IN THE CASE OF: BOARD DATE: 14 April 2015 DOCKET NUMBER: AR20140001068 THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE: 1. Application for correction of military records (with supporting documents provided, if any). 2. Military Personnel Records and advisory opinions (if any). THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE: 1. The applicant requests reconsideration of his previous application to have the Silver Star he was awarded upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross in the form of a de novo review of his case on grounds of legal error and injustice. He further requests that his entire award submission be properly processed and sent to the Secretary of the Army for his review and decision. 2. The applicant states that he would like to appeal the decision made by the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) because there is new information and evidence that was not submitted in the original application that will now be submitted to the Board in this application. He feels that after this evidence is reviewed and analyzed the decision will be made by the ABCMR to recommend to the Secretary of the Army that the Silver Star he was awarded be upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross as the current Army Chief of Staff General (GEN) O (Lieutenant General (LTG) at the time) recommended and now-retired GEN P had approved. 3. The applicant states the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) Army Decorations Board (ADB) that was held on 9 August 2012 was not conducted in accordance with any Army regulations, policy letters, or the directive given by the Secretary of the Army. His application and enclosures will clearly demonstrate the HRC ADB misapplication of both the award criteria and the board process. The HRC ADB was biased and created standards not in accordance with any award criteria listed in any policy letter or regulation. The lack of professionalism of the board members are also demonstrated by the board members' statements that were made to the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG). These statements do not reflect well on the U.S. Army and the Secretary of the Army. This is coupled with the actions of the former HRC Commander (then Brigadier General (BG) F) who did not carry out the assigned duties and responsibility entrusted by the Secretary of the Army in conducting a proper review of the award recommendation and was also derelict in her duties by not providing proper oversight of the ADB. This will be proven without a doubt in this application with the evidence that was not included in the original application. 4. The applicant provides a General Officer Memorandum of Concern, dated 16 June 2007. The applicant also provides multiple enclosures, labeled Enclosures 1 through 18 as follows: * Enclosure 1: Enemy Situation * Enclosure 2: DA Form 638 (Recommendation for Award), dated 3 January 2008 * Enclosure 3: 5 Silver Star Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I) Individual Awards Board Summary Sheets * Enclosure 4: DA Form 638 recommending award of the Distinguished Service Cross, dated 3 August 2010 * Enclosure 5: Initial ABCMR Argument from Counsel submitted with his application dated 11 January 2013 * Enclosure 6: DA Form 4980-4 (Silver Star Certificate) * Enclosure 7: DA Form 638, dated 15 January 2006, showing disapproval for award of the Soldier's Medal * Enclosure 8: DA Form 638, dated 17 May 2006, showing disapproval for award of the Silver Star * Enclosure 9: Partial extract of Army Regulation 600-8-22 (Military Awards), Table 3-6 (Delegation of Award Approval Authority - Wartime Criteria) * Enclosure 10: Memorandum from Chief, Military Awards Branch(now called the Awards and Decorations Branch), HRC to Mr. R, dated 27 August 2009 * Enclosure 11: Message, dated 21 May 2007, subject: Delegation of Wartime Approval Authority to MNF-I * Enclosure 12: MNF-I Command Policy Memorandum 04-01, subject: MNF-I Wartime Awards Policy, dated 12 September 2004 * Enclosure 13: Letter from the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, HRC to Senator N, dated 5 January 2011, acknowledging receipt of a request * Enclosure 14: Letter from the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, HRC to Senator N, dated 1 February 2011, denying award of the Distinguished Service Cross * Enclosure 15: Letter from the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, HRC to Senator N, dated 1 February 2011, refusing to release ADB summary sheets denying award of the Distinguished Service Cross * Enclosure 16: 3 pages apparently extracted from a DODIG investigation * Enclosure 17: Awards and Decorations Statistics charts from the HRC website * Enclosure 18: Army Regulation 600-8-22, paragraph 3-6 (Wartime conditions award approval authority) CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE: 1. Incorporated herein by reference are military records which were summarized in the previous consideration of the applicant's case by the ABCMR in Docket Number AR20130001706, on 14 May 2013. 2. The applicant is currently serving in the rank/pay grade of sergeant major (SGM)/E-9 in the Regular Army and has been serving on active duty since 9 August 1988. He was promoted to SGM on 1 October 2008. 3. The applicant was serving as the First Sergeant (1SG) for Eagle Company, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2/2 SCR) assigned to the Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), Iraq, during the period relevant to this case. 4. The applicant's company commander submitted a DA Form 638, dated 3 January 2008 (Enclosure 2), recommending him for the award of the Silver Star. The narrative stated: First Sergeant [applicant], United States Army, distinguished himself by exceptional valorous conduct in the performance of outstanding service to the United States as First Sergeant for Eagle Company, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment assigned to Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Iraq on 4 September 2007 during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Eagle Company was completing a Relief in Place/Time on arrival (RlP/TOA) of a Combat Outpost in AI Hadar, southern Baghdad to assume duty as the Squadron's main effort. Eagle Company's AO was the AI Qaeda in the Iraq center of gravity, plagued by Sunni and Shia sectarian violence. On 3 September 2007, the outgoing unit departed the Combat Operating Post (COP). First Sergeant [applicant] immediately established the defense of the COP as the top priority for the Company. Under his guidance, the Company worked through the day and night, sand bagging windows and guard towers, repositioning key weapon systems, installing bullet proof glass for the towers, and erecting camouflage netting along the entire perimeter of the COP's rooftop for concealment. During the morning of 4 September 2007, the Company's Executive Officer was on the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Falcon supervising the retrofitting of the company's vehicles. The Company Commander and the Fire Support Officer were at FOB Falcon attending a meeting; First Sergeant [applicant] was the only company level leader at the COP. In the early afternoon, the Company received orders to investigate a possible Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). While one of the platoons was investigating the VBIED they came under enemy fire. [Applicant] deployed the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) platoon and successfully controlled the link-up and extraction of the platoon in contact, resulting in the killing of three enemy and no injuries to friendly forces. Within fifteen minutes after the platoon’s return to the COP, the COP came under a complex attack from 35-45 determined enemy fighters. The enemy initiated the attack by firing 2 rocket propelled grenade (RPGs) at the COP followed by a heavy volume of fire from AKs, PKCs, RPGs, and sniper rifles. The enemy arrayed themselves in a manner that allowed them to attack the COP from three directions simultaneously. Once the firing began, [applicant] immediately requested an Air Weapons Team (AWT) and moved to the roof, [applicant] exposed himself to direct enemy fire by moving from guard tower to guard tower assessing the situation and inspiring his Soldiers by calmly encouraging them to keep up the fire. At this time, Specialist H_____ at tower one was shot. Under direct enemy fire, First Sergeant [applicant] quickly moved to the casualty where he controlled the casualty evacuation while helping to carry the Soldier off of the roof. [Applicant] again returned to the roof, this time concentrating on directing the fire of the key weapon systems and increasing the volume of fire until the company gained fire superiority. During this time period, the AWT arrived on station. [Applicant] gave the AWT a quick situation report, and directed Soldiers to mark one of the known enemy locations with M203 smoke. Once AWT identified the building, [applicant], acting as the on-scene commander, authorized the AWT to launch a Hellfire missile into the enemy's defensive position, crippling the enemy. During the subsequent lull in fire [applicant] returned to the Forward Area Support Team (FAST) on the bottom floor of the COP and reassured the injured Soldier while receiving a report of his condition from the Squadron Physicians Assistant. Based on the condition of the Soldier and the fight at the time, [applicant] directed that the Soldier be ground evacuated to the 28th CASH [sic]. This was done immediately by the companies [sic] QRF, which [applicant] had activated once the attack began. As QRF exited the COP with the injured Soldier, the enemy fire increased, attempting to disrupt the evacuation. [Applicant] once again rallied his company and ensured the Company gained and maintained fire superiority. Yet again, [applicant] coordinated with the AWT to launch additional Hellfire missiles and conduct strafing runs with their 30mm cannons, which destroyed the enemy's remaining defensive position. With the destruction of the second building, Eagle Company successfully broke the enemy's will to continue the attack. [Applicant] immediately supervised the reconsolidation and organization of men, ammunition, and key weapon systems. Aware that ammunition was low, [applicant] radioed back to his Soldiers on FOB Falcon and coordinated for a resupply of ammunition to be delivered to the COP. This foresight prepared the company for a possible counterattack. Throughout the day and evening of 4 September 2007, [applicant] heroically led his company in high intensity combat, while simultaneously fulfilling the jobs of Company Commander, FSO, and First Sergeant. On numerous occasions, he fearlessly exposed himself to direct enemy fire to instill confidence in his men, care for his wounded and to destroy the enemy. As a direct result of [applicant's] preparation, leadership and gallantry, Eagle Company killed 18 Al Qaeda fighters, with no additional wounded Soldiers. [Applicant's] personal courage, uncommon valor, and selfless service contributed directly to the safety and evacuation of two wounded and the recovery of one fallen Soldier. [Applicant] without regard to his personal safety courageously risked his life under enemy fire to save the lives of his fellow Soldiers. His actions reflect distinct credit upon himself, the Second Stryker Cavalry Regiment, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the United States Army. 5. The Commander, 2/2 SCR, a lieutenant colonel (LTC), recommended approval of the award of the Silver Star on 3 January 2008. He stated the applicant's foresightful preparation for the defense of COP Blackfoot as well as his calm, reassuring presence and courageous leadership under fire saved many lives during the 4 September 2007 battle. His heroic actions were absolutely commensurate with this award. 6. The Commander, 2d SCR, a colonel (COL), recommended approval of the award of the Silver Star on 3 January 2008. He stated "Well deserved - heroically led his company in defense of COP Blackfoot - courageous leadership!" 7. The Commander, MND-B, a major general (MG), recommended approval of the award of the Silver Star. The date of his approval is not shown. He stated "Sir - my strongest recommendation." 8. The Commander, MNC-I, LTG O, recommended approval of the award of the Silver Star and recommended it be upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross. He stated "Heroic action, took on the duties of Co Cdr fire support officer. A true leader under fire. Deserves the DSC [Distinguished Service Cross]." The date of his signature is not shown. 9. On 11 April 2008, an MNF-I Individual Awards Board recommended approval of the award of the Silver Star to the applicant. The board consisted of two MGs, a BG, and a command sergeant major (CSM). According to the member voting sheets the award of the Distinguished Service Cross was considered but not recommended. Part 2 (Criteria) of each vote sheet asked the board member "Should the service member be recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross?" Each board member initialed the "NO" block, thereby indicating the applicant should not be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. 10. On 1 August 2008, GEN P, the Commanding General, MNF-I, approved the award of the Silver Star for the applicant. 11. The DA Form 638 and the certificate issued for the award of the Silver Star (Enclosure 6) indicate the award orders were issued on 17 January 2008. The reason for the disparity between the date of approval and the date of the orders is unknown. 12. On 3 August 2010, the applicant's former wartime company fire support officer submitted a DA Form 638 recommending the applicant's award of the Silver Star be upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross. a. He attached statements to provide the necessary new and substantive information required to justify the award of the Silver Star being upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross. Much of the enclosed information was not available at the time the original award recommendation was submitted in September 2007. In addition to the statements he also provided: (1) Four documents containing a timeline of events on 4 September 2007 at Rashid, Eagle Company 2-2 SCR (storyboards). These documents included maps of locations described in the timeline of events. (2) Three photographs showing the attack at COP 860/Blackfoot on 4 September 2007. (3) Eight photographs showing the defensive positions at COP 860/Blackfoot. b. He stated the information illustrated that the severity of the enemy threat faced by Eagle Company on 4 September 2007 was greater than originally thought. It also serves to underscore how the applicant's heroic leadership and actions under fire on 4 September 2007 prevented enemy forces from decisively engaging CF in the way they intended and planned, undoubtedly saving the lives of numerous Eagle Company Soldiers. c. He fully recommended and endorsed to the approving authority that the applicant be recognized for his courageous leadership and valor under fire for his actions during the battle that took place at COP Blackfoot in East Rashid, Baghdad. The Soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers wanted the applicant to be recognized for his incredible leadership during the battle on 4 September 2007, and for his other heroic action during their time in Baghdad. He was truly deserving of this award and a true example of a combat leader. 13. The narrative that accompanied the award stated: [Applicant], United States Army, distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action in the performance of outstanding service to the United States as First Sergeant for Eagle Company, 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment assigned to Multi-National Division-Baghdad, Iraq on 4 September 2007 during OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Eagle Company was completing a Relief in Place/Time on arrival (RIP/TOA) of a Combat Outpost in AI Hadar, southern Baghdad to assume duty as the Squadron's main effort. Eagle Company's AO was the AI Qaeda in the Iraq [sic] center of gravity, plagued by Sunni and Shia sectarian violence. On 3 September 2007, the outgoing unit departed the Combat Operating Post (COP). [Applicant] immediately established the defense of the COP as the top priority for the Company. Under his guidance, the Company worked through the day and night, sand bagging windows and guard towers, repositioning key weapon systems, installing bullet proof glass for the towers, and erecting camouflage netting along the entire perimeter of the COP's rooftop for concealment. During the morning of 4 September 2007, the Company's Executive Officer was on the Forward Operating Base (FOB) Falcon supervising the retrofitting of the company's vehicles. The Company Commander and the Fire Support Officer were at FOB Falcon attending a meeting; First Sergeant [applicant] was the only company level leader at the COP. In the early afternoon, the Company received orders to investigate a possible Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED). While one of the platoons was investigating the VBIED they came under enemy fire. [Applicant] deployed the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) platoon and successfully controlled the link-up and extraction of the platoon in contact, resulting in the killing of three enemy and no injuries to friendly forces. Within fifteen minutes after the platoons returned to the COP, the COP came under a complex attack from 120-150 determined enemy fighters. The enemy initiated the attack by firing 2 rocket propelled grenade (RPGs), mortars from approximately 100 meters at the COP, followed by a heavy volume of fire from AKs, PKCs, RPGs, and sniper rifles. The enemy arrayed themselves in a manner that allowed them to attack the COP from three directions simultaneously. Once the firing began, [applicant] immediately requested an Air Weapons Team (AWT) and moved to the roof, [applicant] exposed himself to direct enemy fire by moving from guard tower to guard tower assessing the situation and inspiring his Soldiers by calmly encouraging them to keep up the fire. At this time, Specialist H_____ at tower one was shot. [Applicant] set the highest example of personal bravery through his demonstrated valor and calmness under fire. Under direct enemy fire, [applicant], quickly moved to the casualty where he controlled the casualty evacuation while helping to carry the Soldier off of the roof. [Applicant] again returned to the roof, this time concentrating on directing the fire of the key weapon systems and increasing the volume of fire until the company gained fire superiority. During this time period, the AWT arrived on station. [Applicant] gave the AWT a quick situation report, and directed Soldiers to mark one of the known enemy locations with M203 smoke. Once AWT identified the building, First Sergeant [applicant], acting as the on-scene commander, authorized the AWT to launch a Hellfire missile into the enemy's defensive position, crippling the enemy. During the subsequent lull in fire [applicant] returned to the Forward Area Support Team (FAST) on the bottom floor of the COP and reassured the injured Soldier while receiving a report of his condition from the Squadron Physicians Assistant. Based on the condition of the Soldier and the fight at the time, [applicant] directed that the Soldier be ground evacuated to the 28th CASH [sic]. This was done immediately by the companies [sic] QRF, which [applicant] had activated once the attack began. On his way back to the rooftop [applicant] grabbed as many cans of ammunition as he could carry and resupplied two of the 50 caliber machine guns on the rooftop [;] this action ensured they did not run out during the fighting. As QRF exited the COP with the injured Soldier, the enemy fire increased, attempting to disrupt the evacuation. [Applicant] once again rallied his company and ensured the Company gained and maintained fire superiority. Yet again, [applicant] coordinated with the AWT to launch additional Hellfire missiles and conduct strafing runs with their 30mm cannons, which destroyed the enemy's remaining defensive position. With the destruction of the second building, Eagle Company successfully broke the enemy's will to continue the attack. [Applicant] immediately supervised the reconsolidation and organization of men, ammunition and key weapon systems. Aware that ammunition was low, [applicant] radioed back to his Soldiers on FOB Falcon and coordinated for a resupply of ammunition to be delivered to the COP. This foresight prepared the company for a possible counterattack. Throughout the day and evening of 4 September 2007, [applicant] repeatedly subjected himself to intense unrelenting enemy fire in order to evacuate a severely injured Soldier while also directing the defense of the combat outpost by both providing direction to both an infantry rifle company and an air weapons team during a fight that lasted over 6 hours. [Applicant] heroically led his company in high intensity combat, while simultaneously fulfilling the jobs of Company Commander, FSO, and First Sergeant. On numerous occasions, he fearlessly exposed himself to direct enemy fire to instill confidence in his men, care for his wounded and to destroy the enemy. As a direct result of [applicant's] preparation, leadership and gallantry, Eagle Company killed 18 Al Qaeda fighters, with no additional wounded Soldiers. [Applicant's] personal courage, uncommon valor, and selfless service contributed directly to the safety and evacuation of two wounded and the recovery of one fallen Soldier. [Applicant] without regard to his personal safety courageously risked his life under enemy fire to save the lives of his fellow Soldiers. His actions reflect distinct credit upon himself, the Second Stryker Cavalry Regiment, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and the United States Army. 14. The former company fire support officer also submitted a letter of justification for reconsideration, dated 9 September 2009. In his letter he stated: The purpose of this statement is to provide a detailed description of the enemy situation in E/2-2SCR's Area of Operations (AO) on 4 SEP 07. The information is intended to help provide the reader with the most accurate data concerning the enemy forces which initiated a complex attack against an Eagle Company patrol, and Combat Outpost (COP) Blackfoot on 4 SEP 07. The information was obtained through debriefings with local nationals that were vetted by 2-2SCR THT, and routinely provided reliable information concerning enemy activities to Coalition Forces (CF) in meetings at COP Blackfoot. I was the Fire Support Officer for Eagle Company from MAR 07-FEB 09, and functioned as a company-level S-2 for the duration of the company's deployment to OIF 07-09. In the time since the original award packet was submitted, new information detailing the enemy's strength, composition, and intent during the 4 SEP 07 attack against COP Blackfoot, was reported to Eagle Company by local national residents of Al-Hadar, whose reporting credibility was proven, and substantial during Eagle Company's eight months operating from COP Blackfoot. The additional intelligence information provides details of the enemy situation, which was either not included in the original award citation, or not known when the original citation was submitted. The information illustrates that the severity of the enemy threat faced by Eagle Company on 4 SEP 07, was greater than originally thought. It also serves to underscore how [applicant's] heroic leadership and actions under fire on 4 SEP 07 prevented enemy forces from decisively engaging CF in the way they intended and planned, undoubtedly saving the lives of numerous Eagle Company Soldiers. On 29 AUG 07, during Relief in Place (RIP) operations, Eagle Company leaders were shadowing leaders from B/2-23 IN during a propane distribution taking place on Yohamama Road, which is the east­west running street immediately north of COP Blackfoot. Security cameras monitoring the main north­south running street in al-Hadar observed a silver Chevy Suburban making numerous passes on the road north of Yohamama. Reporting at the time indicated a vehicle matching this description was known to be used by South Baghdad's al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Emir A__ Y_____, (who was later detained by SOF near Monsour, Baghdad in approximately January 2008). A local national with previous ties to A__ Y_____ confirmed to us in January 2008 that A__ Y_____ and other high-level AQI leaders were conducting reconnaissance of COP Blackfoot in the days prior to the 4 SEP 07 attack. Al-Hadar was AQI's center of gravity during this time, and last significant urban stronghold for AQI in Baghdad at the time. The local national informed us that AQI was aware a new unit was taking over COP Blackfoot and A__ Y_____ wished to "cripple" the new unit in order to maintain AQI's freedom of maneuver in Al-Hadar. Later the same evening, a call to the COP Blackfoot tip-line was received by B/2-23 IN's FSO, CPT S, that claimed 50 fighters from the AQI-linked al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (TWJ) group had been sent to al-Hadar from Adamiyah in order to conduct kinetic operations against CF. The same local national informed us in January 2008 that the culmination of the enemy's plan to cripple the new unit occurred on 4 SEP 07, when they launched a hasty attack against a patrol (from 3rd platoon), that had traveled dismounted, deep into the enemy's support zone to investigate a possible VBIED bus in Mahalia 834. The firepower of the mounted QRF, which [applicant] dispatched from COP Blackfoot, reportedly thwarted the enemy's efforts to ambush the patrol along their route of march back to the COP. The enemy reportedly thought Eagle Company had taken casualties during the engagement, so enemy leaders made the decision to launch their planned, complex attack against COP Blackfoot at that time in order to capitalize on a perceived advantageous situation. Additional details of the complexity of the 4 SEP 07 attack against COP Blackfoot were reported to Eagle Company by another local national with direct ties to the kinetic leader of the attack against COP Blackfoot, G______ al-A___ (detained by Eagle Company 13 0CT 07). This information was gathered during a meeting with the local national at COP Blackfoot in April 2008. The local national reported additional information, detailing the methods and intent of the enemy during the attack. The new information highlighted how [applicant's] actions to reconstruct the COP's defensive positions in the 48 hours prior to the attack disrupted the enemy's battle plan, and how his actions during the attack prevented enemy forces from resupplying, reinforcing, and establishing additional battle positions. The local national informed us that in addition to sniper, RPG, PKC, and AK fires directed against COP Blackfoot, mortars were also fired at the COP from a small field approximately 100 meters southeast of the Tawhid Mosque in Mahalia 832. He said that G______ told him there were three sniper positions (as opposed to one previously thought) occupying buildings to the northwest of the COP (area 7). The snipers were supposed to fire at Eagle Company Soldiers in battle positions on the roof of the COP both initially, and after they were fixed by the enemy attack positions directly north of the COP. The reinforced and reconstructed guard towers and camouflage netting emplaced on the COP's north side, which [applicant] had ordered and supervised the construction on 3 SEP 07, was an unexpected hindrance for the enemy snipers and greatly disrupted their ability to acquire targets, preventing them from effectively engaging Eagle Company Soldiers on the roof of the COP. The local national said that G______ told him 120-150 enemy fighters participated in the attack against COP Blackfoot. Additionally, G______ had told him that there was supposed to be a group of 50 reinforcements who were tasked to resupply the enemy battle positions, and establish new battle positions to attack the COP from the northeast (the area around building 4). The reinforcements were reportedly armed with additional ammunition for AKs, PKCs, as well as additional RPGs. These forces were consolidating in the Ahmed ai-Muktar Mosque in south Mahalia 834, and were to be led by A__ G______ (detained by G/3-2SCR in November 2007). The local national reported that after the AH-64s began engaging the established battle positions, A__ G______ was unable to maneuver his element south to their planned location to conduct resupply, reinforcement, and establishment of additional battle positions. Thus, [applicant's] adept and effective control of the Air Weapons Team (AWT) while under intense enemy fire, prevented the enemy from maneuvering additional personnel and weapons to an area where they could effectively engage COP Blackfoot. Reports were received on the evening of 5 SEP 07, that enemy fighters conducted a show-of-force parade through the northern half of Mahalia 832 earlier that day, which involved approximately 250 armed enemy fighters on foot and in vehicles. Also, five truck-mounted DSHKA machine guns were displayed during the parade. The extraordinary heroism displayed by [applicant] while leading Eagle Company against a numerically superior force of well-armed, and a well-organized, unit of 120-150 enemy fighters during a 7-hour battle from COP Blackfoot on 4 SEP 07 undoubtedly saved the lives of numerous Eagle Company Soldiers. Additionally, [applicant's] simultaneous command and control of Eagle Company, and the Air Weapons Team, inflicted heavy losses on enemy forces during the engagement and greatly weakened the ability and will of AQI to conduct large-scale attacks against CF in AQI's final remaining urban support zone in Baghdad. 15. The former company fire support officer submitted four memoranda from captains (CPTs)/O-3 who were in the applicant's unit as new and substantive information. a. In a memorandum for the Military Awards Branch, HRC, CPT C_________ T_____ stated: I, CPT C_________ T_____ would like the following statement reviewed when considering the upgrade of [applicant's] Silver Star to a Distinguished Service Cross. I served as a rifle platoon leader and executive officer in Eagle Company, 2d Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment from May 2007 through May 2009. I was fortunate to serve with SGM [applicant] during combat operations in Baghdad from August 2007 through April 2008, during which his actions and solid leadership saved the lives of countless U.S. Soldiers and Iraqi civilians. In the last week of August 2007, our Company began to move personnel and equipment from FOB Falcon to COP Blackfoot; [applicant] ensured priority was force protection equipment, sniper screens, and crew served weapons. Within 48 hours of the Company occupying COP Blackfoot, [applicant] increased the amount of firepower and force protection of the defense plan of the previous unit by over 100%. The platoons worked 48 hours straight to ensure our positions on the roof were well built and able to be successfully defended. These efforts proved their merit when the enemy was unable to engage U.S. Forces, and allowed our fire superiority. On the morning of 4 September 2007, my platoon went on a patrol into the enemy's support zone to investigate a possible VBIED when we were engaged by over 15 armed insurgents. INTEL reports received later revealed the enemy attempted to cut off our platoon to capitalize on reduced combat power at COP Blackfoot. [Applicant] quickly dispatched the mounted QRF from 1st platoon to secure my platoon's movement and also redirected an Air Weapons Team to over watch our location. His quick decision to reinforce my platoon in the afternoon of 4 September kept the enemy from enveloping our position, and allowed us to safely return to the COP. Within minutes of my platoon arriving back at the COP, Eagle Company was in direct contact with the enemy from numerous locations. My platoon was the first to the roof to reinforce the security positions operated by 2nd Platoon. As I climbed the stairs to the roof, I encountered [applicant] in the stairwell under tower 1. He was carrying the litter holding SPC H_____ down to the aid station; H_____ was shot in the torso during the initial enemy contact. Once they reached the aid station, [applicant] quickly returned to tower 1 on the rooftop to assess the situation and continue to communicate with the Air Weapons Team. During the firefight, [applicant] moved across the rooftop to each tower while under direct enemy fire to maintain command and control of the company. His command presence under direct fire significantly inspired the Soldiers' will to fight. As a young platoon leader under fire for the first time, [applicant's] leadership, poise, and heroism set the example for me to lead my platoon through that grueling firefight. b. In a memorandum for record, dated 21 September 2009, CPT J_____ W____ stated: I served as a rifle platoon leader in Eagle Company, 2d Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment from January 2007 to January 2009. It was my utmost privilege to serve with [applicant] (then Eagle Company First Sergeant) from April 2007 to April 2008, seven of those months in combat operations in Baghdad. He is hands-down the best Non-Commissioned Officer and leader that I served with in combat; he is a dedicated and steadfast performer, displaying selfless and fearless actions and leadership on numerous occasions during our tour. [Applicant's] leadership and heroic attributes were exemplified on 04 September 2007 during a seven-hour battle against Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) fighters, when they mounted a well coordinated, large-scale attack on our company's Combat Outpost (COP). During the last week of August 2007 our company began the transition from FOB Falcon to COP Blackfoot. [Applicant] ensured that priority defensive equipment was pushed from the FOB to the COP, including PRO-glass, camouflage netting, crew-served weapons and mounts, and sandbags. Upon arriving to the COP, [applicant] directed that the priority of work consist of improving the degraded defensive measures, in particular, the rooftop. With his vast experience and intuition, [applicant] knew the enemy would soon be testing us. He gave the demanding but necessary directive for the company to continuously improve our force protection measures for 48 hours. In my opinion, the standard to which [applicant] required the defensive positions to be improved would not have been reached had he not been present. And it was this standard that proved crucial in the defense of the COP, especially in the initial moments of the attack. On 04 September 2007, not even a full day after defensive improvements had been completed, my platoon was on COP security. In the afternoon our 3rd platoon conducted a dismounted patrol to confirm/deny a possible VBIED only to be nearly enveloped by a growing number of AQI fighters. Quickly and accurately assessing the situation [applicant] deployed the QRF to reinforce 3rd platoon. He also directed an Air Weapons Team (AWT) to over watch the platoons' movement back to the COP, allowing them to safely return. Within fifteen minutes of our 3rd platoon and the QRF returning to the COP, my platoon was simultaneously engaged from three different positions to our north with AK-47s, PKM machineguns, RPGs, and sniper fire. The enemy fire was accurate, immense, and sustained; however, due to the camouflage netting and improved battle positions that [applicant] implemented the enemy was unable to distinguish our positions and movement on the rooftop. Rounds and shrapnel impacted the PRO-glass and sandbags where there had previously been no protection. Without a doubt this saved numerous lives in the initial attack and throughout the firefight. Only one Soldier, SPC H_____, was wounded in the initial volley of enemy fire. This was determined later to have been from an enemy sniper, as the round was recovered from his equipment. Immediately after the firefight began, I moved to the northwest tower where SPC H_____ had been seriously wounded and where the majority of the enemy fire was being directed. Moments later, as SPC H_____ was being placed on a litter, [applicant] arrived at the northwest tower. Under direct enemy fire [applicant] and another Soldier grabbed SPC H_____'s litter and evacuated him to the aid station. Later in the firefight, during a lull in the fighting, [applicant] directed our QRF platoon to evacuate SPC H_____ to the Combat Support Hospital, saving his life. After bringing SPC H_____ to the aid station, [applicant] immediately returned to the northwest tower to assess and coordinate the firefight. Without hesitation or regard for his safety, [applicant] moved from tower to tower under direct enemy fire, identifying enemy positions, repositioning weapon systems, and inspiring our Soldiers to fight tenaciously. In addition to commanding and controlling an entire company engaged in a complex attack from three different directions, as well as the evacuation of SPC H_____, [applicant] also directed the AWT to conduct numerous engagements during the entire the firefight. He accurately directed the AWT to engage static and moving targets with both Hellfire missiles and 30mm machine gun fire, resulting in the destruction of the insurgents involved in the attack. Under direct enemy fire on the rooftop, [applicant] continuously moved between the company command post and the aid station, in order to defeat an attack by a well-organized and resolute enemy force. [Applicant's] stoic and courageous leadership during the seven hour battle on 04 September 2007 against 150 enemy fighters inspired and guided the Soldiers and leaders of Eagle Company to decimate the enemy's will to fight; as well as dealt a crippling blow to AQI's ability to conduct large-scale attacks in their last urban stronghold in Baghdad. With absolutely no doubt, [applicant's] crucial preparations, flawless leadership, and extraordinary heroism saved the lives of an untold number of American Soldiers that day. c. In a memorandum for the Military Awards Branch, HRC, dated 23 September 2009, CPT B_______ B_____ stated: I have been in the US Army for 17 years and I served as the Squadron Physician Assistant for 2d Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment from July 2006 to March 2009. During my time in service, I have never served with a more courageous and capable leader than [applicant]. I had the honor of providing forward medical support to Eagle Company, 2d Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment for seven months during combat operations at Combat Outpost (COP) Blackfoot in Baghdad, Iraq. He distinguished himself on countless occasions during his time as the 1SG for Eagle Company, but the selfless actions, decisive leadership, and keen tactical assessment he demonstrated on 04 September 2007 identify him as one of the greatest Non-Commissioned Officers serving in the Army today. [Applicant] had previously identified that there were potential weaknesses in the defensive measures at COP Blackfoot while conducting his leader recon. He ensured priority was given to transportation of defensive equipment during Eagle Company's transition from Forward Operating Base (FOB) Falcon to COP Blackfoot. [Applicant] directed that the first priority of work was to improve the degraded defensive measures, with particular attention to be directed at the rooftop, which at the time had no overhead concealment and poorly constructed fighting positions. The rooftop of COP Blackfoot was the key to defending the COP and [applicant] knew that, without significant improvement, it would potentially be in enfilade from enemy fire. Immediately upon arriving to COP Blackfoot, he set a demanding schedule that, within 48 hours, resulted in the complete restoration of COP Blackfoot's defensive measures and significant improvement in the amount of firepower available. Throughout the entire 48 hours, [applicant] could be found providing additional guidance and direction as the defensive measures were repaired or improved. I have no doubt in my mind that [applicant's] decisions during the first 48 hours on COP Blackfoot saved countless lives and prevented the enemy from gaining the initiative. On 04 September 2007, less than 12 hours after defensive measures had been improved to standard, 3rd Platoon Eagle Company was dispatched into a known enemy support zone to investigate a suspected VBIED. Third Platoon was initially engaged by approximately 15 armed insurgents and was nearly enveloped as the number of insurgents escalated during the engagement. [Applicant] precisely assessed the situation and rapidly deployed the QRF to reinforce 3rd platoon before they were enveloped. He also directed an Air Weapons Team (AWT) to provide over watch for both platoons as they maneuvered back to COP Blackfoot, and placed AWT on standby once both platoons safely returned. Less than 15 minutes after both platoons entered the gate to COP Blackfoot, the rooftop defensive positions were simultaneously engaged from multiple buildings to the north with AK-47s, PKM machineguns, RPGs, and sniper fire. Despite the volume and prolonged intensity of fire directed at the rooftop positions only one soldier was injured during the initial volley. The carefully planned and improved fighting positions, as well as the sniper netting covering the roof, frustrated the enemy's attempts to overwhelm the rooftop with concentrated and sustained fire. Immediately after the firefight began, [applicant] moved to the rooftop and began directing the Aerial Weapons Team that he had the foresight to place on standby in the area. He maneuvered under enemy fire to the northwest tower where SPC H_____ had been seriously wounded during the initial moments of the attack and assisted in evacuating the Soldier to the aid station. [Applicant] directly returned to the northwest tower where the majority of the enemy fire was being directed. While still maintaining direct control of AWT, he proceeded to provide command and control to an entire company engaged in a complex determined attack by 150 armed insurgents for the next seven hours. [Applicant] came and checked on the status of SPC H_____ during a lull in the fighting before he made the decision on when he would be able to ground evacuate the casualty to the CASH. After leaving the aid station I witnessed [applicant] grabbing cans of ammunition to run back up to the positions on the rooftop. [Applicant]'s courageous leadership, extensive combat experience, and tactical decisions during the battle on 04 September 2007 and the 48 hours prior saved the lives of countless soldiers. The extraordinary leadership and selfless courage displayed by [applicant] while under direct enemy fire inspired the soldiers and leaders of Eagle Company throughout the seven hour battle and resulted in the successful defense of COP Blackfoot, as well as considerable enemy losses. In addition, his actions significantly weakened the ability of AQI to conduct large-scale attacks in their last urban stronghold in Baghdad. d. In a memorandum for the Military Awards Branch, HRC, dated 1 November 2009, CPT F_______ P_____ stated: I, CPT F_______ P_____, would like to make the following statement concerning my perspective of circumstances surrounding the events of 4 September 2007. Particularly, I want to convey the actions of [applicant] during that day. I served as a rifle platoon leader in Eagle Company 2/2 SCR from May 2009 until August 2009. As the first sergeant of the company, [applicant] had a direct and lasting impact on the company and its Soldiers. There is no better example of [applicant]'s impact than of his actions on 4 September 2007. During the last week of August 2007, the leadership of Eagle Company began to move into COP Blackfoot, a combat outpost located in southern Baghdad. The company began observing the actions of the company that had been occupying the COP. During that same time period, Eagle Company began sending Soldiers and equipment to the outpost. Upon arriving to the COP, [applicant] immediately noticed that the force protection status of the COP was inadequate. The first project that the [applicant] undertook was to increase the defensive posture of the COP. He directed and oversaw the implementation of crew served weapons at key positions on the roof. Moreover, he fortified the guard towers and increased the cover and concealment at vulnerable points throughout the building. On September 4th the company commander and the executive officer were not present at the COP. There were only a handful of Soldiers from the previous company left in an advisory role. According to all intelligence reports that we had received, the enemy was well aware that a different unit had occupied the COP. That afternoon at around 1400, 3rd PLT conducted a dismounted patrol to investigate a possible VBIED. [Applicant] set the conditions for the mission by calling in for an air weapons team to over watch the platoon's movement. The enemy had previously experienced a great amount of freedom of maneuver and was prepared to encounter a dismounted patrol during the day. 3rd PLT began to receive small arms fire after searching for the possible VBIED. [Applicant] directed my platoon, 1st PLT, to act as QRF and assist 3rd PLT. I moved to their location and engaged the enemy while also loading some 3rd PLT Soldiers on my vehicles. The remaining dismounted Soldiers moved back to the COP with 1st PLT and AWT as over-watch. When we returned to the COP, [applicant] led an AAR to determine what had happened. During the review, there were explosions and small arms fire that were directed at the COP. The platoon leaders immediately executed the plan as previously briefed by [applicant] for the defense of the COP. 3rd platoon reinforced the roof where 2nd PLT was already providing security. As the QRF, 1st PLT prepared the Strykers for a possible mission into the sector. Within minutes of the firefight, SPC H_____ was shot in the northwest tower. [Applicant] was one of the first Soldiers to assist him as he had been close to the tower when it happened. [Applicant] assisted in carrying SPC H_____ to the aid station and then continued to direct firepower against the enemy. He directed AWT against multiple different targets as well as directed the platoon level leadership to coordinate the fight. When the company gained superiority of the enemy, [applicant] determined that it was necessary to take SPC H_____ to the hospital. He sent 1st PLT and I transported the wounded Soldier to the combat support hospital. Throughout the engagement, [applicant] maintained situational awareness of the developments on the battlefield. He controlled the company's assets from the roof of the COP without regard to his safety. His leadership was truly the determining factor in the company's success on that day. The impact of the company's success on 4 September 2009 was crucial to the Soldiers for the remaining 14 months of that deployment. They gained confidence in their leadership and against the enemy. In addition to saving lives, [applicant]'s intrepidness set an invaluable example for his subordinates and superiors alike. 16. On 3 August 2010, the former Commander, 2/2 SCR, now a COL, recommended approving upgrade of the applicant's Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross. He stated he strongly supported the applicant being awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. His actions of 4 September 2007 were taken without hesitation or regard for his own personal safety, undoubtedly saved the lives of American Soldiers. He stated we must recognize our heroes. In a memorandum for the Military Awards Branch, HRC, dated 7 October 2009, he stated: As the former commander of 2nd Squadron, 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment during OIF 07-09, which includes the events of 4 September 2007, I strongly recommend upgrading this award. The following additional information is presented for your consideration: The Squadron assumed command and control responsibilities for its new sector on 1 September, marking the beginning of "left seat" relief-in-place activities. The official Transfer of Authority was scheduled to occur on 7 September. The Squadron did not receive all authorized Theater Provided Equipment until 7 September. This equipment was provided by a third­party unit and did not come directly from the unit being relieved. Therefore, Eagle Company did not have its full complement of protective equipment available at the time of the attack. Neither the company commander nor the company executive officer were present at the COP during the attack due to ongoing relief-in-place and property accountability coordination elsewhere. [Applicant] assumed command of the company in absentia and personally directed the defense of the COP. These factors better describe the unfamiliar and ambiguous environment in which [applicant] stepped forward to lead his company on 4 September. Viewed in this light, his actions are even more incredible and inspiring. [Applicant]'s instincts to immediately upgrade the COP's defensive posture and his heroic leadership in a desperate situation resulted in no loss of American life and only one Soldier wounded. His personal courage and example overcame uncertainty, spurred action, and saved lives. 17. On 5 August 2010, the former Commander, 2 SCR, a COL, recommended approving the upgrade of the applicant's Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross. He strongly supported the award of the Distinguished Service Cross for the heroic action of SGM [applicant] on 4 September 2007. He stated the applicant's action, without regard for his personal safety, saved the lives of his Soldiers and repelled and defeated a coordinated attack on his unit. In a memorandum for the Military Awards Branch, HRC, dated 24 August 2010, he stated: I, COL J___ R_______, fully endorse and recommend that [applicant] be recognized for his valor and heroism under fire at Combat Outpost Blackfoot, East Rashid, Bagdad, on 4 September 2007. He is fully deserving of the Distinguished Service Cross, and I make this recommendation without hesitation or reservation. As the Commander of the 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment (2SCR) during this time, I know, without doubt, [applicant's] actions saved the lives of Soldiers and inflicted a severe and permanent blow to AI Qaeda (AQI) operating in Southern Baghdad. [Applicant]'s personal courage under direct fire from a large, complex, and well organized attack denied AQI access to a key symbol in East Rashid, Baghdad, and permanently deprived them of a spectacular event they were determined to create in their stronghold. [Applicant]'s actions inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and combined with the efforts of Eagle Company on 4 September 2007, defeated the will of AQI in East Rashid. The extraordinary and courageous leadership displayed by [applicant] during the attack, combined with his steadfast preparation for an attack he anticipated would come, directly resulted in saving the lives of Soldiers of Eagle Company, 2d Squadron, 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment. 18. On 1 September 2010, the former Commander, MND-B, an MG, recommended approving upgrade of the applicant's Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross. He stated "Sir - my strongest recommendation." 19. On 29 October 2010, the former Commander, MNC-I, now a GEN, recommended approving upgrade of the applicant's Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross. He stated "His heroic actions warrant the Distinguished Service Cross. I fully believe he is much deserving of this award." 20. On 10 November 2010, the former Commanding General, MNF-I recommended the applicant's award of the Silver Star be upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross. 21. A letter, dated 9 August 2012, from the Office of the Secretary of the Army notified the applicant his reconsideration for possible upgrade of his Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross was considered by the ADB in January 2011. The ADB determined the degree of action and service did not meet the criteria for award of the Distinguished Service Cross. Based on the recommendation of the ADB, the Commanding General, HRC, acting on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, disapproved the upgrade of the applicant's award of the Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross. 22. The applicant provides a 15-page self-authored statement wherein he states: a. He desires the ABCMR to provide a de novo review of his case on grounds of legal error and injustice. b. The ABCMR should note that his recommendation for the Distinguished Service Cross was lost and not properly tracked from almost the time of its submission. In January 2008, his company commander forwarded his recommendation for award of the Silver Star to the chain of command in recognition of the combat action that took place on 4 September 2007. This award was recommended for approval until it reached the Multi-National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I) commander, then LTG O, who had approval authority for the Silver Star in accordance with the provisions of Army Regulation 600-8-22, recommended the award be upgraded to the Distinguished Service Cross. c. Multi National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) received the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation and then held an awards board for a Silver Star on 11 April 2008, completely overlooking the recommendation from LTG O for an upgrade to the Distinguished Service Cross. After the awards board the recommendation went missing until August 2008. The award was not reviewed or monitored until his grandfather e-mailed GEN P asking about the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation. Then GEN P located the award himself and then signed it on 1 August 2008 as approved. The DA Form 638 (Recommendation for Award) does not specify whether the approved award was the Silver Star or the Distinguished Service Cross. d. As per Army Regulation 600-8-22, Table 3-6 (Delegation of Award approval Authority - Wartime Criteria), the approval authority for the Distinguished Service Cross is the Commanding General of a U.S. Army Force serving in the rank of GEN. It also cannot be further delegated. By the regulation, therefore, when GEN P approved the first DA Form 638, ratifying LTG O's recommendation for an upgrade, the award should have been an approved Distinguished Service Cross. Instead, he received the Silver Star in the mail in September 2008 at Fort Bliss, TX. e. In August 2009, it was brought to the attention of HRC that the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation was lost and not processed correctly by MNF-I. The Chief, Military Awards Branch, placed the entire burden for the proper processing of the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation on his grandfather, Mr. R and his former Squadron Commander, Colonel (COL) R. All the required documentation was submitted. However, COL R and Mr. R continually faced a moving target as requirements on what was needed changed repeatedly. The response from HRC required 6 months. COL R's and Mr. R's perception was that HRC was attempting to drag the process out by making it too difficult. This process went back and forth from COL R to HRC for the next 2 1/2 years before HRC would accept the documentation to process. f. It appeared that the Chief of the Awards and Decorations Branch was not clear on the process for considering the award. As pointed out by the ABCMR, there is a dispute on the actual approval authority of the Distinguished Service Cross. The message, dated 21 May 2007, subject: Delegation of Wartime Approval Authority to MNF-I, created confusion. This message, contrary to Army Regulation 600-8-22, states that GEN P had the delegation of wartime approval authority to award the Silver Star by the Assistant Secretary of the Army. The message also goes into further detail about Medal of Honor and Distinguished Service Cross recommendations: "Recommendations for the Medal of Honor will be forward through MNF-I and CENTCOM to USA HRC (AHRC-PDO-PA), for further processing. Recommendations for award of the Distinguished Service Cross, Distinguished Service Medal, and PUC will be forwarded through CG [Commanding General], MNF-I to USA HRC (AHRC-PDO-PA) for further processing." Therefore, the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation should have gone directly from MNF-I to HRC and then been forwarded to the Secretary of the Army. None of this happened after the MNF-I received the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation from then LTG O. In fact, the award was mislabeled, not processed correctly, and then lost, having never been sent from MNF-I to HRC as required in the message. Further, the MNF-I Wartime Awards policy, dated 12 September 2004, appendix A, also stated that recommendations for the Distinguished Service Cross would be sent to HRC. When the failure to follow any process was brought to the attention of Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, he did nothing to correct this error. He should have known the process or looked into it. Instead the perception was that Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch was only making the process as difficult as possible, by only accepting the documents after 2 1/2 years of pushing back. The applicant contends that the actions of Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, were not in furtherance of paragraph 6 of the message which states: "To preserve the integrity of the Army awards program and to ensure meaningful recognition for truly deserving Soldiers, special care should be exercised so that military decorations for meritorious and valorous achievement or service are only approved for those service members who truly distinguish themselves among their comrades by exceptional performance in combat or in support of combat operations." g. Contrary to HRC's assertion, no additional justification for the award was needed. By regulation and directives, HRC should have taken action immediately after the award recommendation was brought to their attention. The Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, finally accepted the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation packet on 5 January 2011. On 1 February 2011, after just 17 working days, the Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, sent a letter to the applicant's Senator informing him that the Distinguished Service Cross had been disapproved. His former chain of command was surprised by the outcome and how quickly the award disapproved. As evidence of the lack of due diligence and attention to detail applied in the processing of the award, HRC wrote that he was a "Retired" Soldier. In fact, he was on active duty and remains on active duty. h. The letter to the Senator was the only document provided by HRC. COL R called HRC Awards and Decorations Branch to ask about the status of the Distinguished Service Cross and was told that he did not have the proper clearance to get any information about the award. It seems outrageous that a COL can be denied an answer regarding the status of the award of one of his Soldiers. How is the chain of command supposed to track this type of award if they do not have the authority to do so? The applicant requested his Senator obtain the ADB Summary Sheets on his behalf. The Chief, Awards and Decorations Branch, provided a response to the Senator in April 2011 informing him that he could not send the Senator this information because of Army and DOD policy. i. In 2011, the DODIG conducted a reprisal investigation and one of the topics investigated was the process that was used for the Distinguished Service Cross. The applicant refers to partially redacted statements appearing on three pages that he purports to be extracted from the DODIG proceedings which read, in part: (1) "On October 29, 2010, GEN O, former CG MNC-I, signed an Army 'Recommendation for Award' form recommending approval of an upgrade of [the applicant's] Silver Star to a Distinguished Service Cross. On November 10, 2010 GEN P, former CG, MNF-I, also signed the form recommending an upgrade of [the applicant's] award. GEN P wrote on the form, 'Truly heroic and deserving of [Distinguished Service Cross].' The award was to recognize [the applicant's] actions in September 2007 when he exposed himself to enemy fire to evacuate a severely injured Soldier.' The remainder of this extract reads: 'Based on the following [the applicant's] denial of an upgrade of his Silver Star to a Distinguished Service Cross was not in reprisal for his protected communications. Additionally, the evidence did not support that [redacted] influenced that action. Award Standard, Per Army Regulation 600-8-22, 'Military Awards,' the Distinguished Service Cross is awarded for acts of 'extraordinary heroism' that were 'so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from their comrades.'" (2) "Award Approval Process - According to the May, 25, 2010, Secretary of the Army memorandum, 'Composition and Operations of Army Decoration and Unit Awards Boards,' the ADB will recommend whether to approve or disapprove the Distinguished Service Cross. The board consists of three voting members and a simple majority rules. If the board recommends disapproval of the award, it will forward the recommendation and action to the CG, HRC. The CG, HRC, will either forward the recommendation and action to the Senior ADB for further review or take final action by disapproving the award." (3) "Testimony of Responsible Management Officials - As stated previously, [the applicant's] nomination for upgrade to a Distinguished Service Cross concerned his involvement in a combat arms event. [Redacted], the president of the ADB who voted on the nomination, was a former combat arms officer. [Redacted] testified he voted against the upgrade to Distinguished Service Cross because he did not believe [the applicant's] actions met the standard for that award, or for that matter, he stated, even a Silver Star. [Redacted] further testified that [the applicant's] actions were 'business as usual for a sergeant in combat' and that there was not 'a lot of loss of life and a lot of saving of life.' [Redacted] testimony matched the comments he wrote on the ADB Member Vote Sheet. [Redacted] stated that even though GEN O and GEN P signed the 'Recommendation for Award' form for the upgrade, 'typically we make a decision on the merits of the case.' He also stated he had previously not concurred with the recommendation of two generals on other award recommendations and that to not concur with a senior officer was not unusual for him." (4) "Statement of MG F to the DODIG (regarding her actions when serving as the HRC Commander in the rank of BG at the time) - MG F did not recall the specifics of [the applicant's] award process, but testified she would have been the final approval authority. She said she also had the option to refer the award to the SADB for further review if her decision on whether to agree with the board was a close call. MG F explained that if she was having difficulty making a decision because the actions of the service member were close to the criteria for the Silver Star and the Distinguished Service Cross, she would refer it to the SADB. But if it was obvious to her that the actions fit clearly within one or the other, then she would make the decision. MG F, speaking in general terms, explained that a Silver Star is for gallantry in action and is defined by taking leadership and putting yourself in harm's way, whereas a Distinguished Service Cross is for extraordinary heroism, meaning that you put yourself in direct enemy line of fire. MG F further testified that GEN O's and GEN P's signatures on the Recommendation for Award form in support of the upgrade of [the applicant's] Silver Star to Distinguished Service Cross would have influenced her, but only in that she wanted to know who in the chain of command had reviewed the packet and from where the recommendation came. MG F said that in a big part she considered witness statements and whether these witnesses saw the action first hand or got the information second or third hand. j. The applicant contends that the statement made by the president of the ADB above is misplaced and inappropriate. The most inappropriate comment made by him was "there was not enough loss of life and not a lot of saving of life." This clearly shows the president's misapplication of both the award criteria and the board process. By way of context, during the fighting that formed the factual basis for the award, from 1 September to 31 October 2007, the applicant's regiment had paid a very heavy price in loss of life and wounded. As detailed in his award package, the applicant carried a Soldier's body back and held him in his lap. The applicant prayed they would be able to dodge the IEDs that were emplaced by the enemy so he could send his body back to his family. Their regiment lost 29 Soldiers during the deployment and it is completely disrespectful for the awards board president to suggest they did not lose more. k. The applicant notes that a second board member wrote in a statement to the DODIG: "[Redacted] was also a combat arms officer. He testified he voted against the upgrade to Distinguished Service Cross because he believed that [the applicant's] actions did not meet the standard for that award. [Redacted] testified that [the applicant] 'did not fire a weapon or engage personally with an enemy soldier,' but organized a fight and evacuation. [Redacted] said it was [the applicant's] responsibility as a 1SG (first sergeant) to take charge of the Forward Operating Base when it came under attack since the company commander and company executive officer were not present. [Redacted] testimony matched the comments he wrote on the ADB Member Vote Sheet.' [Redacted] also opined that [the applicant's] actions did not even warrant a Silver Star. [Redacted] said he considered the fact that GEN O and GEN P signed the 'Recommendation for Award' form, and that 'more often than not' the boards he participated in voted with the general, but like [Redacted], he also had previously voted contrary to two generals on the other award recommendations." l. The applicant contends that the second board member pointed out that he did not fire a weapon which is not a standard found in the regulation. Though this is incorrect and also not relevant; the board member also said that the applicant "did not engage personally with an enemy soldier." Once again, the applicant does not understand this comment as they were not fighting enemy soldiers, but members of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, a terrorist organization. Further, the directing of fires from key weapons systems, directing Soldiers where to engage the enemy, and calling in air strikes and clearing their fires on the enemy for over six hours is personally engaging the enemy. The board member also wrote in his award board summary sheet that the applicant only "organized a fight and evacuation" and it was his job to take charge of the Forward Operating Base when it came under attack. The fact that the board member does not distinguish a combat outpost, which had about 80 U.S. Army Soldiers defending against an enemy force between 100-150 members of Al-Qaeda, from a forward operating base, comprised of approximately 5,000 American Soldiers in a more garrison environment, shows that misplaced logic of the board or lack of credibility. Further, both GEN P and GEN O, two senior combat commanders who fully understood the conditions under which he operated, recommended the award. m. The applicant notes that the third board member wrote in a statement to the DODIG: "[Redacted] testified he voted to approve the upgrade to Distinguished Service Cross because [the applicant] fulfilled the responsibilities of the company commander, fire support officer, and executive officer, thus enabling the unit to be successful. [Redacted] wrote on his ADB member Vote Sheet, 'I believe that [the applicant's] actions saved many Soldiers lives. His courage under direct fire enabled his unit to deprive the enemy from overrunning their [Forward Operation Base/Command Observation Post.]" The applicant states the third board member agreed with the six commanders who were on the ground during the combat action which included the commanders of the squadron, regiment, division, MNC-I, and the MNF-I. This is in addition to four eyewitness statements of officers who were in the battle. This is a total of eleven people who were actually on the ground; all their recommendations were disregarded because of the two board members who, by their own statements, applied flawed or biased logic when considering the award. n. The applicant notes that MG F, in her capacity as the HRC Commander, reviewed the award, read the recommendation of the ADB, and made decisions as to whether to approve the ADB recommendation or, if more review was warranted in a close case, send the award to the Senior Army Decorations Board (SADB). This responsibility was entrusted to her by the Secretary of the Army. The applicant contends that MG F's statement to the DODIG begins with her inability to recall the specifics of the Distinguished Service Cross recommendation. As of 31 May 2013, according to the HRC Awards branch statistics, there have been 13 Distinguished Service Crosses awarded for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. During Operation Iraqi Freedom there have been 15 Distinguished Service Cross awarded. Given this small number of awards, most people would think that MG F would have better recollection of this case. MG F also had the option to send the award to the SADB if the decision of the ADB was a close call. After 11 votes for "yes" by combat commanders and eye-witness Soldiers in the fight and two votes for "no" from officers applying an inappropriate standard, it would be reasonable to believe that the consideration of this award was, at a minimum, a close call requiring further review by the SADB. MG F specifically states that a Distinguished Service Cross is awarded for putting yourself in "direct enemy line of fire." This very language is included in the Distinguished Service Cross award recommendation based on sworn statements from eyewitnesses. The applicant refers to extracts of statements that are at Enclosures 4 and 16. The applicant states that the recommendations from GEN O and GEN P would have influenced her to further consider the award. The applicant notes that their signatures are on the first three pages of the DA Form 638 and states it appears that MG F did not read any of the witness statements, all from commissioned officers, who were eyewitnesses to the combat action that formed the basis for the award. MG F should not have been the approval authority because Army Regulation 600-8-2 states that GEN P was the approval authority, and makes clear that the award should have been sent to the Secretary for review. o. The applicant states that the message, dated 21 May 2007, subject: Delegation of Wartime Approval Authority to MNF-I, inadvertently created confusion that led to this process which was not the intent. If the regulation had been followed these awards would not have been lost or mishandled. The wartime delegation approval is intended to give more authority to the commanders on the ground to have the ability to approve higher level awards. It was not supposed to be used to take their power away and place it in the hands of non-commander board members applying biased standards. The applicant spoke to a member of the SADB who told him they never reviewed the wartime conditions approval authority as required every 30 days. They did not review it once because it was too difficult; as a Soldier who served in Iraq for 3 years this is an unacceptable response. Also, the regulation states award authority is gradually increased as the length and intensity of conflict increases, and the number of Soldiers committed to the combat theater increases. During the time of this action and award recommendation the war in Iraq had been going on for 4 years, it was a height in violence, and during the troop surge having more Soldiers on the ground than ever before in the conflict. Given these facts, it makes no sense that the Army would decrease the level of approval authority for the combat commanders on the ground. This goes against the regulation and the applicant does not think this is the intent of the Secretary of the Army. The regulations do not contemplate a relatively ad hoc board at HRC overriding, questioning, evaluating, and judging recommendations of senior commanders in combat who are, without question, uniquely more qualified to judge heroism of a Soldier under their command circa September 2007 in the Iraq combat theater. p. The applicant attests that his entire chain of command, to include the most senior commanders on the ground recommended the Distinguished Service Cross. Failing to give at least a modicum of deference to the well-considered recommendations of the senior-most leaders in theater is a serious and substantial error. In summary, the evidence in this case overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the ADB did not properly or objectively judge the award recommendation and supporting documents before them. Further, from the statements included in the DODIG investigation, it appears that the entire HRC award review process is pro forma and did not seriously or properly review a combat award recommended for approval by senior combat commanders. q. The applicant concludes that the Secretary of the Army, Combat Commanders, and the Soldiers who have sacrificed so much expect at least a thorough, objective, and unbiased view of combat award submissions. Sadly, this standard was not even minimally met in this case. Given these many discrepancies, he respectfully requests that this entire award submission be reviewed de novo. He is asking that this process be corrected, and this award be properly processed and sent to the Secretary of the Army for his review and decision. 23. The applicant provides a General Officer Memorandum of Concern, dated 16 June 2007. This memorandum was rendered by a GEN and the final sentence of the memorandum states: "This document will not be filed in any system of records maintained by the Army." In view of the foregoing, the fact that the document pertains to a matter that has no specific relation to this case, and the fact that the applicant offers no explanation as to how he came into possession of this document, its contents shall not be discussed in this Record of Proceedings. 24. Army Regulation 600-8-22 prescribes Army policy, criteria, and administrative instructions concerning individual and unit military awards. It is the responsibility of any individual having personal knowledge of an act, achievement, or service believed to warrant the award of a decoration, to submit a formal recommendation into military command channels for consideration. The Army does not condone self-recognition; therefore, a Soldier may not recommend himself/herself for award of a decoration. a. The Medal of Honor is awarded by the President in the name of Congress to a service member who distinguishes himself or herself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his or her comrades and must have involved risk of life. Incontestable proof of the performance of the service is required and each recommendation for the award of this decoration will be considered on the standard of extraordinary merit. Again, only the President can award the Medal of Honor. b. The Distinguished Service Cross is awarded to a person who, while serving in any capacity with the Army, distinguished himself or herself by extraordinary heroism not justifying the award of a Medal of Honor; while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States; while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing or foreign force; or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing Armed Force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The act or acts of heroism must have been so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from their comrades. c. The Silver Star is awarded to a person who, while serving in any capacity with the U.S. Army, is cited for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The required gallantry, while of a lesser degree than that required for the Distinguished Service Cross, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction. d. Wartime conditions award approval authority: (1) The Medal of Honor is awarded only by the President. Other decorations are awarded by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Army. When wartime conditions erupt, authority to further delegate decorations approval authority will be requested from the Secretary of the Army. The senior Army commander will submit a request through the Commander, HRC. Initial delegation will be requested consistent with the award approval authority outlined in table 3-6, at the end of this chapter. Initial delegation authority is not absolute, but is provided for contingency planning purposes only. Delegation of awards approval authority will be reviewed at 30 day intervals after combat commences to determine if further delegation would be expedient and justified. Award authority is gradually increased as the length and intensity of conflict increases, and the number of Soldiers committed to the combat theater increases. (2) Combat and wartime conditions present opportunities and events which lead to award of decorations, service medals, and badges to Soldiers. Most of these awards and decorations are inactive until the commencement of hostilities. The immediate requirement by commanders to recognize deserving personnel generates heavy administrative requirements throughout all echelons. (A) To help meet the demand and to expedite recognition of combat deeds, delegation of wartime awards approval authority commences and is delegated to commanders based on level of command (see table 3-6). (B) As larger elements or armies are committed, authority to approve higher level awards is granted based on the seniority level of Army commanders. 25. HRC message, dated 21 May 2007, subject: Delegation of Wartime Approval Authority to MNF-I announced that the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve Affairs (M&RA) delegated to the Commanding General, MNF-I, authority to award wartime decorations of the Silver Star and below to United States and foreign military personnel assigned, attached, or under operational control to MNF-I. The message also states recommendations for award of the Distinguished Service Cross will be forwarded through the Commanding General, MNF-I to HRC for further processing. 26. All Army COLs, LTCs (promotable) and SGMs assigned to HRC are eligible for ADB duty. The ADB consists of three voting members. When considering recommendations for valor awards, a minimum of one voting member will be qualified in one of the following branches: Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Engineer, Aviation, or Special Forces. The senior member by grade (or date of rank, if applicable) will serve as president. A simple majority vote will rule. The ADB will consist of all officers for officer award recommendations. For enlisted award recommendations, the ADB will consist of two officers, one of whom would be the president, and one HRC SGM. The CG, HRC will appoint ADB members. This established process for reviewing certain award recommendation, to include the Distinguished Service Cross, was most recently approved by the Secretary of the Army in May 2010. However, the ADB review process has been in place since June 1921, as directed by the then-Secretary of War. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS: 1. The Army awards system recognizes and reacts to distinguishing acts of valor and bravery for Soldiers. The commander on the ground acts as a steward to ensure the proper recognition of our brave men and women. The Army has always been fully committed to the responsibility of properly recognizing Soldiers for their valor, heroism, and meritorious service through a fair and consistent decorations and awards policy and process. a. Awards and decorations are very important to Soldiers. Equally important is the governance of the awards program. For the awards program to be credible to the Soldiers and the American people, it must ensure that it recognizes individuals with a military award worthy of their accomplishments and acts of valor. It must ensure the integrity of the award is maintained through strict procedures and proper justifications. Finally, it must place trust and confidence in commanders to properly execute the program. b. The criteria for military awards are set forth in statutes, executive orders, and appropriate regulations. The criteria for the three highest valor awards are established by law and have not changed from what they were in past conflicts. Army regulation and policy establish the standards by which those awards are processed, approved, and presented. This consistency upholds the heritage of the awards and the legacy of the heroes who have earned them. c. Army policy allows any Soldier to recommend another Soldier for an award; however, the Army does not condone self-recognition. Therefore, a Soldier may not recommend himself/herself for award of a decoration. The Army's awards program relies on those with first-hand knowledge of a Soldier's heroic or valorous action to recommend the Soldier for the appropriate award. Award recommendations are sent up through the Soldier's chain of command to company, battalion, brigade, division, and corps commanders. Commanders at every level of review can recommend approval or upgrade of the award based upon their authority. Commanders with authority to approve awards also have the authority to downgrade or disapprove awards based on their judgment, knowledge, and the criteria established for the award. Command involvement is critical for program success. 2. The highest awards for valor are, in descending order, the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, and the Silver Star. a. The Medal of Honor is awarded by the President in the name of Congress to a service member who distinguishes himself or herself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his or her life above and beyond the call of duty while engaged in action against an enemy of the United States, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The deed performed must have been one of personal bravery or self-sacrifice so conspicuous as to clearly distinguish the individual above his or her comrades and must have involved risk of life. Incontestable proof of the performance of the service is required and each recommendation for the award of this decoration will be considered on the standard of extraordinary merit. Again, only the President can award the Medal of Honor. b. Distinguished Service Cross – The second highest award bestowed upon a Soldier for valor is the Distinguished Service Cross. The Distinguished Service Cross is awarded to a Soldier who distinguishes himself or herself by extraordinary heroism not justifying the award of a Medal of Honor while engaged in an action against an enemy of the United States, while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing/foreign force, or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in an armed conflict against an opposing Armed Force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The act or acts of heroism must be so notable and have involved risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades. Today, the Distinguished Service Cross is approved by the Secretary of the Army. c. Silver Star – The third highest award for combat heroism is the Silver Star. The Silver Star is awarded to a Soldier who is cited for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force or while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict against an opposing armed force in which the United States is not a belligerent party. The required gallantry, while of a lesser degree than that required for award of the Distinguished Service Cross, must nevertheless have been performed with marked distinction. 3. As evidenced by the above descriptions, there exists a very fine distinction between "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity," "extraordinary heroism," and "gallantry in action." Often times, the degree of heroism required for a particular award is blurred and subject to personal interpretation. What is not subject to interpretation is the selfless sacrifice demonstrated by all recipients of these three highest awards for valor. All recipients are, without doubt, true American heroes. 4. The applicant's valor and courage on 4 September 2007 under extremely hazardous conditions is acknowledged and applauded; he is truly an American hero. However, it is extremely difficult to make the necessary distinctions as to whether a particular act constitutes "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity," "extraordinary heroism," or "gallantry in action." 5. While the applicant believes his actions were similar to or overshadow those of other Soldiers who were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, each case stands on its own merits. In this case, the applicant's record shows he was clearly cited for gallantry in action against an enemy of the United States while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an opposing foreign force in Iraq. A decision was made to initially award him the Silver Star. 6. However, one member of his chain of command felt his actions warranted a higher award. This commander apparently determined that his actions rose above "gallantry in action" to the level of "extraordinary heroism." As a result, he recommended that the applicant be considered for award of the Distinguished Service Cross. His award was staffed through the remainder of the chain of command and the award of the Silver Star was ultimately approved. 7. The applicant contends that because GEN P signed the award certificate on 17 January 2008 he could not have seen the recommendation signed by then LTG O. However, the date of General O's signature is not shown on the DA Form 638. The approval for the award of the Silver Star was signed by GEN P on 1 August 2008. Although the reason for the disparity between the date of approval and the dates on the certificate and orders is unknown, the applicant has provided no evidence to support his contention. 8. Army Regulation 600-8-22 clearly states that when wartime conditions erupt, authority to further delegate decorations approval authority will be requested from the Secretary of the Army. The senior Army commander will submit a request through the Commander, HRC. Initial delegation will be requested consistent with the award approval authority outlined in table 3-6, at the end of this chapter. Initial delegation authority is not absolute, but is provided for contingency planning purposes only. Delegation of awards approval authority will be reviewed at 30 day intervals after combat commences to determine if further delegation would be expedient and justified. Award authority is gradually increased as the length and intensity of conflict increases, and the number of Soldiers committed to the combat theater increases. Although an HRC message, dated 21 May 2007, delegated authority to the Commanding General, MNF-I, to award wartime decorations of the Silver Star and below to United States and foreign military personnel assigned, attached, or under operational control to MNF-I, there was no such delegation of authority for the Distinguished Service Cross. In fact, the message also stated recommendations for award of the Distinguished Service Cross would be forwarded through the Commanding General, MNF-I to HRC for further processing. 9. The applicant contends that GEN P initially had the authority to approve the award of the Distinguished Service Cross on the original DA Form 638 if he had been aware of LTG O's recommendation to upgrade the award of the Silver Star. However, HRC message, dated 21 May 2007, subject: Delegation of Wartime Approval Authority to MNF-I, only delegated to the Commanding General of MNF-I authority to award wartime decorations of the Silver Star and below to United States and foreign military personnel assigned, attached, or under operational control to MNF-I. Therefore, at the time of the submission of the original DA Form 638, GEN P was not the award-issuing authority for the award of the Distinguished Service Cross. Recommendations for award of the Distinguished Service Cross had to be forwarded through the Commanding General, MNF-I to HRC for further processing. GEN P did not indicate on the DA Form 638 that he recommended upgrading the award from the Silver Star to the Distinguished Service Cross; therefore, when he approved the award recommendation he was approving the originally recommended Silver Star. 10. The decision of whether to award an individual a decoration and which decoration to award is a judgment call made by the commander having award approval authority. Commanders at the time of the act, or shortly thereafter, determined the applicant's actions were so extraordinary and so noteworthy as to warrant award of the Silver Star. 11. The applicant's award has since been reviewed and re-reviewed for an upgrade to the Distinguished Service Cross. However, the ADB determined the degree of action and service rendered by the applicant did not meet the criteria for award of the Distinguished Service Cross. Based on the board's recommendation, the Commanding General, HRC, on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, disapproved award of the Distinguished Service Cross affirming that the previously-approved award of the Silver Star was the appropriate recognition for the applicant's heroic actions. 12. The ADB was able to evaluate the applicant's act of heroism against other acts of heroism from the Global War on Terrorism era which did result in award of the Distinguished Service Cross. The board of seasoned senior members opined that the applicant's actions did not rise to the level of "extraordinary heroism" and "risk of life so extraordinary as to set the individual apart from his or her comrades" in action necessary to merit an upgrade to the Distinguished Service Cross. Therefore, an upgrade of his Silver Star is not warranted. 13. The authority for the ADB to render decisions on awards is delegated by the Secretary of the Army. This process has been in place for all Soldiers since 1921. Therefore, there was no apparent error or inequity in the processing of the applicant's request for an upgrade of his Silver Star to a Distinguished Service Cross nor its subsequent denial. 14. All statements and evidence submitted in this case were carefully reviewed and considered. His actions on 4 September 2007 during actual combat were truly gallant and performed with marked distinction. However, there is no change in the account of the applicant's actions on that day or new evidence presented that would suggest an error or an injustice was committed by all three echelons of the Army, tactical (MNC-I), operational (MNF-I), or strategic (HRC ADB). As such, after a thorough review of the applicant's actions and those by his chain of command, the Silver Star remains the appropriate award and there is no reason to change it. BOARD VOTE: ________ ________ ________ GRANT FULL RELIEF ________ ________ ________ GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF ________ ________ ________ GRANT FORMAL HEARING ____X____ ____X____ ____X____ DENY APPLICATION BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION: 1. The evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice. Therefore, the Board determined that the overall merits of this case are insufficient as a basis to amend the decision of the ABCMR set forth in Docket Number AR20130001706, dated 14 May 2013. 2. The applicant is a true American hero; his selfless acts of bravery and devotion to duty were in keeping with the highest traditions of the military service. The award of the Silver Star is the appropriate recognition. In making this determination, the applicant and all others concerned should know this action in no way diminishes the sacrifices made by him in service to our Nation. All Americans should be justifiably proud of his service in arms. _______ _ _X______ ___ CHAIRPERSON I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case. ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont) AR20140001068 3 ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1 ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont) AR20140001068 2 ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1