board for Correction
    of Military Records

INDEX

CASE ID	AR2000041226	
SUFFIX		
RECON		
DATE BOARDED	20010215	
TYPE OF DISCHARGE		
DATE OF DISCHARGE		
DISCHARGE AUTHORITY		
DISCHARGE REASON		
BOARD DECISION	(DENY)	
REVIEW AUTHORITY		
ISSUES         1.	134.01	
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.