PROCEEDINGS

	IN THE CASE OF:  

	BOARD DATE:           13 December 2001                   
	DOCKET NUMBER:   AR2001051784

	I certify that hereinafter is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in the case of the above-named individual.  

	Mr. Carl W. S. Chun		Director	
	Mrs. Nancy Amos		Analyst	

  The following members, a quorum, were present:

	Mr. Samuel A. Crumpler		Chairperson	
	Mr. Mark D. Manning		Member	
	Ms. Regan K. Smith		Member	

	The applicant and counsel if any, did not appear before the Board.

	The Board considered the following evidence:

	Exhibit A - Application for correction of military 
                records
	Exhibit B - Military Personnel Records (including
	            advisory opinion, if any)

FINDINGS:

1.  The applicant has exhausted or the Board has waived the requirement for exhaustion of all administrative remedies afforded by existing law or regulations.

2.  The applicant requests, through counsel, that his records be corrected to show he was not relieved from command and that he be awarded, at a minimum, the Silver Star (SS).

3.  The applicant’s counsel’s father, who was a company commander under the applicant during the Korean War, states that the applicant was the quintessential infantry battalion combat commander.  The applicant was put in a no-win situation.  The applicant was given an impossible task and then told how to do it. He (counsel’s father) was awarded the SS for gallantry in action on 28 October 1952 and the applicant was relieved of his command.  The applicant should not have been relieved.  Several letters of support are provided.  In one letter from a film producer producing a documentary about the history of the 65th Infantry Regiment, the writer states that he is aware of specific incidents of heroism on the part of the applicant.  The applicant’s former S-3 from the 65th Infantry Regiment writes that he observed the “incredible valor, serenity and coolness displayed…” by the applicant in action around June 1952.

4.  The applicant’s military records show that after having had prior enlisted service, he was commissioned an Infantry second lieutenant on 14 July 1943.  He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 2 November 1950.  He was assigned to Korea on or about 29 June 1952 and to the 65th Infantry Regiment on 14 July 1952.  A brief history of the 65th Infantry Regiment follows.

5.   On 14 September 1920, the Puerto Rico Regiment of Infantry became the 65th Infantry Regiment.  In 1950, the Regiment was authorized almost 4,000 personnel but had only 92 officers and 1,895 enlisted men.  It was composed entirely of Puerto Rican enlisted personnel, the majority World War II veterans with many years of service in the regiment.  About 60 percent of the officers  were “continental” (white) and 40 percent were Puerto Rican.  Between 11 and    22 August 1950, 600 Puerto Ricans were recruited for service with the regiment. Another 1,200 members of the Enlisted Reserve Corps were also recalled.  World War II veterans made up the vast majority of those who joined up.          The bulk spoke both Spanish and English.  The 65th arrived in Pusan on            23 September 1950.

6.  From 23 September to 31 October 1950, the regiment inflicted more than 1,500 casualties on the enemy while suffering 221.  Men from the regiment won 5 SSs.  In November/December 1950, the regiment assisted Task Force Dog during the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir and defended a sector of the Hungnam beachhead, the exit point through which United Nations Forces were evacuated from northeastern Korea.  Elements of the 65th’s 2d Battalion were among the last troops to come off the beach.  

7.  During January 1951, the 65th participated in Operation Thunderbolt, a reconnaissance in force, and Operation Exploitation, an exploitation to the Han River.  It encountered light to moderate combat.  It was under orders to seize      3 hills held by the Chinese.  On 2 February 1951, two battalions of the regiment fixed bayonets and charged the enemy positions, forcing the Communist soldiers to flee.  In February and March 1951, the 65th participated in Operation Killer and Operation Ripper, aimed at the destruction of enemy forces.  It was the first element of the 3d Infantry Division to reach the southern banks of the Han River below Seoul.  Patrols of the 65th were also among the first US troops to reenter Seoul.  In March 1951, the 65th destroyed a North Korean regiment that slipped through the front lines.  In April 1951, the regiment participated in Operation Dauntless, leading the 3d Infantry Division’s attack and defeating elements of the Chinese 26th Army.  During the Chinese Spring Offensive in April 1951, the 65th defended its position against the vanguard of two Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) divisions, withdrawing in an organized fashion when ordered to do so.  It counterattacked aggressively whenever the opportunity presented itself.  Between May and July 1951, the 65th participated in operations to seize and hold the Chorwon Valley and was instrumental in stopping communist counterattacks in the Iron Triangle area.  It experienced its first major tactical failure when it was unable to seize a series of hills against two enemy battalions in the Chorwon Valley during Operation Cleanup.

8.  By the end of 1951, the 65th Infantry Regiment had established a reputation as a well-led, well-trained, and highly-motivated unit.  

9.  On 1 February 1952, Colonel C___-D___ assumed command of the 65th Infantry Regiment.  He was a Puerto Rican National Guard officer who had served with the regiment in World War II for over 3 ½ years.  

10.  In March 1952, the 65th Infantry Regiment became the division reserve and remained there through May.  In June it became the Eighth Army reserve.  While in reserve it conducted training and security missions and had to be prepared to react to any Chinese penetration of the 8th Army line.  In July 1952, it returned to Line Jamestown where it remained through August, defending its sector and conducting patrols and raids.  

11.  On 14 July 1952, the applicant was assigned as the battalion commander, 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry Regiment, 3d Infantry Division.

12.  By the beginning of the fall of 1952, the Chinese had completed a major quantitative and qualitative buildup and were becoming increasingly aggressive.  A number of key Allied outposts were of particular interest to the CCF, including 

Outpost Kelly, defended by the 65th Infantry Regiment.  On 17 September, the Chinese launched their first concerted attack on Outpost Kelly.  Company C, 1st Battalion repulsed the attack.  The following night, when the outpost was occupied by Company B, 1st Battalion, the outpost fell quickly.  (Statements from officers that took patrols back to Outpost Kelly noted that many of the dead were found in their sleeping bags).  Company E, 2d Battalion executed the first counterattack on the morning of 19 September.  Some of its elements managed to retake the outpost position but a fierce Chinese counterattack forced the company to abandon it.  Company E suffered 33 casualties.  On the night of     20 September, 1st Battalion attacked.  The two lead companies in the assault became targets of heavy Chinese artillery and mortar fire.  Elements of Company C managed to reach the crest of the outpost but they were soon forced to retreat. The regiment had another 71 battle casualties.  Artillery and air strikes pounded Outpost Kelly between 21 and 23 September.  On the morning of the 24th, the 3d Battalion’s three companies launched a counterattack.  Again, intense Chinese artillery and mortar fire caused widespread confusion and panic.  Companies I and K of 3d Battalion disintegrated during the withdrawal.

13.  At the end of September, Outpost Kelly remained in enemy hands as did another outpost manned by the 65th that had earlier fallen to the Chinese.  The regiment suffered 408 battle casualties plus another 134 nonbattle casualties.  Although other regiments suffered setbacks during September, the units that lost the other positions (including Pork Chop Hill) recaptured them in counterattacks. Outpost Kelly was the only outpost that remained in Chinese hands at the end of the month.  As a direct result, both the divisional and regimental commanders were relieved.  

14.  On 22 October 1952, the 65th Infantry Regiment relieved elements of the 51st Republic of Korea Regiment on Line Missouri which included the outpost at Jackson Heights, more than a mile in front of the main defensive line.  Company G, 2d Battalion had charge of the outpost.  Enemy shelling began on 25 October and continued throughout the day and into the evening.  Enemy patrols twice probed the position the next morning but were repulsed each time.  Enemy shelling resumed at 10 a.m. on 27 October with much heavier concentrations than on the previous two days.  A CCF mortar round hit Company G’s ammunition supply and much of their mortar ammunition was destroyed.  By       5 p.m. all but seven members of the company’s mortar platoon were casualties and only two mortars were still in action.  Company G repelled an attack that evening but at the cost of more casualties.  Listening posts detected large numbers of enemy troops positioning themselves; however, when a call went in for artillery fire the commander was informed that he had an allocation of only  
10 illumination and high explosive rounds for the night.  After an immense artillery and mortar barrage, two companies of Chinese infantry attacked at         9 p.m.  Company G responded with small arms fire and its remaining mortar rounds but its ammunition dump was hit a second time.  Company G’s commander called for final defensive artillery fires at 9:20 p.m. which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, allowing Company G to begin withdrawing.  The company suffered 87 battle casualties.

15.  On 28 October, the applicant’s 2d Battalion was ordered to retake Jackson Heights.  Since his battalion already had responsibility for a major sector of the 65th’s main defensive line, he planned to use only one of his companies for the attack, Company F.  He received permission to borrow Company A from 1st Battalion.  Once Jackson Heights returned to American hands, he planned to use Company F to remain on position while Company A returned to its parent unit.  However, his intentions were garbled in transmission and confusion immediately arose within the two units over which would stay and which would depart.  By 9:55 a.m. 28 October, Company F was on the objective and reporting it secured. However, the situation soon began to deteriorate with each company commander thinking his stay on the position was temporary.  The men of the two companies became intermingled, destroying the cohesion of the outpost’s defense.  Enemy artillery and mortar rounds slammed into the position, inflicting numerous casualties and the defending troops began to move off the position.  Company A’s commander called a meeting of his officers; however, a Chinese 76-mm round scored a direct hit on the group, killing four officers.  The men then began to abandon the position in even larger numbers.  At 3:00 p.m., the applicant ordered Company F to remain on Jackson Heights and Company A to return to the main defensive line.  There matters stood until 5:05 p.m., when the 2d Battalion command post received a message from Captain C___ (father of applicant’s counsel) on Jackson Heights stating that the fighting strength remaining on the position was down to ten men and requesting permission to withdraw.  

16.  At 5:15 p.m., a lieutenant from Company H, 2d Battalion reported that some 80 men from Companies A and F were refusing to go back to Jackson Heights.  The applicant ordered these men, including the Company A executive officer, to go back up the hill to rejoin Captain C___.  Most of the men again refused.  At approximately 5:30 p.m., Captain C___ ordered the remaining men to withdraw. 

17.  Early on 29 October, Company C, 1st Battalion departed for Jackson Heights.  The unit reported the objective secured at 7:20 a.m. but shortly thereafter its men began abandoning the position without an enemy round being fired or a live enemy being sighted. 

18.  On 29 October, the 3d Infantry Division relieved the 65th of its sector along Line Missouri.  A total of 122 Puerto Rican enlisted personnel and one Puerto Rican officer were in the division stockade pending court-martial for refusing to attack the enemy as ordered and misbehavior before the enemy.  The applicant, the regiment’s only Puerto Rican battalion commander, was relieved of his command.  On 3 November, 39 more enlisted men of the 3d Battalion’s Company L refused to continue with a patrol while attached to the 15th Infantry Regiment in the vicinity of Jackson Heights.  They were also placed under arrest. 

19.  Of the personnel convicted, 28 (including one officer) were from the 1st Battalion, 27 were from the 2d Battalion and 37 were from the 3d Battalion.  The 3d Infantry Division Command Report for the period 1 – 31 October 1952 stated in part “…the conduct of continental officers during this operation was excellent…the continental officers of the 65th Infantry Regiment are high-type leaders, with exceptional records…”

20.  Soldiers were not always court-martialed for refusing to attack the enemy or for misbehavior before the enemy.  When 100 soldiers of the 2d Infantry Division abandoned their positions in July 1952 during the battle to recapture Old Baldy and refused to return to the fighting, they were not court-martialed.  The division commander said “They were typical clear-eyed, good-looking American boys.  They had probably been afraid…frightened to their very souls, but they were not cowards.”  The men were lectured and their progress was monitored.  The 3d Infantry Division took pains in its official report on the episode at Jackson Heights to absolve its white officers of all responsibility.  Furthermore, the refusal of the 3d Battalion’s Company L to continue with its combat patrol in November 1952 resulted in neither the relief of the regimental nor of the battalion commander, both of who were white nor was any action taken against either the company commander or platoon leaders.  The 3d Infantry Division commander also opted not to take any action against the officers and men of the 15th Infantry when a patrol from that regiment refused to follow its commander to the still hotly-contested position at Jackson Heights in November 1952.  The same was true when the regiment was thrown off Jackson Heights by the Chinese in November 1952 and failed to regain the heights. 

21.  After his relief from command, the applicant was assigned to the Korean Military Assistance Group.  The only references to the applicant’s relief for cause in his military personnel records are a letter from him dated 11 November 1952, Subject:  Request of (sic) Investigation, wherein he requested an investigation into the incidents leading to his relief in anticipation of the Officer Efficiency Report he expected to receive and a first endorsement dated 18 May 1953 from The Adjutant General’s Office (TAGO) to that letter which stated “An efficiency report for the period referred to in para 1, basic communication, is not of official record in this office.”  The endorsement is further annotated that it was believed the report for the period in question was forwarded to TAGO in December 1952, returned without action to the Commander, 65th Infantry Regiment in January 1953, and that the report was not returned to TAGO.  The applicant retired on     1 January 1963.  

22.  A review of the records at the National Archives revealed that the 3d Infantry Division Command Report for the period 1 – 31 October 1952, page 9 indicates “As a result of the action, the commanding officer of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry, was relieved of command.”  The 3d Infantry Division G-1 Journal for    30 October 1952 indicates (item 13) “Talked to …pertaining to (the applicant) who was relieved as Commanding Officer, 2nd Battalion, 65th Regiment..” and (item 18) “Discussed with …about the relief of (the applicant)…”

23.  Army Regulation 600-8-22 provides, in pertinent part, that the Silver Star is awarded for gallantry in action against the enemy.  The required gallantry (spirited and conspicuous acts of heroism and courage) must have been performed with marked distinction.  As with all personal decorations, formal recommendations, approval through the chain of command, and announcement in orders are required.  The Bronze Star Medal is awarded for acts of heroism, performed under circumstances not involving aerial flight, in connection with military operations against an armed enemy, or while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing armed force, which are of lesser degree than required for the award of the Silver Star.

24.  A recommendation for award of the Silver Star was submitted under the provisions of Title 10, U. S. Code, section 1130 (formerly known as section 522 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996), wherein the Service concerned will review a proposal for the award of, or upgrading of, a decoration that would not otherwise be authorized to be awarded based upon time limitations previously established by law.  Based upon that recommendation, the U. S. Total Army Personnel Command awarded the applicant the Bronze Star Medal on 27 July 2001.  The recommendation is not available.  The narrative reads in part “…When enemy mortar fire hit a large grader being driven by a soldier, (the applicant) ordered his jeep stopped and under intense enemy artillery fire, without regard for his safety, personally removed the driver of the grader and helped him to safety…”

25.  Section 1552 of Title 10, U. S. Code is the law governing correction of military records.  Section 1552(g) defines the term military record, in part, as a document or other record that pertains to (1) an individual member or former member of the armed forces, or (2) at the discretion of the Secretary of the military department concerned, any other military matter affecting a member of former member of the armed forces.

CONCLUSIONS:

1.  Without commenting on the rightness of the commander’s decision to relieve the applicant from command, the Board concludes that his relief, as the 65th Infantry Regiment’s only Puerto Rican battalion commander, was inequitable.  

2.  The applicant was the commander of the 2d Battalion, 65th Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion’s Company B was the unit that lost Outpost Kelly, perhaps because its men were sleeping at their posts.  3d Battalion’s Companies K and L disintegrated while counterattacking at Outpost Kelly, their troops streaming back 
in disorder.  Meanwhile, the applicant’s Company G held Jackson Heights for the better part of four days against heavy odds.  Company A of 1st Battalion and Company F of 2d Battalion later abandoned the same position but the historical view is that the enemy’s fire was so intense no one could have remained on Jackson Heights that day.  However, Company C of 1st Battalion took and then abandoned the position without any Chinese opposition.  

3.  The Board notes that although all three battalions had discipline problems, the discipline of the other two battalions in the 65th Infantry Regiment compared unfavorably with that of the applicant’s battalion.  Besides the incidents noted above, of the personnel convicted by court-martial for refusing to attack the enemy as ordered and misbehavior before the enemy, 28 (including one officer) were from the 1st Battalion, 27 were from the 2d Battalion and 37 were from the 3d Battalion.  However, only the applicant was relieved from command.  

4.  In light of the above noted incidents and from present historical research, it seems clear that a double standard was operative where the 65th Infantry was concerned.  The 3d Infantry Division took pains in its official report on the episode at Jackson Heights to absolve its “continental” (i. e., “white”) officers of all responsibility.  Further, the refusal of the 3d Battalion’s Company L to continue with its combat patrol in November 1952 resulted in neither the relief of the regimental nor of the battalion commander, both of whom were white.  No action was taken by the 3d Infantry Division commander against the officers and men   of the 15th Infantry when a patrol from that regiment refused to follow its commander to the still hotly-contested position at Jackson Heights in November 1952.  None of the “white” officers involved in these incidents, whether company- or battalion-level, were relieved of their commands.

5.  The Board notes the narrative of the Bronze Star Medal citation and concludes that the heroic actions of the applicant cited thereon do not meet the gallantry in action criteria (spirited and conspicuous acts of heroism and courage) required for award of the Silver Star.

6.  In view of the foregoing, the 3d Infantry Division’s historical records, i. e., its Command Report for the period 1 – 31 October 1952 and its G-1 Journal for     30 October 1952 should be amended as recommended below.

RECOMMENDATION:

1.  That this directive showing that the applicant’s relief from command was inequitable be distributed to the National Archives and Records Administration  for filing with the 3d Infantry Division’s Command Report for the period                1 – 31 October 1952 and its G-1 Journal for 30 October 1952.
2.  That so much of the application as is in excess of the foregoing be denied.

BOARD VOTE:  

___sac__  __mdm___  __rks___  GRANT AS STATED IN RECOMMENDATION

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

________  ________  ________  DENY APPLICATION

			Samuel A. Crumpler
		______________________
		        CHAIRPERSON

INDEX

CASE ID	AR2001051784	
SUFFIX		
RECON		
DATE BOARDED	20011213	
TYPE OF DISCHARGE		
DATE OF DISCHARGE		
DISCHARGE AUTHORITY		
DISCHARGE REASON		
BOARD DECISION	(GRANT)	
REVIEW AUTHORITY		
ISSUES         1.	107.0007	
2.	134.00	
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.