PROCEEDINGS

	IN THE CASE OF:  

	BOARD DATE:           18 September 2001
	DOCKET NUMBER:   AR2001051454

	I certify that hereinafter is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in the case of the above-named individual.  

	Mr. Carl W. S. Chun		Director	
	Mr. Hubert S. Shaw, Jr.		Analyst	

  The following members, a quorum, were present:

	Ms. Joann Langston		Chairperson	
	Mr. Melvin H. Meyer		Member	
	Ms. Karen A. Heinz		Member	

	The applicant and counsel if any, did not appear before the Board.

	The Board considered the following evidence:

	Exhibit A - Application for correction of military 
                records
	Exhibit B - Military Personnel Records (including
	            advisory opinion, if any)

FINDINGS:

1.  The applicant has exhausted or the Board has waived the requirement for exhaustion of all administrative remedies afforded by existing law or regulations.

2.  The applicant requests, in effect, retroactive promulgation of orders with appropriate fund cites to permit reimbursement for travel, lodging and other expenses incurred during the period 9 July 1998 through 3 February 1999.

3.  The applicant states that he was ordered to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for 210 days with orders having no fund cite and Fort Bragg could not provide accommodations.  In support of his application, the applicant submitted a 7 October 1999 E-mail providing a statement of support from a major in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps who was the senior defense counsel at Fort Bragg during the period 15 June 1998 to July 1999; an 8 October 1999 letter from a member of Hunter Maclean Law firm to the Executive Officer of the Engineer Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division (3ID); an 11 June 1998 memorandum approving attachment of the applicant to XVIII Airborne Corps for the purpose of administration of military justice; a 7 July 1999 letter from the landlord of the quarters rented by the applicant at Fort Stewart, Georgia; an 8 July 1999 E-mail from the 3ID Adjutant General (AG) to the 3ID Inspector General with a response regarding accommodations for the applicant at Fort Bragg; a 30 August 1999 memorandum from the 3ID Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) forwarding the applicant’s claim for reimbursement to the SJA of XVIII Airborne Corps; a 29 September 1999 memorandum from the SJA of XVIII Airborne Corps denying the applicant’s request for reimbursement; a DA Form 1610 (Request and Authorization for TDY Travel of DOD Personnel), dated 24 June 1999, annotated as Travel Order 06567 for the applicant to proceed to Fort Bragg on 9 July 1998; an undated memorandum from the applicant through his chain of command to the Chief of Staff of the 3ID requesting compensation for the period 9 July 1998 through 3 February 1999; a chronology of events prepared by the applicant; XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 070-02, dated 2 July 1998, attaching the applicant to the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg; a copy of XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 013-01, dated 29 January 1999, amending the 2 July 1998 orders; XVIII Airborne Corps Court-Martial Order Number 18, dated 12 April 1999, showing the applicant was found not guilty of all charges and specifications; XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 103-04, dated 13 April 1999, releasing the applicant from attachment to the 20th Engineer Brigade; a 4 May 1999 request by the applicant [endorsed by the Commander of the 3ID Engineer Brigade to the Commanding General of the 3ID for appropriate compensation in the amount of $14, 036.18 for the period 9 July 1998 through 3 February 1999; an undated memorandum from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to a major in the 3ID Soldier Support Battalion (3ID SSB) whose duty position is not identified; a 5 April 2000 Settlement Certificate by the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA); a 22 May 2000 letter from the applicant to the Deputy Director for Systems and Procedures at DFAS appealing the Settlement Certificate by the DOHA; and a 22 September 1999 memorandum from DFAS to the SJA of XVIII Airborne Corps regarding the applicant’s claim.  Also included in support of his application, he submitted a package of documents which contain a 22 February 1999 memorandum for record; a 20 April 1999 E-mail between the 3ID Adjutant General and the Command Sergeant Major (CSM) of the 3ID SSB regarding review of the applicant’s travel claim, travel orders and preparation of travel vouchers; an unsigned and undated memorandum from the Chief of Staff of the 3ID to the Chief of Staff of XVIII Airborne Corps regarding reimbursement for lodging; a copy of the applicant’s 22 April 1999 request for appropriate compensation; a 25 June 1999 Endorsement by the Chief of Criminal Law at XVIII Airborne Corps supporting reimbursement for certain travel costs but denying reimbursement for any other costs; a copy of the DA Form 1610, dated 24 June 1999 [previously identified as Travel Order 06567]; a copy of two pages of a completed travel voucher; a copy of a DA Form 268 (Report to Suspend Favorable Personnel Actions (FLAG)) removing the applicant’s FLAG effective 26 March 1999; copies of two pages extracted from Army Regulation 600-8-105 (Military Orders); a second copy of the same DA Form 1610 previously identified; Travel Voucher Summaries prepared on 18 May 1999; a 13 October 1999 memorandum by the 20th Engineer Brigade Maintenance Officer describing the applicant’s duties while he was attached to that unit; and a copy of the applicant’s DA Form 67-9 (Officer Evaluation Report) covering the period 16 June 1998 through 15 June 1999.

4.  The applicant’s military records show that at the time in question the applicant was serving on active duty as a Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5).

5.  Evidence of record shows the applicant was assigned to the 3ID Engineer Brigade at Fort Stewart, Georgia, when he was investigated by the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command for offenses punishable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) which occurred while the applicant was assigned to a unit located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  By memorandum, dated 11 June 1998, the Commanding General of the 3ID concurred in the request of the Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps to attach the applicant to XVIII Airborne Corps “for the purpose of administration of military justice.”

6.  XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 070-02, dated 2 July 1998 attached the applicant to the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, effective 9 July 1998.  These orders showed the period of attachment as “Indefinite” and the purpose as “Pending legal investigation” and “Attached for Duty, UCMJ and Administration.”  The entry “NA” [not applicable] appeared after the heading of “Accounting classification”. 

7.  XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 013-01, dated 29 January 1999, amended XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 070-02, dated 2 July 1998 to change the “Purpose” of the orders to read “ATTACHED FOR UCMJ AND ADMINISTRATION” instead of “ATTACHED FOR DUTY, UCMJ AND ADMINISTRATION.”

8.  XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 103-04, dated 13 April 1999, released the applicant from attachment to the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg to “resume normal duties” at Fort Stewart, Georgia, effective 13 April 1999.

9.  A 22 February 1999 memorandum for record shows that a major assigned to the 3ID SSB contacted an official of the Travel Policy Section at DFAS to determine if travel entitlement was authorized based on the three orders issued to the applicant.  That DFAS representative determined that under paragraph U7450 (a) of the Joint Federal Travel Regulation (JFTR) the applicant had no entitlement to per diem and travel reimbursement.  This official at DFAS pointed out that the JFTR does not address travel reimbursement in an attached status, but that paragraph U7450(a) does address ordered travel for disciplinary actions. He also concluded that no reimbursement exists because there was no evidence of “official” travel supported by official orders for the period of time the applicant was attached for duty at Fort Bragg.

10.  Documentary evidence shows that, upon the applicant’s return to Fort Stewart, he submitted a claims, dated 22 April 1999 and 4 May 1999, for appropriate reimbursement for travel, lodging and other expenses incidental to the preparation of his defense against General Court-martial charges and for the court-martial proceeding itself.  In both claims, the applicant states that he complied with orders to travel from Fort Stewart to report for duty at Fort Bragg effective 9 July 1998.  He also stated that he made trips back an forth between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart which were necessitated by the fact that his defense counsel was located at Hunter Army Airfield which is adjacent to Fort Stewart, that witnesses and evidence were located at Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart and that the Article 32 hearing was conducted at both Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart.

11.  The applicant also stated that he returned to Fort Stewart on 3 February 1999 after his orders were amended by XVIII Airborne Corps to eliminate the requirement for the applicant to perform duty at Fort Bragg.  However, he returned to Fort Bragg without additional orders to attend his court-martial and subsequently returned to Fort Stewart on 29 March 1999 based on XVIII Airborne Corps orders ending his attachment to the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg. 

12.  The applicant also stated that he requested a speedy trial because of the financial burden placed on him due to his attachment to Fort Bragg and maintenance of two residences.  This resulted in amendment of his orders and his return to Fort Stewart for duty.  

13.  In his claim, the applicant also stated that, when he was issued orders to report to Fort Bragg, there was no housing available for a CW5 at Fort Bragg.  The applicant contends that the 3ID Inspector General confirmed this with the XVIII Airborne Corps Inspector General.  The applicant also stated to the 3ID Inspector General that he had a home in Fayetteville, North Carolina, in which his daughter lived while he was assigned at Fort Stewart.  The applicant argued in his claims that he should not be precluded from drawing per diem just because he had a home in Fayetteville in view of the fact that he had to maintain a residence at Fort Stewart.

14.  In conclusion, the applicant stated that he interpreted the Joint Travel Regulation to require that if he was away from his permanent duty station, then he had to be in a travel status.  He contends that no travel status was established because he did not execute a Permanent Change of Station to Fort Bragg and he did not receive a DD Form 1610 with his attachment orders to Fort Bragg.  

15.  The applicant’s 4 May 1999 request for appropriate compensation also indicated that he had obtained an estimate of such compensation from the military finance office at Fort Stewart, Georgia.  Paragraph 4 of this request states:  “Payment due appears to be, Per Diem ($6817.00), Mileage ($2219.18), and Lodging ($5000), for a total of $14036.18.”  Also submitted with this request is a DD Form 1610, dated 14 July 1999, which is completed with the expense information cited above, but which does not contain a funding citation and is not authenticated.  Also attached to this request is a DD Form 1351-2 (Travel Voucher or Subvoucher) covering all the applicant’s travel and expenses for the period 9 July 1998 through 29 March 1999.

16.  By 2nd Endorsement, dated 25 June 1999, the Chief of Criminal Law Division of the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA responded to the applicant’s 4 May 1999 request for appropriate compensation and provided a completed and authenticated DD Form 1610 (identified as Travel Order Number 06567, dated 24 June 1999) showing estimated costs for Per Diem in the amount of $1,146.60 and for Travel in the amount of $1020.00 amounting to a total estimated cost of $2,166.60.  The DD Form 1610 also authorized use of privately owned conveyance at the rate of 32.5 cents per mile and stated in item 16 (Remarks): “Government Rations and quarters are not available.  Soldier does not have a government credit card.  Soldier is not authorized a rental car.”

17.  Paragraph 2 of this response by the Chief of the Criminal Law Division at XVIII Airborne Corps authorized the following travel in item 11 (Itinerary):

	“a.  9 Jul 98: Travel from Fort Stewart to Fort Bragg;
	 b.  26-30 Jul 98:  Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	 c.  23-24 Aug 98:  Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	 d.  7-9 Sep 98:  Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	 e.  14-19 Sep 98: Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	  f.  3 Feb 99:  Travel from Fort Bragg to Fort Stewart;
	 g.  18-29 Mar 99 Round-trip travel between Fort Stewart and Fort Bragg.”

18.  The Chief of the Criminal Law Division also advised the applicant to submit his travel voucher through the Office of the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA for administrative review prior to forwarding it for settlement.  Further, the Chief of the Criminal Law Division stated:  “3.  Your request for reimbursement of any other expenses, to include per diem allowances, arising out of your attachment to 20th Engineer Brigade, Fort Bragg, is hereby denied.  The Joint Federal Travel Regulations do not authorize payment of per diem allowance during the period of your attachment to 20th Engineer Brigade.”

19.  The review of the applicant’s request for compensation concluded with instructions on how to appeal this decision by writing to the Chief of the Criminal Law Division at XVIII Airborne Corps.  The applicant was also advised that ultimately he could appeal to the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals. 

20.  At 12:56 p.m. on 25 June 1999 the applicant submitted by “telefax” a signed DD Form 1351 (two pages) listing his travel for the period 9 July 1998 through 29 March 1999 to the Office of the SJA at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  The Chief of the Criminal Law Division in the Office of the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA authenticated the DD Form 1351 as the approving officer.  This DD Form 1351 shows the applicant’s travel as the same travel authorized in item 11 (Itinerary) of the DD Form 1610.  Item 18 (Reimbursable Expenses) of the DD Form 1351 shows the entry “Not completed per instructions MEMO DATE 25 JUN 99.”  The continuation page of the DD Form 1351 contains the same entry under reimbursable expenses. 

21.  On 28 June 1999, the major at the 3ID SSB received a DFAS memorandum, (subject:  Request for Reimbursement) in response to the applicant’s request for appropriate reimbursement.  This memorandum was prepared by the Operations NCO [noncommissioned officer] of the Systems and Procedures Finance Directorate and stated that the applicant was “not entitled to travel and transportation allowances based on the attachment orders and amendments contained in this packet.”  This DFAS official further stated that conditions described in the applicant’s request indicated “a travel status existed for 
July 9, 1998, through some date in January, 1999, for which authorized travel orders, permanent change of station (PCS) and temporary duty should be issued.”  In support of this conclusion the DFAS official cited Volume 1, paragraph U2200, of the JFTR which states that members are in a travel status while performing travel away from the permanent duty station on public business under competent travel orders and that such travel begins when members leave the point of departure and return to the points of arrival at the conclusion of their trip.  The DFAS official also pointed out that Paragraph U2100 of the JFTR states that a written travel order is used for reimbursement of travel and transportation expenses directing a member to travel between designated points.  The Operations NCO of the Systems and Procedures Finance Directorate of DFAS concluded:  
	a.  The applicant’s moves from Fort Stewart to Fort Bragg in July 1998 and from Fort Bragg to Fort Stewart in January 1999 were permanent change of station (PCS) moves based on the seven months he was assigned to Fort Bragg. Therefore, Fort Stewart should issue PCS orders directing the applicant to travel from Fort Stewart to Fort Bragg on 8 July 1998 rather than attachment orders since the applicant was in an authorized travel status.  Fort Bragg should issue PCS travel orders returning the applicant to Fort Stewart in January 1999.  The applicant is entitled to travel and transportation allowances described in the JFTR, Volume 1, Chapter 5, for his PCS moves with proper PCS orders.

	b.  Temporary Duty (TDY) orders authorizing official travel are required for the applicant’s trips between Fort Bragg, Fort Stewart and Fort Benning.  The issuance of orders to seek legal counsel appear to be at the order authorizing official’s discretion.  TDY orders should have been issued at Fort Bragg to attend the Article 32 investigation since the applicant was directed to travel from Fort Bragg to Fort Stewart.  In summary the applicant is entitled to travel and transportation allowances for his TDY trips with proper TDY orders.

22.  The applicant presented a 7 July 1999 memorandum (subject:  Statement of Rental Agreement) from his landlord which attested to the fact that the applicant maintained his residence in Hinesville, Georgia, at a monthly payment of $450.

23.  By memorandum, dated 30 August 1999, the 3ID SJA forwarded a claim for reimbursement on behalf of the applicant to the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA.  In his memorandum, the 3ID SJA noted that various finance experts have come to different conclusions regarding the entitlement to payment and the documentation and orders required for reimbursement.  However, the applicant’s chain of command and the 3ID SJA have encouraged the applicant to make “an all encompassing, good faith claim for any and all expenses that he has incurred with the understanding that your office [XVIII Airborne Corps SJA] will provide appropriate orders and administrative support, adjudicate the claim, and pay what you deem proper.  [The applicant’s name omitted] will then be able to appeal denial of any claimed expenses that he continues to believe are authorized.”  The 3ID SJA also pointed out that the applicant has consulted with finance personnel regarding the orders issued by the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA, dated 24 June 1999 and identified as Travel Orders 06567, and has determined that those orders are “inadequate.”  He believes that he should be tendered orders prepared like the 14 July 1999 orders, which he had prepared as a sample, and requires only the addition of a fund cite in item 19 (Accounting Citation).  The 3ID SJA requested that the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA review the merits of this claim and issue or modify orders and make any other administrative changes as are appropriate.  In concluding, the 3ID SJA noted that the crux of the issue is that the applicant was required to maintain two households and to travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart to consult with his defense counsel.  The applicant and his chain of command believe that he should be reimbursed for the costs of maintaining the second household and traveling between two locations.  The 3ID SJA also points out that the applicant is requesting appropriate orders and is submitting his claim form with the intent of receiving that reimbursement.  The attached DD Form 1610 shows under item 7 (Type of Orders) the entry TDY and in item 10 (Approximate Number of Days of TDY) the entry “210”.  Item 11 (Itinerary) shows the entries:  “Travel from Ft Stewart, GA to Fort Bragg, NC and Return”, Soldier is authorized to travel from Ft Bragg, NC to Fort Stewart,GA” and the block “Variation Authorized” contains an “X”.  Item 14 (Estimated Cost) shows the estimated cost of Per Diem at $6817.00, the estimated cost of Travel as $2219.21, and estimated other costs as $5000, for a total of $14036.18.  Item 16 (Remarks) contains the entries that government meals and quarters are not available, the soldier does not have a government credit card and is not authorized a rental car.  The final entries in item 16 are that POV [privately owned vehicle] is authorized and that “total miles one way” is 293 miles.

24.  By memorandum dated 22 September 1999, the Deputy Director for Systems and Procedures at DFAS advised the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA that the previous opinion (28 June 1999) by the Operations NCO of the Systems and Procedures Finance Directorate of DFAS had been reviewed in conjunction with rulings from the DOHA and Comptroller General of the United States and consultation with the General Counsel of DFAS.  The Deputy Director stated that the applicant has no travel orders for his travel from Fort Stewart to Fort Bragg and a TDY travel orders should be prepared to support the travel from Fort Stewart to Fort Bragg.  However, the Deputy Director concluded that, based on DOHA ruling, Comptroller General Decisions, and the JFTR, it appears that there are no travel and transportation allowances payable pursuant to the travel performed, even with a valid TDY order.  

25.  The Deputy Director for Systems and Procedures at DFAS cited paragraph U7450 of the JFTR which states that “payment of per diem, while traveling or while at the disciplinary action point, isn’t authorized.”  The Deputy Director further explained that the original DFAS opinion was based on the premise that travel did not become disciplinary travel until the member was found guilty of an offense and was sent to receive/perform discipline such as incarceration or hard labor.  However, he pointed out that the Comptroller General ruled in B-170827 (12 October 1970) and B-17664 (11 April 1973) that travel to attend a court-martial was disciplinary travel and should be paid pursuant to paragraph U7450 of the JFTR.  The Deputy Director also pointed out that this interpretation was supported by Comptroller General Decision B-256663 (9 November 1994) and by the DOHA in claim number 96070227.  Then he stated that travel and transportation allowances are paid based on valid orders, but that orders cannot create an entitlement not otherwise available in the JFTR which is a statutory regulation.  Additionally, the Deputy Director wrote that decisions of the Comptroller General and the DOHA are binding on the Department of Defense and have the force and effect of law.

26.  The Deputy Director for Systems and Procedures at DFAS concluded his discussion of payment of the applicant’s per diem by stating that no per diem is payable based on decisions of the Comptroller General and the DOHA that the travel performed by the applicant to Fort Bragg was “disciplinary in nature” and   not public business.  However, the Deputy Director pointed out that Comptroller General Decisions provide that gas and oil expended during travel enroute to the disciplinary action point are reimbursable, but noted that the records at DFAS did not contain receipts or other acceptable evidence of these expenses in the applicant’s case.

27.  The Deputy Director for Systems and Procedures at DFAS then discussed the matter of the applicant’s return trips between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart for the purpose of consulting with his appointed defense counsel.  The Deputy Director states that “the legal community has informed us that it is normal practice for the attorney to go to the member, not the member to the attorney.”  This DFAS official acknowledged that a soldier on TDY is authorized voluntary returns to the Permanent Duty Station (PDS) in accordance with paragraph U4130 of the JFTR; however, a cost comparison must be made between the cost of remaining at the TDY site and the cost of returning to the PDS and only the lesser amount can be reimbursed.  But the Deputy Director further concluded that, in light of the normal practice of the attorney going to his client and absent any documented requirement to the contrary, the applicant’s trips to Fort Stewart were voluntary returns instead of required returns and entitlements should be computed accordingly.

28.  In a Settlement Certificate, dated 5 April 2000, the DOHA allowed “reimbursement for the fuel and oil expenses of [the applicant’s] travel between Forts Bragg and Stewart on certain occasions.”  The DOHA also “disallowed per diem for the period at issue.”  In discussion of the facts related to this case, the DOHA essentially restated the facts regarding the applicant’s posting at Fort Bragg including the fact that he was attached to the 20th Engineer Brigade, lived in a house that he and his wife owned but was occupied by a relative, that defense counsel was not available for him at Fort Bragg and he was ironically assigned defense counsel from Fort Stewart, that counsel could not travel to meet with the applicant at Fort Bragg due to a heavy case load and lack of TDY funds, and that the applicant was returned to Fort Stewart when the military judge asked for an explanation for the applicant’s continued attachment at Frot Bragg when his defense counsel was located at Fort Stewart.  The DOHA Settlement Certificate also acknowledges that the applicant was found “not guilty on all four charges and six specifications, the other four specifications having been previously dismissed.”  The DOHA adjudicator also noted that Fort Bragg, in an attempt to reimburse the applicant, had issued three travel orders:  one on 24 June 1999 for travel between Forts Bragg and Stewart on 9 July, 26-30 July 1998; 23 July to August 24 1998; 7-9 and 14-19 September 1998; 3 February 1999 and 18-29 March 1999 with travel by POV at $032.5 per mile and “per diem authorized in accordance with the JTR.”  The second order was requested on 27 September 1999, issued on 30 September 1999 and provided confirmatory orders for approximately six days of TDY at Fort Stewart beginning on or about 14 September 1998 with travel by POV at $0.31 per mile and per diem authorized “in accordance with JTR.”  The third order was requested on 27 September 1999, issued on 30 September 1999, and provided confirmatory orders for approximately 12 days of TDY at Fort Bragg beginning on or about 18 March 1999 with travel by POV at $0.31 per mile and per diem authorized “in accordance with JTR.”

29.  In its discussion of the case, the DOHA noted that DFAS determined the applicant was entitled to reimbursement for oil and gasoline for travel between Forts Bragg and Stewart, but was not entitled to per diem and mileage.  It was also noted that the applicant reiterated his claim to DFAS by memorandum dated 2 November 1999 and that DFAS referred the claim to the DOHA for adjudication.  In that claim, the applicant submitted a travel voucher for 22 one-way trips between Forts Stewart and Bragg.  He also claimed $450.00 per month for rent during the period July 1998 through January 1999, a total of $3,150.00.  The claim also requested that in the event per diem was disallowed that it be considered for submission to Congress under the Meritorious Claims Act.

30.  The first issue addressed by the DOHA adjudicator was whether the applicant’s attachment on TDY to Fort Bragg was primarily for disciplinary reasons or for duty purposes.  Notwithstanding the fact that the attachment orders stated “Duty” in the purpose block, the DOHA found that the impetus for the applicant’s assignment to Fort Bragg was for disciplinary purposes.  The adjudicator then cited paragraph U7450A of the JFTR which states in part:  “When a member is ordered to travel for disciplinary action:  if a POC [privately-owned conveyance] is used for the ordered travel, the member shall be reimbursed only for the cost of gas and oil.  Payment of mileage isn’t authorized.”

31.  The DOHA adjudicator addressed the orders published governing the applicant’s travel during the period in question.  He concluded that Orders Number 070-02 was for all practical purposes a travel order which was missing detailed information normally included in such orders.  He also noted that the chain of command attempted to correct the lack of information through publication of additional orders which were in error by authorizing mileage at the rates of $0.325 and $0.31 contrary to paragraph U7450-A of the JFTR.  The adjudicator, therefore, concluded that the mileage portion of those orders were ineffective.  However, he did allow reimbursement for the fuel and oil costs of all trips which were covered by orders and denied reimbursement for those trips not covered by orders, specifically those trips on 23-29 August 1998, 5-8 October 1998, 9-12 November 1998, 19-22 December 1998, and 12-13 January 1999.  

32.  The DOHA adjudicator addressed the matter of per diem.  He stated that paragraph U7450-A clearly prohibits payment of per diem for periods of disciplinary travel and TDY.  Thusly, he concluded that the applicant may not be paid any per diem for the period at issue and he observed that he is not aware of any other provision under which the applicant could be reimbursed for his lodging, meals and other incidental living expenses for that period. 

33.  The DOHA adjudicator also addressed the matter of per diem during trips by the applicant from Fort Bragg to Fort Stewart and return which were characterized by other agencies as “voluntary returns” to the applicant’s PDS.  He asserted that this matter was governed by paragraph U4130-A of the JFTR and that under this regulation no reimbursement is authorized.  The adjudicator based this conclusion on the fact that reimbursement would be based on the lesser of (a) per diem or actual expenses allowance, plus transportation expenses, for travel between the TDY location and the PDS or (b) the per diem or actual expenses allowance had the member stayed at the TDY location.  Since the adjudicator already determined that the applicant was not authorized per diem and mileage because he was ordered to travel for disciplinary action in accordance with paragraph U7450-A, then the costs at the TDY location (Fort Bragg) were “$0”, the lesser amount is also $0; and, therefore, the amount payable would also be $0. 

34.  The DOHA adjudicator further concluded that the trips discussed in paragraph 32, above, cannot be considered “voluntary returns.”  He noted that the applicant was assigned to Fort Bragg, but his officially assigned counsel was assigned at Fort Stewart and could not travel to meet his client due to case load and funding restrictions.  The adjudicator argued that the applicant had to travel to Fort Stewart to meet with his counsel to build an effective defense and that a number of these trips were also officially endorsed through later travel orders.

35.  The DOHA adjudicator also addressed the request to submit the applicant’s claim to Congress under the Meritorious Claims Act in the event the DOHA did not allow per diem or other compensation.  He cited the Meritorious Claims Act (Section 3702(d), Title 31, United States Code):  

	“The official responsible under subsection (a) for settling the claim shall report to Congress on a claim against the government that is timely presented under this section that may not be adjusted by using an existing appropriation, and that the official believes Congress should consider for legal or equitable reasons.  The report shall include the recommendations of the official.”

36.  The adjudicator also stated that beside the statutory requirement for “legal and equitable reasons” as a basis for consideration of the claim by Congress, a claim has to be “unusual or extraordinary” to warrant submission to Congress as affirmed in decisions by the Comptroller General.  The adjudicator then cited the General Accounting Office (Com.Gen.157 (1973)):

	The remedy afforded by the Act is limited to extraordinary circumstances, and the cases reported by the GAO to the Congress generally have involved equitable circumstances of an unusual nature and which are unlikely to constitute a recurring problem, since to report to Congress a particular case when similar equities exist or are likely to arise with respect to other claimants would constitute preferential treatment over others in similar circumstances.”  

37.  Thus, the DOHA adjudicator concluded, based on the foregoing, that preferential treatment of one claimant from many similarly situated claimants (actual or potential should not be afforded under the meritorious Claims Act.  Although the adjudicator admits that referral of the applicant’s claim can be made on equitable grounds, “notably his complete acquittal”, the record does not show that his claim is “unusual or extraordinary.”  The adjudicator states that “Travel and TDY for disciplinary reasons is not unusual or extraordinary.  The acquittal of members on some or all charges is not unusual or extraordinary either.  Therefore, we decline to refer [the applicant’s] claim to the Congress under the Meritorious Claims Act.”

38.  By letter, dated 22 May 2000, the applicant appealed the decision of the DOHA to the Deputy Director for Systems and Procedures at DFAS.  In his appeal, the applicant pointed out that the Commanding General of XVIII Airborne Corps requested the applicant be attached to Fort Bragg (ultimately the 20th Engineer Brigade), but he received orders with no fund cite and rations and quarters were not provided.  The applicant also states that because he was under suspension of favorable personnel action he could not move his family back to Fort Bragg with him and was forced into the situation of maintaining two residences, one at Fort Stewart (his PDS) and one at Fort Bragg (his TDY station).

39.  The applicant also contends in his appeal that neither he nor his chain of command knew at the time that the JFTR provisions considered an investigation a disciplinary action which would prevent him from receiving per diem and mileage.  The applicant contends that had his chain of command known this beforehand, then they would not have allowed him to be attached to Fort Bragg for duty.  The applicant also asserts that there was nothing that required his presence at Fort Bragg except for the Article 32 hearing held on 
22-23 August 1998 and the court-martial held on 18-2 March 1999.  He also points out that his defense counsel was also stationed at Fort Stewart and that his command at Fort Stewart also continued to assign work to him.  The applicant concluded that in hindsight he spent six months at Fort Bragg for no legitimate military purpose 

40.  The applicant concluded his appeal with justification for forwarding his claim under the Meritorious Claims Act to the Congress for consideration.  He contends that his case should be considered under the Meritorious Claims Act to prevent situations similar to his from occurring in the future, specifically the selective application of the JFTR to certain individuals who are under investigation.  The applicant asserts that there are numerous cases where soldiers under investigation are placed on TDY with per diem and provided transportation, lodging, subsistence and proper legal representation.

41.  The applicant provided a statement from the Senior Defense Counsel at Fort Bragg during the period June 1998 to June 1999.  In summary, this officer, a major of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps stated that his office was severely short defense counsels at the time the applicant was sent to Fort Bragg.  He stated that there also five or six other soldiers at Fort Bragg who were being tried at the same time as the applicant and they required separate counsel, so he had to request additional counsel through the Regional Defense Counsel.  The major also stated that the applicant was assigned a particular captain from Hunter Army Airfield because he was very experienced, but that assignment of this defense counsel created some unusual “challenges” for the applicant because “his defense counsel and numerous witnesses were at Stewart [Fort Stewart] and several other key witnesses and evidence were located in and around Fort Bragg.  CPT R—d [the applicant’s assigned defense counsel located at Fort Stewart] was exceptionally busy given the shortage of counsel throughout the region and, frankly, it would make no sense for him [CPT R—d] to travel to Bragg [Fort Bragg] for short conversations/interviews/review of pieces of evidence given the travelling distance for this one case.  It had to have made more sense in terms of economy of time for [the applicant] to do much of the travelling.  I can also tell you that there [were] issues of support from XVIII Airborne Corps SJA office on funding for [the applicant’s] counsel.  Specifically, because CPT R—d had so many other cases and this case was so big, a second counsel [CPT H—e], from Hunter Army Airfield was added to [the applicant’s] defense team.  My recollect is that the Corps SJA [XVIII Airborne Corps SJA] refused to provide funding for this second counsel.”

42.  In addition to stating the preceding facts, the Senior Defense Counsel provided his opinion that “the Government should never have tried that case.  It was a travesty that [the applicant] was subjected to the embarrassment and financial hardship the case imposed upon him.  It is an even greater tragedy that [the applicant] has to fight to get reimbursed for his expenses after successfully defending himself.  If there is any way he can recoup the money he was forced to spend to defend himself we should reimburse him.  Our Army leadership spends a lot of time mentoring about doing what is right.  Paying this man, with over 30 years of service to this country, for his expenses to defend himself before a court-martial his command did not want to do in the first place is the right thing to do.”  

43.  The applicant also submitted a letter of support from the former trial defense counsel at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, who now practices law in a firm located in Savannah, Georgia.  In summary, the applicant’s former defense counsel stated that Fort Stewart did not want to prosecute the applicant due to lack of evidence, but XVIII Airborne Corps elected to pursue the case; that the applicant was needed to be at Fort Stewart on a number of occasions because a significant amount of physical evidence and a number of witnesses were at Fort Stewart; the whole process could have ended at the conclusion of the Article 32 investigation because it was recommended that the matter be disposed of at a level below general court-martial; he does not challenge the Corps Commander’s authority to proceed to court-martial, but the applicant should have been reimbursed for his expenses as a result of this decision; we would not have had half the defense that we presented had it not been for the applicant’s travel back to Fort Stewart on numerous occasions; XVIII Airborne Corps SJA refused to pay for my TDY because they “felt only one defense attorney was needed for the trip”; the regional defense counsel argued on behalf of the applicant’s defense team, but this argument “fell on deaf ears”; this refusal cut off our ability to jointly represent the applicant and compelled him therefore to travel to Fort Stewart; and contrary to argument set forth that counsel travels to the client, it was common for the respondents to travel to the defense counsel’s location due to the shortage of defense counsel, their case loads and the large geographic area covered.  In conclusion, the applicant’s former defense counsel stated:  “The blame for [the applicant’s] situation does not lie with his immediate commanders. It is, however, due to the individuals outside the command, who influence this process, who are causing one of our Army’s most senior and knowledgeable current active duty members to be treated like a criminal.  I do not know if the JFTR expressly authorizes funding for [the applicant] under this situation, however, under the circumstances it should.  If it does not, the individuals who placed [the applicant] on orders to remain at Fort Bragg should bear the responsibility.  Someone needs to step up to the plate, admit a mistake was made and reimburse [the applicant].”

44.  The Brigade Maintenance Officer of the 20th Engineer Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, prepared a 13 October 1999 memorandum which stated the applicant’s duties while he was attached to that unit and attested to the fact that the applicant traveled to Fort Stewart with the permission of the 20th Engineer Brigade chain of command and only to meet with counsel or pick up documents and evidence related to his court-martial.  

45.  At the request of the staff of the ABCMR, the applicant submitted by telefax a statement attesting to the fact that he has only requested reimbursement for costs of gas and oil for trips to and from Fort Stewart and Fort Bragg for travel completed between 9 July 1998 and 29 March 1999.  The applicant also submitted a TDY [Temporary Duty] Settlement Voucher, dated 8 May 1999, which shows that he was reimbursed $350.00 for fuel per Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals findings (DOHA Claim Number 00030607).  

46.  Paragraph U2100 of the Joint Federal Travel Regulation (JFTR) discusses travel orders and states that a travel order used for reimbursement of travel and transportation expenses is a written document issued or approved by the Secretarial Process directing a member or a group of members to travel between designated points. The travel order establishes the conditions for official travel and transportation at Government expense, and provides the basis for the traveler's reimbursement. A travel order should be issued before the travel is performed.  Reimbursement for travel is not authorized when the travel is performed before receipt of written or oral orders. 

47.  Paragraph U2115 of the JFTR governs orders for travel and reimbursement and defines the types of travel orders.  A written order issued by competent authority is required for reimbursement of expenses incident to official travel. For the purpose of reimbursement, a written order that quotes or references an authority authorized to initiate the order is a competent order.  Oral orders are rendered when an urgent or unusual situation may require that official travel begin or be performed before a written order can be issued. Under these circumstances an oral order, conveyed by any medium including telephone, may be given. When this occurs, the order-issuing official shall promptly issue a confirmatory written order. 

48.  Paragraph U7450 governs those situations when a member is ordered to travel for disciplinary action.  Part A governs travel:  

	1.  a Government conveyance shall be used, if available; or 

	2.  if a Government conveyance is not available, the member shall be directed to use Government-procured transportation; or 

	3.  if Government-procured transportation is not available the member shall be reimbursed for the actual cost of personally procured common carrier transportation for the mode of transportation used; or 

	4.  if a POC is used for the ordered travel, the member shall be reimbursed only for the cost of gas and oil. Payment of mileage is not authorized. Payment of per diem, while traveling or while at the disciplinary action point is not authorized. 

49.  Paragraph U7450 of the JFTR governs those situations when a member is ordered to travel for disciplinary action.  Part B of this provision governs meals and states that the member shall be directed to use meal tickets, if available.  If meal tickets are not available, a member who personally procures meals during actual travel shall be reimbursed for meal costs not to exceed the values in paragraph U5018.

50.  Paragraph U5018 of the JFTR provides the maximum rates of reimbursement for meals for individuals ordered to travel for disciplinary action as specified in Paragraph U7450.  Effective 22 January 1997, the maximum rate per meal per member shall not exceed the applicable amount below. Meals may be acquired at lower cost.  The Meal Rates are: Morning $6; Noon $6; and Evening $16.

51.  Paragraph U4125 of the JFTR, in pertinent part, provides for the proportional meal rate to be used when a uniformed service member is at a TDY location and adequate Government quarters are not available at the installation to which the applicant is assigned TDY.  Appendix D shows the meal rates applicable to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the time the applicant was attached there as $32.00 per day.

CONCLUSIONS:

1.  The Board reviewed in detail the applicant’s request for reimbursement for travel, lodging and other expenses incurred during the period 9 July 1998 through 3 February 1999.

2.  The Board also considered the opinions, decisions and reimbursement actions resulting from claims submitted by the applicant to DFAS and the DOHA. 

3.  During review of all pertinent evidence, the Board noted the following:  

	a.  The chain of command of the 3ID, located at Fort Stewart, Georgia, reviewed the Criminal Investigation Command report of investigation regarding several offenses of larceny, stealing and false swearing related to control of a Government credit card and Government equipment by several soldiers including the applicant.  The applicant’s chain of command determined that there was insufficient evidence to try the applicant by court-martial for these offenses.

	b.  The Commanding General of the XVIII Airborne Corps personally interceded and requested the applicant be attached to XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, some 300 miles by ground from Fort Stewart, Georgia.  The stated reason for this attachment was “for the purpose of administration of military justice.”

	c.   XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 070-02, dated 2 July 1998 attached the applicant to the 20th Engineer at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, effective 9 July 1998.  These orders showed the period of attachment as “Indefinite and the purpose as “Pending legal investigation” and “Attached for Duty, UCMJ and Administration.”  There was no accounting classification data on these orders.  

	d.  The same XVIII Airborne Corps orders attaching the applicant to the 20th Engineer at Fort Bragg remained in effect for approximately seven months until amended by XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 013-01, dated 29 January 1999, to change the “Purpose” of the orders to read “ATTACHED FOR UCMJ AND ADMINISTRATION” instead of “ATTACHED FOR DUTY, UCMJ AND ADMINISTRATION.”

	e.  Evidence shows that the applicant traveled to Fort Bragg on or about 9 July 1998 as ordered and was charged on 21 July 1999 for various offenses already described.  As was his right, the applicant sought defense counsel at Fort Bragg but, since none was available at Fort Bragg, the Office of the Regional Defense Counsel assigned the applicant counsel who happened to be located at Fort Stewart where the applicant was assigned prior to attachment to Fort Bragg.

	f.  An article 32 investigation was conducted at two locations, on site at Fort Bragg and also on site at Fort Stewart.  Subsequently, the general court-martial convening authority determined that the applicant among others would be tried by general court-martial which was eventually conducted during the latter part of March 1999 at Fort Bragg.

	g.  XVIII Airborne Corps Court-Martial Order Number 18, dated 12 April 1999, shows the applicant was found not guilty of all charges and specifications and XVIII Airborne Corps Orders 103-04, dated 13 April 1999, released the applicant from attachment to the 20th Engineer Brigade, thereby enabling his return to his unit at Fort Stewart.

	h.  Records show that the applicant claimed official travel for several trips back and forth from Fort Stewart to Fort Bragg and from Fort Bragg to Fort Stewart necessitated by the fact that his defense counsel was located at Fort Stewart and that witnesses and evidence were located at both Fort Stewart and Fort Bragg.

	i.  The applicant admitted that, during the time he was attached to Fort Bragg, he lived in a house in Fayetteville, North Carolina, which he owned, but which was rented to his daughter.

	j.  Records provided voluntarily by the applicant show that he was reimbursed by DFAS for $350.00 for fuel as the result of a claim approved in part by the DOHA.
	k.  The DOHA, based on Comptroller General decisions and provisions of the JFTR, denied the applicant reimbursement for per diem for the period the applicant was attached and was present at Fort Bragg because it was determined to be disciplinary travel.

4.  Based on review of all pertinent evidence, the Board concluded that:

	a.  Competent authority ordered the applicant to travel to Fort Bragg and subsequently attached him to the 20th Engineer Brigade for “Duty, UCMJ and Administration.”  However, officials executing these instructions did not provide transportation, meals and lodging or in the alternative proper orders authorizing reimbursement for expenses for travel, rations and lodging at the time the applicant was ordered to travel to Fort Bragg.

	b.  The officials executing the orders of the Commanding General of XVIII Airborne Corps also did not determine whether or not defense counsel was available at Fort Bragg for the applicant.  When it was discovered that defense counsel for the applicant was not available at Fort Bragg, Army officials assigned a defense counsel stationed at Fort Stewart to the applicant.  This lack of prior coordination and planning by officials at Fort Bragg necessitated travel back and forth between Forts Bragg and Stewart by the applicant when in fact he could have remained at Fort Stewart collocated with his defense counsel and traveled to Fort Bragg as necessary.  The Board concluded that the Army placed the applicant in the difficult position of paying living and travel expenses out of his own pocket without reimbursement or giving up his rights to be present at the Article 32 investigation and to consult with his appointed defense counsel.  Therefore, the Army bears responsibility for its decisions which resulted in highly inequitable and unjust treatment of the applicant.

	c.  Notwithstanding the determination based on paragraph U7450 of the JFTR that the applicant was performing disciplinary travel and was, therefore, not entitled to per diem during the period of his attachment to Fort Bragg, the Board has determined that officials at XVIII Airborne Corps in ordering the applicant to Fort Bragg were obligated to provide the applicant with government transportation, quarters and rations for the duration of the applicant’s attachment to Fort Bragg or in the alternative adequate orders to reimburse the applicant for expenses for travel, lodging and meals during that period of attachment away from his duty station.  Failure to do any of these, in the opinion of the Board constituted inequitable and unjust treatment of an Army officer.

	d.  The determination that the applicant was attached to Fort Bragg for disciplinary action when he had not been charged is also inequitable, unjust and prejudicial in view of the fact that our justice system presupposes that a person is innocent until proven guilty by a jury of his peers.  Furthermore, the applicant remained attached to Fort Bragg for “duty” without reimbursement for any expenses pending disciplinary action which did not occur until he was tried before a general court-martial at Fort Bragg nine months after his attachment there.  Finally, the applicant was required to travel back and forth between Forts Bragg and Stewart just to attend the Article 32 investigation and just to be able to consult with his defense counsel which are both his rights under the law.

	e.  It is interesting to note that paragraph U7451 of the JFTR (immediately following the paragraph used to deny the applicant travel and per diem based on disciplinary travel) applies to travel and transportation of prisoners and their guards.  This paragraph provides that a military guard is authorized reimbursement for transportation, lodging, and meals incurred on behalf of a prisoner, absentee, straggler, or deserter who has made no prior arrangements, and lacks funds to purchase necessary items.  Total reimbursement for meals and lodging shall not exceed per diem or actual expense allowances computed under Chapter 4, Part B or C.   Further reimbursement for transportation is authorized for the actual amount of personal funds spent on behalf of the prisoner, absentee, straggler, or deserter.  Subparagraph 1 describes the travel and transportation allowances for prisoners and Part N for allowances for absentees, stragglers, and deserters being moved between U.S. installations.  It is clear to the Board that the Army provides for the transportation, lodging and meals for a prisoner already convicted and those soldiers who are absentees, stragglers, and deserters.  But it is unconscionable, in this case, that the Army failed to provide for the transportation, lodging and meals for a soldier with over 30 years of service who was not guilty of anything and was complying with the request of the lieutenant general in command of XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg.  

	f.  There is no basis for the applicant’s claim for reimbursement for $450.00 per month as a lodging expense because he did not pay any out of pocket costs for lodging at Fort Bragg and resided at his quarters at Fort Stewart at no additional cost when he was at that location.  Evidence of record shows that prior to attachment to Fort Bragg, the applicant was making a mortgage payment on a house he owned in Fayetteville, North Carolina, and was also paying rent in the amount of $450.00 for quarters occupied by his wife and himself at Fort Stewart. Those expenses did not change when the applicant was attached to Fort Bragg.  Records show that the applicant lived in the house he owned in Fayetteville, North Carolina, while attached to Fort Bragg.  The JFTR specifically precludes reimbursement for lodging with a relative or any other lodging where the service member pays no costs.

	g.  The applicant was reimbursed $350 for the cost of fuel for his trips claimed as official travel between Forts Bragg and Stewart and this reimbursement was based on the maximum allowable without receipts, not actual expenses, since the applicant could not produce receipts to prove the actual expense incurred.  In view of the rate allowed under the JFTR for travel by privately owned conveyance it is obvious that the applicant paid substantially more than he was reimbursed by the decision of the DOHA.

	e.  The applicant was not reimbursed for meals on the days he resided at Fort Bragg during the period of his attachment there and he was not reimbursed for meals during his travel between Forts Bragg and Stewart.  

	f.  The Comptroller General has determined that travel pursuant to a court-martial is disciplinary travel and should be paid pursuant to paragraph U7450 of the JFTR.  That paragraph of the JFTR allows reimbursement for fuel as acknowledged by DFAS and the DOHA.  However, those agencies also failed to acknowledge that the applicant is entitled to reimbursement for meals as authorized by paragraph U7450 in accordance with rates under paragraph U5018 of the JFTR.

5.   Based on the preceding, the Board has determined as a matter of equity, the applicant is entitled to partial reimbursement for expenses incurred during this period attachment.   The basis for this determination is that the applicant has been treated inequitably, unjustly and prejudicially by the Army which failed to provide proper orders to the applicant when he was directed to report for duty at Fort Bragg, by officials at Fort Bragg who failed to assure defense counsel was available at Fort Bragg when they ordered him there, by officials at Fort Bragg who failed to order the applicant back to Fort Stewart when the defense counsel provided to him was located at Fort Stewart, and by Government officials who have invoked the disciplinary travel provision of the JFTR as a basis to deny entitlement to travel reimbursement at the full rate and per diem to an officer who was acting pursuant to orders, was assuring protection of his rights and was guilty of nothing at the time in question.

6.  As a result, the Board has determined that the applicant is entitled to reimbursement of travel expenses for those trips allowed by the DOHA at the mileage rate for use of privately owned conveyance in effect at the time in question, less that amount of $350 already allowed by the DOHA and paid by DFAS.  The applicant is also entitled to reimbursement for meals during this travel at the rate allowable under the JFTR in effect at the time in question. 

7.  Furthermore, as a matter of equity, the applicant will be reimbursed for meals at the commercial rate for those days that he was in an attached status and physically present for duty at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  The staff of the ABCMR calculated from the applicant’s Travel Vouchers, dated 4 May 1999 and dated 25 June 1999, that the applicant was present for duty at Fort Bragg for 183 days (not including days of travel and days present for duty at Fort Stewart and Fort Benning) between 9 July 1998 and 29 March 1999.  The Board has determined that the calculation of 183 is correct for the purposes of reimbursement for meals in the absence of evidence of record to the contrary or determination by other competent authority that mathematical miscalculation has occurred.

8.  In view of the foregoing findings and conclusions, it would be appropriate to correct the applicant’s records, but only as recommended below.

RECOMMENDATION:

1.  That all of the Department of the Army records related to this case be corrected: 

	a.  by showing the ABCMR as a matter of equity has amended the authenticated DD Form 1610 (identified as Travel Order Number 06567, dated 24 June 1999) and the appropriate Travel Voucher (DD Form 1351, two pages) submitted by the individual concerned to show those expenses/reimbursements allowable and those expenses/reimbursements disallowed as specified in subparagraphs 1b through g, below:

	b.  by showing that the individual concerned performed the following official travel as in item 11 (Itinerary) of the Travel Voucher, dated 25 June 1999, and verified by an official of the Office of the XVIII Airborne Corps SJA on 25 June 1999: 

	“9 Jul 98: Travel from Fort Stewart to Fort Bragg;
	 26-30 Jul 98:  Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	 23-24 Aug 98:  Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	 7-9 Sep 98:  Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	 14-19 Sep 98: Round-trip travel between Fort Bragg and Fort Stewart;
	 3 Feb 99:  Travel from Fort Bragg to Fort Stewart;
	 18-29 Mar 99 Round-trip travel between Fort Stewart and Fort Bragg”;

	c.  by showing that he was entitled to reimbursement for travel mileage for the above cited trips based on use of a privately owned conveyance at a rate of 32.5 cents per mile as authorized by the authenticated DD Form 1610 (identified as Travel Order Number 06567, dated 24 June 1999), which authorized use of privately owned conveyance at the rate of 32.5 cents per mile;

	d.  by showing on the cited Travel Order that “Government Rations and quarters are not available.  Soldier does not have a government credit card.  Soldier is not authorized a rental car.” 

	e.  by showing that the individual concerned was entitled to reimbursement for meals during the performance of official travel cited in Recommendation 1b, above;

	f.  by showing that the individual concerned was entitled to reimbursement for commercial meals at the rate in effect at the time during the 183 days that he was physically present at Fort Bragg for duty during the period 9 July 1998 and 29 March 1999;

	g.  by showing that the individual concerned was not entitled to reimbursement for lodging because there were no lodging expenses; 

2.  That DFAS audit the Travel Pay Account of the individual concerned based on the DD Form 1610, dated 24 June 1999, and the DD Form 1351, dated 25 June 1999, as amended by this action of the ABCMR and pay from funds authorized for the payment of claims approved under 10 U.S.C. 1552 any monies due to him less any reimbursements already received for travel, meals and lodging during the period 9 July 1998 through 29 March 1999.

3.  That so much of the application as is in excess of the foregoing be denied.

BOARD VOTE:  

___JL___  __KAH__  __MHM__  GRANT AS STATED IN RECOMMENDATION

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

________  ________  ________  DENY APPLICATION

		___Ms. Joann Langston__
		        CHAIRPERSON

INDEX

CASE ID	AR201051454	
SUFFIX		
RECON	YYYYMMDD	
DATE BOARDED	20010918	
TYPE OF DISCHARGE	(HD, GD, UOTHC, UD, BCD, DD, UNCHAR)	
DATE OF DISCHARGE	YYYYMMDD	
DISCHARGE AUTHORITY	AR . . . . .  	
DISCHARGE REASON		
BOARD DECISION	(NC, GRANT , DENY, GRANT PLUS)	
REVIEW AUTHORITY	MR SCHNEIDER	
ISSUES         1.	128.0000.0000	
2.	128.1400.0000	
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.