IN THE CASE OF: BOARD DATE: 13 September 2016 DOCKET NUMBER: AR20160011967 BOARD VOTE: _________ _______ ________ GRANT FULL RELIEF ________ ________ ________ GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF ________ ________ ________ GRANT FORMAL HEARING ___x____ ___x____ ___x____ DENY APPLICATION 2 Enclosures 1. Board Determination/Recommendation 2. Evidence and Consideration IN THE CASE OF: BOARD DATE: 13 September 2016 DOCKET NUMBER: AR20160011967 BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION: The evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice. Therefore, the Board determined the overall merits of this case are insufficient as a basis for correction of the records of the individual concerned. __________x_______________ CHAIRPERSON I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case. IN THE CASE OF: BOARD DATE: 13 September 2016 DOCKET NUMBER: AR20160011967 THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE: 1. Application for correction of military records (with supporting documents provided, if any). 2. Military Personnel Records and advisory opinions (if any). THE APPLICANT'S REQUEST, STATEMENT, AND EVIDENCE: 1. The applicant requests, in effect: * reinstatement of the Basic Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Badge, concurrent with the removal of the badge's revocation order * removal of a referred officer evaluation report (OER) for the rating period 10 November 2008 through 28 May 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the contested OER), or in the alternative, correction by deleting the checkmarks in Part II (Authentication), item d (This is a Referred Report, do you wish to make comments?) * based on favorable consideration by the Board of his above-cited requests, convene a Special Selection Board (SSB) to consider him for promotion to major (MAJ) * to personally appear before the Board 2. The applicant states, in effect, as an EOD lieutenant (LT), he was required to complete Team Leader Certification (TLC) within 12 months. He was deployed to Iraq from 4 March 2008 to 1 June 2009. During his 15-month deployment, he did his best to balance combat operations with TLC training events, but he was unsuccessful. As a result, he was counseled, received a referred OER, and his EOD Badge was revoked. He asserts his failure was the direct result of inadequate training resources, allocated to complete training on an arbitrarily enforced timeline. a. Statement of Facts: (1) Between fiscal years 2006 and 2008, EOD authorizations increased by 37 percent (1,500 to 2,050 personnel). This occurred as the Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED) fight began to escalate in Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF). * EOD staff sergeant (SSG)/E-6 billets increased by 35 percent * primary trainer authorizations (sergeants first class (SFC)/E-7) increased only 28 percent * total EOD officer billets grew by 48 percent, with a 1,680 percent increase in first lieutenant (1LT) authorizations (2) The growth in EOD authorizations, coupled with an extended EOD training timeline of one year and high attrition rates, resulted in units being understrength in the grades of SSG through master sergeant (MSG), and 1LT through captain (CPT) for many years. This situation forced the leadership to focus training priorities and resources on the SSG EOD Team Leader, considered the heart of EOD combat power. (3) During OIF and OEF, it was common for EOD companies to deploy with 75 percent, or fewer, certified EOD teams. Based on this fact, unit training during deployments focused on certifying SSGs to fill team leader billets to maintain proficiency. (4) During the period in question, TLC relied on the mastery of 23 key tasks, with many having no room for error. Historically, enlisted Soldiers took 3 years to complete TLC, but this changed with Execute Order (EXORD) 057-09, Subject: Army EOD Team Leader Certification Standardization. * this EXORD, dated 16 December 2008 but effective 1 May 2009, stated all newly assigned officers (LT or CPT) had to complete TLC in 12 months, with 180 days being the goal * the message did not address TLCs that were already in progress * with only 5 months between announcement and implementation, there was very little time to prepare for the new requirements, especially for units that were already deployed * courses of action in the event of failure were addressed for Soldiers in military occupational specialty 89D (EOD Specialist), but there was no guidance regarding officers * after implementation, the policy was not widely enforced; this was particularly true for deployed EOD platoon leaders, special staff in battalions, and EOD team members either injured or on leave (5) The applicant tried to balance combat operations with TLC training. * it was pretty common to conduct a training scenario on his reset day * he would then transition to primary duty, running 12 to 16 hours of continuous EOD response missions over a 48 hour period * this was followed by 2 days of secondary duty: first response to calls from on-base, and back-up support to primary and secondary teams * then tertiary duty: 2 days of back-up support while conducting reset and repairing equipment * if he failed a TLC training event, it could take up to 1 week before there was time and personnel available to retest * he studied on his own time, but there was no substitute for actual training scenarios constructed and adjudicated by the rarely-available Master EOD Badge technicians (6) He worked diligently to complete all TLC tasks. * between 5 December 2007, when he signed in at his unit, and 4 March 2008, when the unit deployed, his leadership apportioned very little time for his TLC * during this same period, he completed three EOD-specific courses, which consumed about 2 of the 12 months mandated by the EXORD * as noted earlier, the majority of unit training resources were dedicated to certifying SSGs * this was because their primary mission was to be team leaders, while his duty was to serve as platoon leader; ultimately, his unit's success was measured by their ability to deploy teams with effective team leaders (7) His official military personnel file (OMPF) is void of any documents that indicate his performance as a platoon leader was substandard. In fact, his final OER contained comments extolling his performance, and he received an Army Commendation Medal as an end-of-tour award. In stark contrast is his EOD Badge revocation, resulting from his failure to complete TLC. b. EOD Policy Violations. (1) His company commander, CPT PAC, did not provide quality control for the TLC process. This was a violation of Army Regulation (AR) 75-15 (Policy for EOD), Appendix B (EOD TLC Process), paragraph B-2 (TLC Responsibilities), subparagraph e (EOD Company Commander) [citing current regulation dated 17 December 2013]. * oversight and quality control for the TLC process was kept relatively opaque for those outside the company command team * the applicant knows other Soldiers struggled to complete certain key TLC tasks; they were retrained and retested * he does not know the outcome of individual certifications or whether the other Soldiers were able to complete TLC within 12 months * while he was counseled, this counseling was not delivered in a reasonable amount of time to correct deficiencies; the record of this counseling does not exist in the applicant's personnel records (2) The regulation permits an officer in the grade of O-4 or higher, or an EOD battalion commander to grant a newly assigned EOD officers a one-time 6-month extension. * CPT PAC chose not to seek an extension for the applicant to complete his TLC * the applicant was never informed of the existence of this option * such extensions were common during this timeframe due to the high operational tempo being experienced by all deployed EOD personnel * he is confident he would have completed his TLC, had he been granted the extension (3) The regulation mandates the training and certification process to begin immediately on an EOD Soldier's reception or integration in the unit. The applicant's company commander failed to do this. (4) The applicant firmly believes his suspension from EOD platoon leader duties, and the subsequent revocation of his EOD Badge were based on some unknown personal displeasure on the part of his company commander. This displeasure left the applicant devoid of his commander's mentorship and guidance. c. Unjustified Badge Revocation. (1) His EOD Badge revocation was unjustified, based on the criteria in AR 600-8-22 (Military Awards). (2) His revocation did not meet any of the criteria for revocation: * he never refused to participate in EOD duties * he did not commit any gross negligence or any flagrant violations of EOD safety procedures during TLC * he never initiated any action to terminate his EOD status prior to completion of 18 consecutive months of EOD duty d. OER Referral Timeline. (1) The contested OER was submitted from Iraq to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) as a "senior rater option" just before his redeployment to the Continental U.S. (CONUS). (2) Though not initially marked as a "referred report," HRC rejected the contested OER and returned it to the senior rater. This occurred solely on the basis of negative comments written in the rater's section. He asserts: * these comments were directly tied to the revocation of his EOD Badge * the senior rater's section contained no negative comments with regard to his potential as a multifunctional logistician (3) The senior rater emailed the contested OER to the applicant for acknowledgement of the negative comments, and gave him a suspense of 2 days. The applicant contends this suspense violated AR 623-3 (Evaluation Reporting System), wherein it states the rated officer will be given a "reasonable suspense date." (4) He submitted his response to the negative comments with the understanding they would be forwarded directly to HRC. He had directed his comments to HRC, and, had he known they should instead have been addressed to his senior rater, he would have done so. He believed this rebuttal was his only recourse, and, thus, did not pursue an appeal or request a commander's inquiry. (5) His senior rater presumably did nothing other than attach the applicant's comments and forward them with the contested OER back to HRC. HRC, in turn, filed the OER with his comments in his OMPF, reflecting the contested OER as a referred report. (6) He had already been selected for CPT, and was verbally counseled by his battalion leadership that the contested OER would not affect his career. (7) The contested OER would not have been considered derogatory by the MAJ Promotion Selection Board (PSB) had it not been marked as "referred." He is certain the PSB considered the contested OER as all previously masked OERs were moved to the performance folder of his OMPF. e. Detrimental injustice. (1) He asserts he relied on the assurances of his battalion commander and command sergeant major, stating this "setback" (EOD Badge revocation) would not be detrimental to his career. (2) Unfortunately, 6 years after the badge's revocation, and shortly before the MAJ PSB for which he was eligible, a Military Personnel (MILPER) Message and Army Directive (AD) 2015-07 required all LT OERs to be unmasked. (3) The unmasking of all LT OERs effectively eliminated the idea that service as a platoon leader was a formative, learning experience in which certain mistakes would not be detrimental to future service. This strategic move is, at its very essence, a violation of trust between junior officers and HRC. Many raters and senior raters wrote OERs that were not strongly enumerated as a way of challenging young LTs to strive for improvement. Had every LT earned superior ratings at the beginning of their careers, there would have been no room for improvement, especially in the minds of the rated individuals. f. Punitive effects of badge revocation. Over 6 years after his EOD Badge was revoked, he was denied promotion to MAJ due in large part to the referred OER, linked directly to said badge revocation. This is double punishment; first being the revocation of his EOD Badge, second being his elimination from the EOD career field. 3. The applicant provides: * Unclassified/For Official Use Only (FOUO) document dealing with authorizations * printout from the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATTRS) * Unclassified/FOUO EXORD, dated 16 December 2008 * Officer Record Brief * two DA Forms 1059 (Service School Academic Evaluation Report) for the rating periods of 11 December 2006 through 13 March 2007 and 9 April 2007 through 9 November 2007, respectively * five certificates of training * Orders Number 351-225, dated 17 December 2007 * PO Number 136-001, dated 16 May 2009 * PO Number 146-08, dated 26 May 2009 * Army Commendation Medal award certificate * contested OER * memorandum, dated 20 August 2009, Subject: OER Referral (Report Period 20081110 - 20090528), [applicant] * memorandum for record, dated 24 August 2009, Subject: OER Rebuttal * Orders Number 140-151, dated 20 May 2009 * Permanent Orders (PO) Number 312-003, dated 8 November 2007 * AD 2015-07, dated 27 January 2015 * Naval Postgraduate School, Masters of Business Administration (MBA) Professional Report, Grade Point Average as a Predictor of Success in EOD Training, dated December 2009 * FOUO, AR 75-15 CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE: 1. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 1552(b), provides that applications for correction of military records must be filed within 3 years after discovery of the alleged error or injustice. This provision of law also allows the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) to excuse an applicant's failure to timely file within the 3-year statute of limitations if the ABCMR determines it would be in the interest of justice to do so. While it appears the applicant did not file within the time frame provided in the statute of limitations, the ABCMR has elected to conduct a substantive review of this case and, only to the extent relief, if any, is granted, has determined it is in the interest of justice to excuse the applicant's failure to timely file. In all other respects, there are insufficient bases to waive the statute of limitations for timely filing. 2. Having had prior service in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) as a Reserve Officers' Training Corps cadet, he was appointed as a USAR commissioned officer in the rank of second lieutenant (2LT). He executed his oath of office on 6 May 2006. 3. Orders Number 112-35-A-607, dated 22 April 2006, issued by Headquarters, U.S. Army Cadet Command, ordered him to active duty with a 6-year active duty commitment. 4. Orders Number 289-197, dated 16 October 2007, issued by HRC, promoted him to 1LT effective 27 November 2007. 5. PO Number 312-003, dated 8 November 2007, issued by EOD Training Detachment, awarded him the EOD Badge, effective 9 November 2007, based on his successful completion of mandatory training. 6. He was assigned to the 710th Ordnance Company (EOD) on or about 5 December 2007. Orders Number 351-225, dated 17 December 2007, issued by Headquarters, U.S. Army Garrison, directed his deployment to Iraq to participate in OIF, proceeding on or about 15 March 2008. 7. In or around May 2009, the applicant received the contested OER, a senior rater option OER, covering 7 months of rated time, for his duties as platoon leader, while assigned to the 710th Ordnance Company, during the period 10 November 2008 through 28 May 2009. His rater was CPT PAC, company commander, and his senior rater was Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) GDS, battalion commander. Part II, item d indicates this is a referred report. a. Part IV (Performance Evaluation - Professionalism (Rater)) had all "Yes" blocks checked for Army values and for Leader Attributes/Skills/Actions. b. Part V Performance and Potential Evaluation (Rater)): * sub-item a (Evaluate the Rated Officer's Performance during the Rated Period and His/Her Potential for Promotion) - "Satisfactory Performance, Promote" * sub-item b (Comment on Specific Aspects of the Performance) contained many favorable comments; also included was the statement "Although [Applicant] continued to work towards his EOD Team Leader certification, an identification of continued deficiencies has resulted in a recommendation that he be reclassed [i.e. reclassified] from the EOD Field. Despite his lack of EOD proficiency, [Applicant] has demonstrated great potential as a platoon leader with excellent management skills." * sub-item c (Comment on Potential for Promotion) - "Already selected for promotion and slated to attend CLC3 (Combined Logistics Captains Career Course)" c. Part VII (Senior Rater): * sub-item a (Evaluate the Rated Officer's Promotion Potential to the Next Higher Grade) - "Fully Qualified" * sub-item b (Potential Compared with Officers Senior Rated in Same Grade) shows no box check * sub-item c (Comment on Performance/Potential) - contains generally favorable comments, and also included "A very good platoon leader performance by [Applicant] during this deployment" 8. Orders Number 056-51, dated 25 February 2009, issued by Combined Joint Task Force Troy (C-IED), awarded the applicant the Army Commendation Medal for exceptionally meritorious service during Operation Iraqi Freedom for the period 6 March 2008 to 2 June 2009. 9. PO Number 136-001, dated 16 May 2009, issued by Combined Joint Task Force Troy (C-IED), revoked PO Number 312-003, and rescinded the award of the EOD Badge. The record is void of information as to why the award was rescinded. 10. Order Number 140-151, dated 20 May 2009, issued by HRC, showed the applicant was promoted to CPT effective 1 June 2009. 11. On 24 August 2009, the applicant submitted a written rebuttal to the contested report. He essentially stated: * on 20 August 2009, he was informed via email that the [contested OER] was rejected by DA * the comments under review were: * "Although [Applicant] continued to work towards his EOD Team Leader certification, an identification of continued deficiencies has resulted in a recommendation that he be reclassified from the EOD Field" * "Despite his lack of EOD proficiency, [Applicant] has demonstrated great potential as a platoon leader with excellent management skills" * he arrived at the unit 3 months before the deployment, and spent the majority of that time conducting deployment preparation * while deployed for 15 months, he balanced EOD operational duties with his platoon leader responsibilities * his primary focus was on his Soldiers and their continued well-being and safety; his TLC became secondary to the success of his platoon * as the deployment was ending, his commander initiated proceeding intended to remove him from the EOD field; he cited a perceived lack of progress in his [the Applicant's] TLC * his platoon sergeants were forced to truncate his training to focus on redeployment issues; had he been given the opportunity to finish his TLC during the final weeks of deployment, he expressed confidence he could have been successfully certified * based on the recommendations of his rater and senior rater, the Task Force commander stripped him of his EOD Badge; he was sent to the battalion to complete the final two weeks of deployment * the root of the entire problem was his relationship with his commander, which lacked any form of constructive communication; he received "zero professional development" from his commander, and he sought such mentorship in other areas * his company executive officer, CPT B, and many other staff officers in the battalion managed to fill this void with sound judgment and advice * the time spent at battalion was extremely enlightening into the proper way to manage Soldiers in combat; he appreciated the opportunity both for what he learned and the relative safety it offered * he began to fear for his safety while still in his company; his commander no longer had his best interests in mind, and was prepared to do anything in his power to remove him from the company * many of his fellow EOD technicians also relegated him to this fate; while his beliefs and perceptions may not be considered factual, they were nonetheless his own views, and seriously affected his performance as an EOD technician and platoon leader * he cannot express the crushing stress lifted from his mind when he transitioned to the battalion staff; with this transition, he was able to effectively communicate his sense of safety and well-being to his family * he expressed gratitude to the battalion commander for moving him to the battalion staff * while he may not agree with his removal from the EOD field, he believed it was the best choice for himself and his family; he was still confident he could have completed his TLC with proper time and training * he was, at that point, focused on his attendance at the CPT's career course, and he looked forward to continuing his service in the Army 12. MILPER Message Number 14-352, dated 10 December 2014, Subject: FY 15 MAJ, Operations (OPS), Operations Support (OS), and Force Sustainment (FS), PSB, Zones of Consideration, showed the applicant's DOR was in the zone of consideration for this board. It also stated, for OERs to be reviewed by the board, all reports had to be received by 20 March 2015. 13. MILPER Message Number 15-050, dated 19 February 2015, Subject: Amendment to the FY 15 Colonel OPS, OS, and FS; FY 15 MAJ OPS, OS, FS; FY 15 MAJ Medical Corps and Dental Corps; FY 15 CPT Army Competitive Category; FY 15 CPT Army Nurse Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Army Medical Specialist Corps, and FY 15 Chief Warrant Officer Three (CW3), CW4, and CW5 PSBs, Zones of Consideration, stated 2LT and 1LT OERs were masked on promotion to CPT, but 1LT (promotable (P)) OERs were not to be masked. 14. According to the HRC website, the FY 15 MAJ FS PSB convened from 30 March 2015 to 1 May 2015. 15. In an email, dated 2 September 2016, an official from HRC confirmed the applicant was in the zone and considered for promotion by the FY 15 MAJ FS PSB. The PSB did not recommend the applicant. REFERENCES: 1. AR 600-8-22 (Military Awards) prescribes policies and procedures for military awards. With regard to the EOD Badge, a. Any commissioned officer or enlisted Soldier may be awarded the EOD Badge if they meet, or have met, all of the following: * successful completion of conventional "render-safe" qualification, as prescribed for the EOD course of instruction * assigned to an EOD position for which the basic EOD course is a prerequisite * for permanent award, service in an authorized EOD position must have been satisfactory for 18 months b. All commanding generals of divisions and higher commands, commanders of separate groups or equivalent headquarters exercising operational control of EOD personnel or units, may approve all levels of the EOD Badge. c. The EOD Badge may be revoked when: * the awardee is convicted by court-martial for refusal to participate in EOD operations * by a commander having authority to award the badge determines the awardee was guilty of gross negligence in the performance of EOD duties, or a flagrant violation of EOD safety procedures or regulations * when the awardee initiates, in his or her initial tour of EOD duty, action that results in termination of his or her EOD status prior to the completion of 18 consecutive months of EOD duty 2. AR 623-3, in effect at the time, established the policies and procedures and served as the authority for preparation of the OER. a. The paragraph which describes performance and potential evaluations stated Army evaluation reports were assessments on how well the rated Soldier met the demands of his/her duty assignment and adhered to the professional standards of the Army officer corps. (1) Performance would be evaluated by observing action, demonstrated behavior, and results from the point of view of Army values, leadership framework and responsibilities identified on the evaluation forms, counseling forms, and other pertinent regulations. (2) Potential evaluations would be performance-based assessments of the rated officers of the same grade to perform in positions of greater responsibility and/or higher grades. b. Guidance to raters stated Part IV contains a listing of the Army values and the dimensions of the Army's leadership doctrine that define professionalism for the Army officer. These apply across all grades, positions, branches, and specialties. They are needed to maintain public trust, confidence, and the qualities of leadership and management needed to sustain an effective officer corps. c. The paragraph regarding the modification to previously submitted reports stated: * requests to alter, withdraw, or replace a report will not be honored * as an exception, information that was unknown or unverified when the report was prepared but is later verified, and is so significant that it would have resulted in a higher or lower evaluation, had it been known d. Evaluation reports accepted for inclusion in the Soldier’s official record were presumed to be administratively correct, have been prepared by the proper rating officials, and to represent the considered opinion and objective judgment of rating officials at the time of preparation. e. To justify deletion or amendment of a report, the appellant must produce evidence establishing clearly and convincingly that the presumption of regularity should not be applied to the report under consideration or that action was warranted to correct a material error, inaccuracy, or injustice. Clear and convincing evidence must be of a strong and compelling nature, not merely proof of the possibility of administrative error or factual inaccuracy. The burden of proof rests with the appellant. 3. AR 600-8-29 (Officer Promotions), currently in effect, prescribes policies and procedures governing promotion of Army commissioned and warrant officers on the active duty list. Chapter 7 provides for SSBs. SSBs are governed by the same instructions provided to the boards that considered or should have considered an officer for promotion. a. Paragraph 7-2 states SSBs may be convened under Title 10, U.S. Code, section 628 to consider or reconsider commissioned or warrant officers for promotion when Headquarters, Department of the Army discovers one or more of the following: (1) An officer was not considered from in or above the promotion zone by a regularly-scheduled board because of administrative error (SSB required). (2) The board that considered an officer from in or above the promotion zone acted contrary to law or made a material error (SSB discretionary) (3) The board that considered an officer from in or above the promotion zone did not have before it some material information (SSB discretionary). b. A material error is defined as being of such nature that in the judgment of the reviewing official (or body), had it been corrected at the time the officer was considered by the board that failed to recommend him/her for promotion, it would have resulted in a reasonable chance that the officer would have been recommended for promotion. Reconsideration may also be granted when material information was missing from the officer's file when seen by a promotion board. 4. AD 2015-07, dated 27 January 2015 (no longer in effect), stated: * the Army policy of masking OERs was created with the advent of DA Form 67-9 (OER) and the implementation of the senior rater managed profile technique * effective with the release of AD 2015-07, HRC could no longer mask OERs and will move previously masked OERs to the performance section of the OMPF 5. AR 75-15, dated 22 February 2005 and in effect at the time, prescribes policies and procedures for implementing the Army EOD program. a. Paragraph 1-15 (Commander, U.S. Army EOD Units and Officers-in-Charge of Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) Elements), states, with regard to training, commanders will, within the mission and functions of their unit: * supervise and evaluate technical and tactical training of subordinate organizations * provide unexploded explosive ordnance recognition classes * comply with requirements in the Environmental Protection Agency Military Munitions rule, to include training for EOD Soldiers that fulfills 29 Code of Federal Regulations 1910.120 (Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response) b. Paragraph 2-2 (EOD Qualifications and Training) states all officers (area of concentration (AOC) 89E (EOD Officer) volunteering for and/or assigned to primary duty positions requiring EOD skills must meet the prerequisites and requirements of AR 611-105 (Selection, Processing, and Training of Officer Volunteers for EOD Duty) for initial and refresher training. 6. AR 15-185 (ABCMR) prescribes policies and procedures for the ABCMR. It states, in pertinent part, the ABCMR considers individual applications that are properly brought before it. a. Paragraph 2-9 contains guidance on the burden of proof. It states, in pertinent part, that the ABCMR begins its consideration of each case with the presumption of administrative regularity, which is that what the Army did was correct. b. The ABCMR is not an investigative body and decides cases based on the evidence that is presented in the military records provided the independent evidence submitted with the application. The applicant has the burden of proving an error or injustice by a preponderance of the evidence. c. The ABCMR may, in its discretion, hold a hearing or request additional evidence or opinions. It states further, in paragraph 2-11, that applicants do not have a right to a hearing before the ABCMR. The Director or the ABCMR may grant a formal hearing when deemed appropriate. DISCUSSION: 1. By regulation an applicant is not entitled to a hearing before the Board. The Director of the ABCMR, or a panel of the Board, can authorize a personal appearance. In this case, the evidence of record is sufficient to render a fair and equitable decision at this time. As a result, a personal appearance hearing is not necessary to serve the interest of equity and justice in this case. 2. With regard to the reinstatement of his EOD Badge, he contends the basis for his EOD Badge revocation was his failure to complete TLC. He does not, however, provide any documentary evidence to prove this assertion. Additionally, the evidence of record is void of any documentation explaining the command's reasons. a. The ABCMR is not an investigative body and begins its consideration of each case with the presumption of administrative regularity. b. Because of the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed the actions taken by the command in revoking his EOD Badge were proper, and done in accordance with the regulations and policies in effect at the time. 3. Given the guidance issued in MILPER Message 15-050, it is very likely the PSB considered the contested OER. a. This message indicated, while OERs for Soldiers in the ranks of 2LT and 1LT were not to be considered, any reports given while in the rank of 1LT (P) were subject to the promotion board's review. b. The applicant was a 1LT (P) when he received the contested OER. 4. Concerning his contentions for the removal or modification of the contested OER: a. He claims the PSB would not have considered the report as derogatory, were it not reflected as being referred. The fact HRC rejected the report, however, suggests, despite the applicant's claims, the negative comments were viewed as significant enough to require referral for his comment. If HRC viewed the comments this way, it is highly likely the PSB did as well. b. While he acknowledges he failed to obtain his TLC within the mandated 12 months, he points out the timeline for TLC was reduced significantly, training resources were very limited, and he describes how hard it was to balance combat operations with training commitments. He additionally appears to contend there were improprieties associated with this failure. (1) He claims the time requirements were inconsistently enforced, but offers no evidence to support this assertion. (2) He states his commander chose not to seek a one-time 6-month extension that, he asserts, would have given the time he needed to finish his TLC. Providing such an extension, however, was a matter of command-discretion. Lacking evidence of bias or malfeasance, the Board must presume the commander acted properly based upon his assessment of the applicant's situation. (3) He further contends his commander failed to provide the quality controls outlined in AR 75-15 for the TLC process. In making this assertion, however, he cites a version of the regulation that did not become effective until more than 4 years after the end-date of the contested OER. There is no proof that the commander did not fulfill the requirements of the regulation in effect at the time. 5. Evaluation reports accepted for inclusion in the Soldier’s official record are presumed to be administratively correct, to have been prepared by the proper rating officials, and to represent the considered opinion and objective judgment of rating officials at the time of preparation. To remove or amend a report, an applicant must produce evidence that clearly and convincingly established the presumption of regularity does not apply. The applicant has not offered sufficient proof the contested OER did not represent the considered opinion and objective judgment of his rating officials. Nor does he provide any evidence the comments contained in the contested OER were factually inaccurate. 6. As to his contention the contested report served as the basis for his non-selection for promotion to MAJ, this is speculative, and does not invalidate the contested OER. There is insufficient evidence to show his non-selection for promotion can be attributed to this particular OER. In addition, promotion selection boards are not required to divulge the reasons for a Soldier’s non-selection. 7. Given the lack of supporting evidence to reinstate his EOD Badge or remove the contested OER, there does not appear to be sufficient basis to grant his request for an SSB. //NOTHING FOLLOWS// ABCMR Record of Proceedings AR20150000953 Enclosure 1 ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont) AR20160011967 2 ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Enclosure 1 ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont) AR20160011967 16 ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Enclosure 2