MEMORANDUM OF CONSIDERATION

	IN THE CASE OF:       

	BOARD DATE:            7 August 2001                  
	DOCKET NUMBER:   AR2001055784

	I certify that hereinafter is recorded the record of consideration of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in the case of the above-named individual.

	Mr. Carl W. S. Chun		Director	
	Mr. Edmund P. Mercanti		Analyst	

  The following members, a quorum, were present:

	Ms. Margaret K. Patterson		Chairperson	
	Mr. Thomas B. Redfern		Member	
	Ms. Regan K. Smith		Member	

	The Board, established pursuant to authority contained in 10 U.S.C. 1552, convened at the call of the Chairperson on the above date.  In accordance with Army Regulation 15-185, the application and the available military records pertinent to the corrective action requested were reviewed to determine whether to authorize a formal hearing, recommend that the records be corrected without a formal hearing, or to deny the application without a formal hearing if it is determined that insufficient relevant evidence has been presented to demonstrate the existence of probable material error or injustice.

	The applicant requests correction of military records as stated in the application to the Board and as restated herein.

	The Board considered the following evidence:

	Exhibit A - Application for correction of military 
                records
	Exhibit B - Military Personnel Records (including
	     advisory opinion, if any)

APPLICANT REQUESTS:  Reconsideration of his earlier two appeals to correct his military records by upgrading his undesirable discharge.

APPLICANT STATES:  In effect, that his unauthorized absences were due to his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) from his experiences in Vietnam.

NEW EVIDENCE OR INFORMATION:  Incorporated herein by reference are military records which were summarized in a memorandum prepared to reflect the Board's original consideration of his case on 24 November 1999 (AR1999028398) and the Board’s 1st reconsideration of his case on 15 March 2001 (AR2001052466).

The applicant submits a copy of his Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) rating decision in which he was awarded a 100 percent disability rating for PTSD.  This rating decision is new evidence, which has not been considered by the Board in its earlier considerations of his case.

Title 38, United States Code, permits the DVA to award compensation for a medical condition which was incurred in or aggravated by active military service.  The DVA, however, is not required by law to determine medical fitness for further military service.  The DVA, in accordance with its own policies and regulations, awards compensation solely on the basis that a medical condition exists and that said medical condition reduces or impairs the social or industrial adaptability of the individual concerned.  Consequently, due to the two concepts involved, an individual’s medical condition, although not considered medically unfitting for military service at the time of processing for separation, discharge or retirement, may be sufficient to qualify the individual for DVA benefits based on an evaluation by that agency.  Furthermore, unlike the Army the DVA can evaluate a veteran throughout his or her lifetime, adjusting the percentage of disability based upon that agency’s examinations and findings. 

PTSD, an anxiety disorder, was not recognized as a psychiatric disorder until 1980 with the publishing of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) III.  The condition is described in the current DSM-III-R, pages 247 through 251.  While PTSD has only been categorized by psychiatrists as a distinct diagnosis since 1980, it has, as early as the Civil War, been described in psychological literature, variously labeled as shell shock, soldier’s heart, effect syndrome, combat fatigue and traumatic neurosis.  During the period of time in question, similar psychiatric symptomatology was categorized as hysterical neurosis.  Although the current label of PTSD is of rather recent acceptance, the idea that catastrophes and tragedies can result in persistent emotional and 

psychological symptoms is common even among the lay public.  While PTSD was not recognized as a specific illness at the time of the applicant’s separation from the service, the fact that an individual might not be fit for further military service because of psychosis, psychoneurosis, or neurological disorders was outlined in Army Regulation 40-501 which was in effect at the time of his separation.  The Army here established standards and procedures for determining fitness for retention and utilized those procedures and standards in evaluating individuals at that time.  The specific diagnostic label given to an individual’s condition a decade or more after his discharge from the service may change, but any change does not call into question the application of then existing fitness standards.

The Manual for Courts-Martial, R.C.M. 916, provides that it is an affirmative defense to any offense that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the accused, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his or her acts.  Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.  The accused is presumed to have been mentally responsible at the time of the alleged offense.  This presumption continues until the accused establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she was not mentally responsible at the time of the alleged offense.

DISCUSSION:  Considering all the evidence, allegations, and information presented by the applicant, together with the evidence of record and applicable law and regulations, it is concluded:

1.  The fact that the applicant was awarded a disability rating for PTSD on 1 May 1999 does not by any means indicate that he suffered from PTSD when he was discharged on 13 March 1980.  The Board notes that the applicant’s discharge was almost 11 years from the date he completed his tour in Vietnam.

2.  The applicant underwent a complete separation physical examination and was determined medically qualified for separation.  If he was suffering from a grave mental condition at that time, it would appear reasonable that he would have told the attending physician the PTSD symptoms he was experiencing.  

3.  But the primary issue is one that was discussed in the Board’s previous denial.  There is no indication that the applicant was ever, or is now, mentally incompetent.  Without a finding of mental incompetence, he was responsible for his actions, regardless of whether he was suffering from a physical or mental defect.  In other words, even if the applicant was suffering from PTSD while he was on active duty, it would not excuse his numerous periods of AWOL.

4.  In view of the foregoing, there is no basis for granting the applicant's request.

DETERMINATION:  The applicant has failed to submit
sufficient relevant evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable error or injustice.

BOARD VOTE:

________  ________  ________  GRANT

________  ________  ________  GRANT FORMAL HEARING

___mkp__  ___tbr  __  ___rks __  DENY APPLICATION

		    Carl W. S. Chun
		    Director, Army Board for Correction
    of Military Records

INDEX

CASE ID	AR2001055784	
SUFFIX		
RECON	YYYYMMDD	
DATE BOARDED	20010807	
TYPE OF DISCHARGE	(HD, GD, UOTHC, UD, BCD, DD, UNCHAR)	
DATE OF DISCHARGE	YYYYMMDD	
DISCHARGE AUTHORITY	AR . . . . .  	
DISCHARGE REASON		
BOARD DECISION	DENY	
REVIEW AUTHORITY		
ISSUES         1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.