MEMORANDUM OF CONSIDERATION

	IN THE CASE OF:   

	BOARD DATE:            5 April 2001
	DOCKET NUMBER:   AR2000044082

	I certify that hereinafter is recorded the record of consideration of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in the case of the above-named individual.

	Mr. Carl W. S. Chun		Director	
	Mr. Hubert S. Shaw, Jr.		Analyst	

  The following members, a quorum, were present:

	Ms. June Hajjar		Chairperson	
	Ms. Celia L. Adolphi		Member	
	Mr. Harry B. Oberg		Member	

	The Board, established pursuant to authority contained in 10 U.S.C. 1552, convened at the call of the Chairperson on the above date.  In accordance with Army Regulation 15-185, the application and the available military records pertinent to the corrective action requested were reviewed to determine whether to authorize a formal hearing, recommend that the records be corrected without a formal hearing, or to deny the application without a formal hearing if it is determined that insufficient relevant evidence has been presented to demonstrate the existence of probable material error or injustice.

	The applicant requests correction of military records as stated in the application to the Board and as restated herein.

	The Board considered the following evidence:

	Exhibit A - Application for correction of military 
                records
	Exhibit B - Military Personnel Records (including
	            advisory opinion, if any)

APPLICANT REQUESTS:  Through counsel, that he be considered for promotion to lieutenant colonel by a Special Selection Board.  Further, it is specifically requested that this consideration be conducted using the criteria in effect for the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board, but without race and gender instructions which counsel for the applicant finds offensive.  The applicant also requests, through counsel, that if he is selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel by the Special Selection Board, then his date of rank be adjusted accordingly and that he be paid all appropriate back pay and allowances.

APPLICANT STATES:  That his contentions will be presented by counsel.

COUNSEL CONTENDS:  In a six-page brief that the conduct of the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board is “unconstitutional” and “illegal” because it was “instructed to give preference in the selection process to women and minorities.”

Counsel sets forth several points in support of his premise.  First, he contends that because the selection board selected the maximum number of officers it was authorized to select, any preference, advantage or revoting in favor of one officer necessarily disadvantaged another officer.  Counsel further points out that changing the position of one officer on “the order of merit list” is to the disadvantage of another officer on the list.

Counsel then provides the following excerpt from the Memorandum of Instruction to the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board:  

	“8.  Equal Opportunity 

	 c.  Your goal is to achieve a selection rate in each minority group (Black, Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, American Indian, and other unknown) or gender group (female), that is not less than the selection rate for all officers in the promotion zone of consideration (first-time considered).  This goal will not be interpreted as guidance to meet a particular “quota.”  The actual selection rate may be higher or lower than the goal.  Comparison of tentative selection rates to the goal offers you a diagnostic tool to ensure that all officers receive equal opportunity in the selection process.  

	 d.  You are required to conduct a review of the files of all first-time considered officers under consideration by the Board in a minority or gender group who are determined to be fully qualified, but tentatively not best qualified for selection.  You will review such files for the effects of past discrimination in any case in which the selection rate for all first time considered officers.  This review is required even if the selection of one additional individual in a minority or gender group would result in a selection rate equal to or greater than the equal opportunity goal for the minority or gender group.  If the board finds an indication that the official record of an officer many not accurately reflect his or her potential for service at the next higher grade due to past discriminatory practices—whether institutional or personal, deliberate, or inadvertent—the board will reevaluate (revote) that officer’s record and adjust his or her relative standing to reflect the new evaluation.”  

Counsel asserts that Section 8e of the Secretary of the Army’s instructions to the selection board regarding an equal opportunity review takes precedence over the general guidance stated in Department of the Army Memorandum 600-2 (Policies and Procedures for Active Component Officer Selection Boards), paragraph 
A-10c(3)(a) and cites the guidance contained in Army Memorandum 600-2:  

	“If the selection rate in any minority or gender group falls below the selection rate for all first-time considered officers by more than one individual, review the files of all fully qualified but tentatively not best qualified officers in that group, following the guidance provided at paragraph 10 of this memorandum.”

Counsel argues that the instructions given to the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board resulted in some officers under consideration receiving as many as three opportunities to be selected for lieutenant colonel.  He contends that multiple considerations of officers, who were not sufficiently high on the order of merit list to be promoted, placed officers, who had already made the selection cut off on their first consideration, at a distinct disadvantage.  Counsel also contended that revoting files provided an additional opportunity to women and minority officers which was unconstitutional, specifically that the instructions by the Secretary of the Army violated the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

Counsel states that, based on invalidating the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board, the ABCMR should grant relief to the applicant in the form of consideration for promotion to lieutenant colonel by a Special Selection Board, and if selected, then adjustment of his date of rank with back pay and correction of records.

Counsel then provides background information on the case under consideration. In this dialogue, counsel contends that the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board was “instructed to give preferential treatment of women and minorities.”  He argues that an instruction to an Air Force promotion board similar to the one provided to the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board, was “questioned” in an Air Force Judge Advocate General legal review.  In summary, this review set forth the position that speculation by selection board members regarding the existence of personal or institutional discrimination and speculation on the impact of this discrimination on the officer’s record which resulted in revision of the rating of the officer’s file was “a complete and categorical reversal of the long held/mandated requirement for objective evaluation of promotion records.”

Counsel then restates his earlier argument that the promotion selection board in question “perpetuated a complete denial of equal protection under the law to those officers who would have been promoted, initially, but who were displaced as a result of the Secretary of the Army’s instruction to revote some of the records and give special consideration to women and minority officers.”  But he expands his argument to set forth the proposition that, “even if there were no revoting, the instructions to the Selection Board to give special consideration to women and minorities was presumptively followed by the Selection Board members, constituting an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.”

Counsel contends that the applicant was deprived of the opportunity to reach lieutenant colonel as a result of his non-selection.  Counsel argues that each board which failed to select him was “given unconstitutional guidance with respect to a Department of the Army affirmative action program” and that for this guidance to be upheld it must meet the “strict scrutiny test” under applicable United States Supreme Court precedent.  Counsel then proceeds to cite case law in support of his argument, specifically Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.   He argues that, based on Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Army must demonstrate there is a compelling government interest in the affirmative action program in question and that the program is narrowly tailored to meet the compelling government interest.  Counsel asserts that the Army has not and cannot satisfy this test.

Counsel states that the strict scrutiny test was reiterated in Sirmans v. Caldera where “the instruction was determined to by the Court to constitute a racial classification”, that the error in the instruction is of a constitutional nature and that the injustice pertains to the disparate treatment of officers identically situated.  Counsel further cites Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC as another recent decision involving racial classifications.  Then counsel asserts:  “It is undisputed that the formal instruction given by the Secretary of the Army to the FY98 and FY99 Promotion Selection Boards explicitly introduced considerations of race and gender.”  From this position, counsel argues that when “a service secretary issues formal instructions that a Promotion Board should favor certain minority officers over all other officers and should afford that group special and unequal treatment at the hands of the board, the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod analysis of Adarand dictates application of the strict scrutiny standard to those instructions.  Counsel concludes with the statement that, even prior to the Adarand decision, Supreme Court precedent emphasized the presumptive invalidity of racial classifications, specifically:  “A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.”

Counsel then discusses the Army’s affirmative action instructions in the context of the Fiscal Year 1992 Army Lieutenant Colonel Selective Early Retirement Board.  He states that the Chief Judge of the Court of Federal Claims denounced the “social engineering efforts which these instructions undertake” and struck down the instruction as it applied to all members of the affected class.  Counsel concludes that, in light of the Chief Judge’s opinion, “there can be no question with respect to the appropriateness of the relief which [the applicant] seeks.”  Counsel then restates his request for relief, specifically that the applicant be afforded consideration by Special Selection Boards convened pursuant to Title 10 United States Code, Section 628 (10 USC 628), and if selected for promotion, that his date of rank be appropriately adjusted and that he receive back pay. 

In support of the application, counsel submitted a copy of the Selection Board Instructions for the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board; a copy of Department of the Army Memorandum 600-2, dated 26 November 1993; a copy of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the case of Baker et al v. United States; a copy of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena; a copy of the opinion of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Sirmans v. Caldera; a copy of the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC; and a copy of the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims in Christian v. United States.

EVIDENCE OF RECORD:  The applicant's military records show:

The applicant was appointed as a Reserve commissioned officer in the rank of second lieutenant in the Quartermaster Corps effective 11 June 1983.  He was ordered to active duty in the rank of first lieutenant in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps effective 27 April 1987.  

Records show the applicant was appointed in the rank of captain effective 1 August 1987.  He was advanced to the rank of major effective 1 August 1994.  The applicant is currently serving on active duty as a major in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

The applicant’s Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) microfiche shows eight Officer Evaluation Reports as a captain rated on the DA Form 67-8.  In these OER’s, the applicant received ratings of “1” in all 14 elements of professional competence and positive comments under professional ethics and competence from six different raters.  All six raters placed him in the top block (Always Exceeded Requirement) under Part Vc (Comments on Specific Aspects of the Performance) and in the top block (Promote Ahead of Contemporaries) in Part Vd (This Officer’s Potential for Promotion to the Next Higher Grade).  

Five different SR’s evaluated the applicant on the eight OER’s tendered to him as a captain.  He received the following senior ratings (the asterisk indicates the applicant’s position within that senior rater profile):  (14/23/4/14*/0/0/0/0/0); (18/33*/5/15/0/0/0/0/0); (7/9*/1/0/0/0/0/0/0); (5*/10/2/0/0/0/0/0/0); (13*/20/9/0/0/0/0/0/0); (53*/69/22/0/0/0/0/0/0); (11*/18/1/0/0/0/0/0/0); and (24*/19/1/0/0/0/0/0/0).  Based on these senior ratings, the applicant was rated below center of mass on one OER, center of mass on three OER’s, and above center of mass on four OER’s.

As a major, the applicant was evaluated three times using the DA Form 67-8.  Also, he was evaluated three times using the DA Form 67-9 which became effective 1 October 1997.  On the six OER’s he received as a major, he was evaluated by five different rating officials and he was evaluated by five different senior rating officials.

In the three evaluations rendered on the DA Form 67-8, rating officials evaluated the applicant with ratings of “1” in all 14 elements of professional competence, provided positive comments under professional ethics and competence, and placed him in the top blocks for performance and potential with positive comments in both narratives.  

In the three evaluations rendered on the DA Form 67-8, he received the following senior ratings (the asterisk indicates the applicant’s position within that senior rater profile):  (4*/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0); (18*/1/0/0/0/0/0/0/0); and (8*/0/0/0/0/0/0/0/0).

On the three evaluations rendered using the DA Form 67-9, the applicant was placed in the top block (Outstanding Performance Must Promote) in Part V (Performance and Potential Evaluation) by three different raters with positive comments in Part Vb (Comment on Specific Aspects of the Performance and Potential for Promotion).

Three different SR’s evaluated the applicant using the DA Form 67-9.  All of the SR’s placed the applicant in the top block (Best Qualified) in Part VIIa (Evaluate the Rated Officer’s Potential to the Next Higher Grade) and made positive narrative comments on the applicant’s performance and potential.  

On the first of the three evaluations on the DA Form 67-9, the senior rating of “Best Qualified” placed the applicant “Center of Mass” based on a total of five officers rated.  On the second of the three OER’s on the DA Form 67-9, the senior rating of “Best Qualified” placed the applicant “Above Center of Mass” based on a total of 14 officers rated.  On the third of these three OER’s, the senior rating of “Best Qualified” placed the applicant “Above Center of Mass” based on a total of four officers rated.

Based on these senior ratings on all six OER’s rendered on the applicant as a major, the applicant was rated center of mass on four OER’s and above center of mass on two OER’s.

In the processing of this case, an advisory opinion was requested from the Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) on 12 July 2000.  The staff of the DCSPER provided an advisory opinion, dated 26 July 2000.  The applicant and his counsel were provided a copy of the advisory opinion and both of them provided comments for consideration by the Board.

The DCSPER advisory opinion restated the applicant’s request for relief and his contention the promotion selection board in question acted illegally and unconstitutionally by affording preferential treatment to various minority groups.  The advisory opinion stated the after action report for the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board indicated that all “Equal Opportunity goals were met and does not indicate that any review or revote took place in accordance with the Memorandum of Instruction that resulted in anyone being moved from the standing on the order of merit list.”  The opinion concluded that there was no material error in the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps, Promotion Selection Board and the applicant’s request for relief should be denied.

The applicant submitted comments, dated 1 September 2000, on the DCSPER advisory opinion.  He initially asserted the statements in the advisory opinion that equal opportunity (EO) goals were met, that no review or revote took place and that no officer was removed from their standing list position “are not dispositive of the matter.”  

The applicant contends that the EO instructions “inherently and unconstitutionally tainted the entirety of the selection board process” and “violate Department of Defense and U.S. Army equal opportunity regulations which provide, in pertinent part, that sex and race should not be considered in making decisions in matter of promotion.”  He then argues that speeches by the Secretary of the Army to the DACOWITS [Defense Advisory Council on Women in the Service] in 1998 and to the NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] Award Banquet in July 1999 are “indications” that the EO instructions were either crafted or intended to be used as a mechanism to promote higher percentages of women and minorities at field grade officer levels.

The applicant also argues there was no evidence prior to the promotion board that the Judge Advocate General’s Corps (JAGC) discriminated against women and minorities in his year group.  Thus, he concluded that the EO instructions were “not necessary in the FY 1999 JAGC LTC Promotion Board, unless they were being illegally used as a mechanism to promote women and minorities at higher percentages.”  The applicant requests the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) provide to him any evidence the JAGC discriminated against women and minorities prior to the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board.

The applicant then describes a situation wherein, from June 1996 to June 1997, he was assigned in a position subordinate to a female JAGC officer who was junior to him and had input to his OER.  The applicant asserted that the JAGC makes great efforts to put women and minorities in positions that will enable them to be promoted.  He noted that the junior female officer who acted as his superior in 1996 and 1997 was selected for promotion by the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps, Promotion Selection Board.

The applicant also addressed a statement regarding a Freedom of Information Act request he submitted in February 2000.  The applicant states that he submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the DCSPER for “any reports that may have been generated by the promotion board or the secretariat.”  The applicant acknowledges that he has yet to receive any of these documents from the DCSPER, and therefore, maintains that he is being asked to respond to the DCSPER advisory opinion without benefit of information which he asserts is possessed by the ABCMR.  He requests, as a matter of fairness, that the ABCMR “immediately send copies of these documents” to him and his counsel and that the ABCMR respond to the applicant.

In a 12 September 2000 letter, the applicant’s counsel addressed the DCSPER advisory opinion, specifically the information that there was no revoting or movement of officers within the original order of merit list during the conduct of the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps, Promotion Selection Board.  Counsel contends that, without a copy of the report by the promotion board, “it is not possible to ascertain if this conclusion was derived from an evaluation of evidence to the contrary or if the report affirmatively states that no revoting transpired.”

In his 12 September letter, the applicant’s counsel also states that the action officer in the office of DCSPER acknowledged the applicant’s Freedom of Information Act request on 30 June 2000 and advised that he was seeking legal advice on this matter from the Office of The Judge Advocate General.  Counsel contends that this same action officer has provided information to the ABCMR, but is denying information to the applicant.  Counsel states that his client, the applicant, is entitled to this information and states that it is essential that the source of the information provided by the DCSPER to the ABCMR be disclosed to the applicant and his counsel.
The applicant and his counsel made reference to Sirmans v. Caldera in their brief.  This case involves a challenge to the affirmative action program used by the United States Army in the selection of officers in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps for promotion to the rank of colonel.  However, the plaintiff and the Government reached a settlement in this case before a decision was rendered by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.  As a matter of equity, the ABCMR has granted relief similar to that agreed to in the settlement to those officers who were similarly situated to the plaintiff and who were considered by the same promotion selection board.

Since the submission of this application by the applicant and his counsel, there have been significant developments in the ongoing class action case in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims involving the Fiscal Year 1992 Army Lieutenant Colonel Selective Early Retirement Board.  A senior judge of that Court has ruled in Christian v. United States that the equal opportunity instructions to this Selective Early Retirement Board are unconstitutional and the results of this board are void.  However, the Government’s position remains that the instructions to the Fiscal Year 1992 Army Lieutenant Colonel Selective Early Retirement Board are legal, that the ruling in this case is not final and not yet subject to appeal by the Government, and that this ruling is controlling only in this specific litigation.

Title 10 United States Code, Section 611a (10 USC 611a) governs the convening of selection boards.  This provision of law states that, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the military department concerned, whenever the needs of the service require, shall convene selection boards to recommend for promotion to the next higher permanent grade officers on the active-duty list in permanent grade from first lieutenant through brigadier general in the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps, and from lieutenant (junior grade) through rear admiral (lower half) in the Navy.  

Title 10 United States Code, Section 615 (10 USC 615) governs information furnished to selection boards convened under 10 USC 611a.  This provision of law states that he Secretary of the military department concerned shall furnish, inter alia, “such other information and guidelines as may be necessary to enable the board to properly perform its functions.”

Title 10 United States Code, Section 628 (10 USC 628) governs special selection boards.  This law provides for consideration by special selection board in the case of officers not considered by a promotion board due administrative error (10 USC 628a) and in the case of officers considered in an unfair manner by a promotion board (10 USC 628b).  

Title 10 United States Code Section 628b provides that if the Secretary of a military department determines, in the case of a person considered but not selected by a promotion board, that there was material unfairness with respect to that person, then the Secretary concerned may convene a special selection board to determine if that person should be recommended for promotion.  Further, in order to determine if there was “material unfairness”, the Secretary must determine that:  A) the action of the promotion board which considered the person was contrary to law or involved material error of fact or material administrative error; or B) the board did not have before it for its consideration material information.

DISCUSSION:  Considering all the evidence, allegations, and information presented by the applicant, together with the evidence of record, applicable law and regulations, and advisory opinion(s), it is concluded:

1.  The Board reviewed the contentions of the applicant and his counsel wherein they assert that the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board was conducted illegally and unconstitutionally as a result of instructions to the promotion selection board to give preference to women and minorities.  Case law submitted in support of these contentions was also considered by the Board.

2.  The Board reviewed the provisions of Title 10 United States Code governing the convening of selection boards, information provided to selection boards and the convening of special selection boards. 

3.  The Board considered the advisory opinion rendered by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel as well as the comments and rebuttal to this advisory opinion furnished by the applicant and his counsel.

4.  The Board also reviewed the applicant’s record of performance.

5.  Notwithstanding the case law submitted by the applicant and his counsel to support their contentions, this Board noted that the instructions to promotion selection boards undergo legal reviews at the departmental level and there is no evidence that the equal opportunity instructions to Department of the Army promotion selection boards have been found legally objectionable during such reviews. 

6.  The Board noted counsel’s reference to Sirmans v. Caldera, but determined that this case is not controlling in this matter because the applicant is not similarly situated to the plaintiff.  Although the applicant is a Judge Advocate General’s Corps officer, he is not a lieutenant colonel seeking promotion to colonel.  Therefore, he was not considered by the same promotion selection board as the plaintiff in Sirmans v. Caldera and he was not a party to the out of court settlement in this case.

7.  In the matter of Christian v. United States, the Board determined again that this case law is not controlling.  The Board acknowledges that the senior judge has ruled in this case; however, the Board noted that the Court has not rendered its final ruling in this case and the Government has not exercised its option to appeal the final ruling once rendered.  As a result, the Board concluded that the senior judge’s ruling at his point is binding only in Christian v. United States.

8.  This Board noted that the selection rates for minority or gender groups were met through normal operation of the selection board process and that the procedures for reviewing and revoting records, which are deemed offensive by the applicant and his counsel, were not implemented in the case of the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps, Promotion Selection Board.  Therefore, this Board concludes that the contentions by the applicant and his counsel regarding the “illegal” and “unconstitutional” conduct of the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps, Promotion Selection Board are without merit.

9.  Based on review of the applicant’s OER’s, it is clear that he is a “center of mass” officer.  Further, his performance of military duties, as recorded in his OER’s, is not sufficiently meritorious or otherwise distinguished to convince the Board that the only reason he was not selected for promotion was due to the equal opportunity instructions contained in the Memorandum of Instruction to the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General Corps, Promotion Selection Board.  

10.  There is no indication that the applicant’s non-selection to lieutenant colonel was unjust or inequitable.  There also is no evidence of record which shows that the applicant’s non-selection was contrary to law or involved material error of fact or material administrative error or that material information was not before the promotion selection board.

11.  Based on the foregoing facts and conclusions in the two preceding paragraphs (9 and 10, above), the Board determined that the applicant has not provided conclusive evidence that the conduct or the results of the Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Board were flawed or otherwise improper.  The Board also determined that the applicant did not present conclusive evidence of a material error in his file at the time he was not selected for promotion by the Fiscal Year 1998 or Fiscal Year 1999 Lieutenant Colonel, Judge Advocate General’s Corps, Promotion Selection Boards.  Therefore, there is no basis for submitting the applicant’s records to a Special Selection Board. 

12.  In order to justify correction of a military record the applicant must show to the satisfaction of the Board, or it must otherwise satisfactorily appear, that the record is in error or unjust.  The applicant has failed to submit evidence that would satisfy this requirement.

13.  In view of the foregoing, there is no basis for granting the applicant's request.

DETERMINATION:  The applicant has failed to submit sufficient relevant evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable error or injustice.

BOARD VOTE:

________  ________  ________  GRANT

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

__JH____  __HBO__  __CLA___  DENY APPLICATION

		    Carl W. S. Chun
		    Director, Army Board for Correction
    of Military Records

INDEX

CASE ID	AR2000044082	
SUFFIX		
RECON	YYYYMMDD	
DATE BOARDED	20010405	
TYPE OF DISCHARGE	(HD, GD, UOTHC, UD, BCD, DD, UNCHAR)	
DATE OF DISCHARGE	YYYYMMDD	
DISCHARGE AUTHORITY	AR .  .  .  .  .  	
DISCHARGE REASON		
BOARD DECISION	(NC, GRANT , DENY, GRANT PLUS)	
REVIEW AUTHORITY	MR CHUN	
ISSUES         1.	131.0000.0000	
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.