ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE OF: BOARD DATE: 1 May 2019 DOCKET NUMBER: AR20170008465 APPLICANT REQUESTS: correction of the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) finding of reprisal by her against Command Sergeant Major (CSM) X X . APPLICANT'S SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD: * DD Form 149 (Application for Correction of Military Record under the Provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1552) * Memorandum, Department of Defense (DOD) Explosives Safety Board, Alexandria, VA, dated 14 May 2017, subject: Request for Correction of Military Records for (Applicant) of the DAIG Finding of Reprisal * Memorandum, U.S. Army Inspector General (DAIG) Agency, dated 6 January 2017, subject: Request for Reconsideration of Inspector General Conclusions for Case Number 15-00XXX (ROI 14-0XX) of Substantiated Finding of Reprisal on the Basis of Mistake of Evidence, New Evidence/Information and Mistake of Law * Enclosure 1 – Request a copy of Report ROI 14-0XX (Freedom of Information Act FOIA), Response Memorandum, dated 10 December 2015, and USAIG Agency Report of Investigation, (partial redacted) * Enclosure 2 – DA Form 2166-8, (Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report (NCOER)), period covered 15 February 2013 through 8 December 2013 * Enclosure 3 – Memorandum, Headquarters, U.S. Army North (Fifth Army), Fort Sam Houston, TX, dated 31 May 2016, subject: Reconsideration Request of (Applicant) * Enclosure 4 – Memorandum for Record, U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, dated 7 January 2015, subject: Rater and Senior Rater Responsibilities for 52d Ordnance Group (Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)) from 11 January 2014 to 7 March 2014 * Enclosure 5 – 52d Ordnance Group (EOD) Officer and Enlisted Rating Schemes as of 10 January 2014 * Enclosure 6 – Memorandum for Record, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-101, Headquarters, Regional Command-East, Afghanistan, dated 18 November 2013, subject: Executive Summary, Army Regulation 15-6 (Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers) Investigation, Senior Leader Misconduct, CJTF Paladin * * Enclosure 7 – Memorandum for Record, CJTF-101, dated 18 November 2013, subject: Facts, Findings, and Recommendations, Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, Senior Leader Misconduct, CJTF * Enclosure 8 – Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, dated 6 November 2013, subject: Senior Leader Misconduct (Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) X ), with 3 enclosures and 21 exhibits * Enclosure 9 – Email, dated 12 December 2013, subject: RE (Unclassified) NCOER (CSM X ), with enclosed articles, "Upward Bullying," dated 4 August 2014 and "Harassing Women with Power: The Case for Including Contra-power Harassment Within," Villanova University School of Law, 2006, Paper 59 * Enclosure 10 – Memorandum, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), International Joint Command (IJC), Afghanistan, dated 7 October 2013, subject: Review of CJTF Paladin Morale Assessment, with enclosed Standard Form 600 (Chronological Record of Medical Care), dated 17 January 2014 * Enclosure 11 – DA Form 67-9 (Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs)), periods covered 13 June 2011 through 12 June 2012, 13 June 2012 through 8 May 2013, and 9 May 2013 through 9 January 2014, with email from Brigadier General (BG) X___ X. X___, dated 10 January 2014 * Enclosure 12 – Letter, Office of the Inspector General, Washington, DC, dated 6 April 2015 (Completion of Investigation) * Enclosure 13 – Memorandum, DOD Explosives Safety Board, Alexandria, VA, dated 21 December 2015, subject: Appeal to the Initial Denial Authority – Expedited Request for the Unredacted Copy of Investigation for Case Number 15-00XXX (ROI 14-0XX) to Include all Exhibits and Documents Considered in the Findings Determination, with 3 enclosures * Letter, DODIG, Alexandria, VA, dated 5 April 2017, Reconsideration of Reprisal Complaint FACTS: 1. The applicant was serving in the Regular Army in the rank of colonel (COL) at the time of her application to the Board. 2. The applicant states: a. The error of finding is a personal injustice, as well as an injustice to the system which was used in a manner inconsistent with truth and fairness. This included the Soldier's false official statement to initiate the investigation, as well as facts, evidence, and information provided for review and consideration. b. She did not reprise against CSM X . CSM X received a fair, impartial, and accurate NCOER as recommended by CSM X___ X___ (unit CSM), CSM X (IJC/III Corps CSM), and the legal advisor LTC X___ X___ (IJC/III Corps) to ensure the fairness and appropriateness of his NCOER. a. c. She assessed CSM X 's performance during the rating period as "Successful/Superior" with a "2/2" rating as his senior rater. The NCOER was less successful than his previous NCOER, but was consistent with his behavior during the rating period. The Army Regulation 15-6 investigation into senior leader misconduct in the facts and findings recommendations, identified CSM X 's behavior, which was formally identified as "disrespectful and subversive" with attempts to "disrupt unity of command and good order and discipline" was inconsistent with appropriate leader behavior in accordance with Army Regulation 600-20 (Army Command Policy). d. The Army Regulation 15-6 investigation was initiated after she reported the behavior of CSM X and his immediate supervisor LTC X_ to the IJC/III Corps Inspector General and her chain of command. e. The DAIG found CSM X 's sworn statement within the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation – which she initiated based on the behavior of CSM X and his supervisor – to be his protected communication and the basis of the reprisal investigation and subsequent substantiated finding of reprisal. f. CSM X 's sworn statement was cited as the partial basis in the findings, facts, and recommendation which found him as "disrespectful and subversive." g. CSM X 's allegations against her in the sworn statement within the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation were found not reasonable, nor credible. The Army Regulation 15-6 investigation found she acted appropriately. h. The Unit Morale Assessment, which she formally requested from the IJC/III Corps IG to assess and double-check her leadership, found "The perception among the senior leaders of the organization and the IG Team is that the CJTF Paladin Commander [Applicant] works very hard to meet the needs of subordinates and superiors alike." i. She supported CSM X 's interim position as 52d Ordnance Group (EOD) Acting CSM when CSM X (the unit CSM) was selected for a nominative position. She did not initiated a separate investigation with CSM X as the subject, which would have likely resulted in a similar recommendation as that of his battalion commander – nonjudicial punishment and/or adverse administrative action. j. She served the Army honorably for 30 years and is scheduled to retire on 1 June 2017. 3. On 1-2 October 2013, MG X (IJC Command IG) determined to conduct a review of subordinate unit command climate surveys and execute a morale assessment of the CJTF Paladin Headquarters in accordance with Army Regulation 20-1. 1. 4. On 7 October 2013, a review of CJTF Paladin Morale Assessment was signed by LTG X (IJC Commander) (see enclosure 10). The findings showed: a. There was no evidence that a toxic command climate existed within CJTF Paladin, per Army Doctrine Publication 6-22 (Army Leadership). b. Based on the feedback received during the sensing sessions, the issues affecting task force morale revolved around two areas of friction: communication and the relationship between the CJTF Paladin Commander and 184th Ordnance Battalion (EOD) Commander. c. Amongst the members of CJTF Paladin, there was not a clear or shared understanding of mission, intent, and priorities, and since they did not share the same understanding, there was a prevalent feeling that the commander was creating missions to justify the continued existence of the task force. d. Most of the uniformed personnel felt they could not exercise initiative with the commander's intent. e. Everyone in the command felt the commander was approachable and could use her open door policy, but many felt that bad news was not well-received and they would get shut down. f. The perception among the senior leaders of the organization and the IG team was that the CJTF Paladin Commander worked very hard to meet the needs of subordinates and superiors alike and the desire to resolve issues sometimes caused the commander to try to fix things immediately instead of exercising tactical patience, gathering all the facts, and determining the true scope of the issue. g. As part of the mission shift to the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) development, the commander directed a reorganization of the staff to establish an ANSF development section and the sudden nature of the reorganization, without prior consultation with the affected staff members, created a point of friction within the organization that still existed several months later. h. There was an adversarial relationship that existed between the CJTF Paladin Commander and the 184th Ordnance Battalion (EOD) Commander. i. The CJTF Paladin Commander had attempted to contain this issue between her and the 184th Ordnance Battalion (EOD) Commander, but had been unsuccessful and the poor relationship was well known throughout both units. a. j. There was a small group of CJTF Paladin staff personnel who were disgruntled and used the friction between the commanders to try to influence others within the brigade. j. The civilian contractors were tired of the derogatory comments about contractors and felt it was the commander's responsibility to foster a climate of dignity and respect for all. 5. On 6 November 2013, COL X___ X___ was appointed as the Army Regulation 15-6 investigating officer (IO) to conduct an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegation of misconduct against LTC X___ X. X___ (see enclosure 8). 6. The memorandum for record from the IO, dated 18 November 2013, describes the facts, findings, and recommendations reference the senior leader misconduct. The findings showed (see enclosure 7): * LTC X was disrespectful toward the applicant in violation of Article 89, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) * LTC X____'s tacit approval of his battalion CSM to jump the chain of command and contact the 20th Support Command leadership and make arrangements to have a subsequent meeting was disrespectful and subversive * LTC X was disrespectful by making unsolicited negative comments about the applicant to peers and subordinates * LTC X was disrespectful to the applicant, as evidenced by the nonverbal signals observed of LTC X * the IO found that while LTC X displayed disrespect toward the applicant in public settings, he was never insubordinate and the evidence presented showed he did not willfully disobey 7. The Standard Form 600, dated 17 January 2014, shows the applicant was given a post-deployment health reassessment. Item 9 (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) showed she experienced a situation that occurred down range with a subordinate service member and the investigation only found the subordinate to be disrespectful. She was told to follow up with counseling to deal with the situation (see enclosure 10). 8. Headquarters, CJTF Paladin, was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for exceptionally meritorious service from 29 May 2013 to 1 February 2014. 9. On 21 April 2014, the DAIG received a complaint from CSM X (the battalion CSM for LTC X ) that he received a negative NCOER in reprisal for making a protected communication in a sworn statement to the IO reference LTC X 's investigation. 1. 10. DAIG's letter to THE APPLICANT, dated 6 April 2015 showed that the investigation was completed and the concluded allegation that she reprised against a subordinate was substantiated (see enclosure 12). 11. CSM X filed his complaint 97 days after he was aware of the unfavorable personnel action. Although he wasn't within the 60 days required to report the unfavorable personnel action, he indicated the applicant was still his senior rater after he redeployed and she was scheduled to change command in March 2014 (see enclosure 5). He decided to wait until the applicant was no longer his senior rater. The investigation showed (see enclosure 1): * the DAIG directed an investigation * CSM X spoke to his former battalion commander reference the hostile relationship between him and the applicant * he discussed issues between LTC X and the applicant and arranged a meeting with Major General (MG) X * the DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement), dated 16 November 2013, discussed prevailing issues between LTC X and the applicant * his first NCOER from the applicant (1 April 2012-14 February 2013) showed his senior rater rated him "1" in overall performance and potential * his next rating period from 15 February 2013 through 8 December 2013 showed a "2" rating in overall performance and potential from his senior rater (see enclosure 2) * the applicant's reasons for downgrading the second NCOER were because of CSM X 's continued hostility, odd behavior combined with his struggle to reconcile loyalty to his commander, loyalty to the organization, and different operating conditions based on their deployment * the applicant's testimony showed CSM X showed insubordination and hostility during the first rating period, but she chose to overlook it because she considered his behavior to be her personal leadership challenge * the Discussion paragraph states that "where it is possible that CSM X did not perform well during the deployment there were no counseling statements to indicate a change in performance during the deployment" * the Conclusion paragraph states the preponderance of the evidence indicated the applicant reprised against CSM X by downgrading his performance on an NCOER following a protected communication he made as part of an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation 12. The applicant provided a memorandum, dated 21 December 2015, showing intent to submit a reconsideration of the IG's conclusion, where she attached three enclosures (see enclosure 13). 13. On 6 January 2017, the applicant submitted a reconsideration request to DAIG wherein she provided 13 enclosures that presented new evidence, information, and 1. identified a mistake of law in response to the allegations delineated within the 6 March 2015 U.S. Army Inspector General Agency Report of Investigation Case 14-0XX. She stated: a. When CSM X initially met with her in her office in August 2012, he expressed his personal dislike for her when he entered her office without warning or reason and stated, "I don't like you. I've heard about you. And I just don't like you." She told him, "I work very hard to do the right thing" and "I was confident I could gain his trust in the future" (see enclosure 4). b. CSM X____ received a fair, impartial, and accurate NCOER as recommended and reviewed through the Corps IJC/III Corps CSM and reviewed by LTC X , the IJC/III Corps Legal Advisor. c. She also consulted with the Corps IJC/III Corps CSM, who she directed to mentor and counsel CSM X____ through the second rating period, and he provided her with an email and senior rater comments for the second rating period (see enclosure 9). d. In her sworn statement in support of the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation against LTC X (see enclosure 8, exhibit 1), she highlighted her leadership philosophy of "My job is to be a leader, and lead people to success." Her focus is to ensure the care, leadership, and success of subordinates, which included CSM X . e. Her leaders were informed during the entire process. f. She was recognized for her courage and leadership while dealing with the challenging behavior of two senior subordinates. g. She was recognized for phenomenal performance as one of the top 4 of 48 very competitive COLs by her senior rater, then Lieutenant General (LTG) X , while deployed in Afghanistan. h. At the conclusion of the deployed operation and prior to redeployment in which she worked diligently with both LTC X 's and CSM X 's challenging behaviors, BG B , her rater and CSM X 's reviewer, sent an email stating the unit had done an amazing job (see enclosure 3, last page). i. The DAIG opening statement, paragraph 7, page 4, Formal IG Morale Assessment, page 3(e), states "The perception among the senior leaders of the organization and the IG team is that the CJTF Paladin Commander works very hard to meet the needs of subordinates and superiors alike" (see enclosure 10). 14. A letter from the DODIG, dated 5 April 2017, shows the applicant's request for reconsideration with the additional documents provided determined she did not present 1. compelling information or extenuating circumstances to overturn the original determination or to support further action regarding CSM X 's 21 April 2014 reprisal complaint. She was informed she could address her concerns with the ABCMR. 15. The applicant provided two articles that discussed patterns of behavior that she indicates are identical to CSM X 's behavior (see enclosure 9). 16. She provided three OERs (see enclosure 11) while serving in the position of Group and CJTF Commander that all show in: * Part Va (Performance and Potential Evaluation), she was rated "OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE, MUST PROMOTE" * Part Vc (Comment on Potential for Promotion), the comments "Select for promotion to Brigadier General, "Unlimited potential," and "Select for Brigadier General today!" * Part VII(a) (Senior Rater), she was "Best Qualified" 17. Part IVc of her OER covering the period 10 January 2014 through 14 June 2016 contains the comments: "[Applicant's] potential is unlimited. She is currently performing at the GO/FO [general officer/flag officer] level..." and "Her leadership style is infectious and inspires and energizes subordinates, peers and seniors." 18. She retired on 31 May 2017 in the rank of COL. She completed 30 years and 6 days of active service, including 12 years, 8 months, and 24 days of foreign service. BOARD DISCUSSION: After reviewing the application and all supporting documents, the Board determined that relief was not warranted. Based upon the documentary evidence presented by the applicant and found within the military service record, the Board found there to be insufficient evidence to show an error or injustice which would warrant making a change to the service record. The Board concluded that based upon the review of the documentary evidence the processing of the DAIG action was handled within all regulatory guidance and that the applicant was afforded all due process during the course of the investigation. For that reason, the Board recommended denying the applicant’s request for relief. BOARD VOTE: Mbr 1 Mbr 2 Mbr 3 : : : GRANT FULL RELIEF : : : GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF : : : GRANT FORMAL HEARING X X X DENY APPLICATION BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION: The evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a probable error or injustice. Therefore, the Board determined the overall merits of this case are insufficient as a basis for correction of the records of the individual concerned. 5/8/2019 X CHAIRPERSON Signed by: I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case. REFERENCES: 1. DOD Directive 7050.06 (Military Whistleblower Protection), dated 23 July 2007, states members of the Armed Forces shall be free from reprisal for making or preparing to make a protected communication. No person may take or threaten to take an unfavorable personnel action, or withhold or threaten to withhold a favorable personnel action, in reprisal for making or preparing to make a protected communication. No person shall restrict a member of the Armed Forces from making lawful communications to a Member of Congress or an IG. 2. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 1034 as amended, prohibits interference with a military member's right to make protected communications to members of Congress; IGs; members of DOD audit, inspection, investigation or law enforcement organizations; and other persons or organizations (including the chain of command) designated by regulation or administrative procedures. A protected communication is any lawful communication to a Member of Congress or an IG, as well as any communication made to a person or organization designated under competent regulations to receive such communications, which a member of the Armed Services reasonably believes reports a violation of law or regulation (including sexual harassment, unlawful discrimination, mismanagement, a gross waste of funds or other resources, abuse of authority, or a substantial or specific danger to public health or safety). 3. Army Regulation 15-6 establishes procedures for investigations and boards of officers not specifically authorized by any other directive. 4. Army Regulation 20-1 (Inspector General Activities and Procedures) prescribes policy and procedures concerning the mission and duties of the IG. The IG records are protected documents that contain sensitive and confidential information and advice. a. DAIG records are any written or recorded IG work product created during the course of an IG assistance inquiry, inspection, investigative inquiry, or investigation. An IG record includes, but is not limited to, correspondence or documents received from a witness or a person requesting assistance, IG reports, IG Network data, or other computer automatic data processing files or data, to include IG notes and working papers. b. An IG investigation is a fact-finding examination by a detailed IG into allegations to provide the directing authority a sound basis for decisions and actions. An IG investigator will not discard an allegation solely because it appears frivolous, unimportant, or not relevant to the matters under investigation. An IG investigator will obtain sufficient evidence to determine that an allegation is either substantiated or unsubstantiated. Preponderance of credible evidence is the standard of proof IGs use to substantiate or not substantiate allegations. Preponderance is defined as "superiority of weight." IGs will include a complete, objective, and impartial a. presentation of all pertinent evidence gathered during the investigation in the Report of Investigation. c. "Not substantiated" is defined as a conclusion drawn by an IG at the close of an investigative inquiry or investigation when the preponderance of credible evidence suggests the subject or suspect did not do what was alleged in the allegation. d. "Substantiated" is defined as a conclusion drawn by an IG at the close of an investigative inquiry or investigation when the preponderance of credible information suggests the subject or suspect actually did what was alleged. 5. Army Regulation 600-20 prescribes the policy and responsibilities of command which include the wellbeing of the force, military discipline and conduct, the Army Equal Opportunity Program, and the Army Sexual Assault Victim Program. a. Paragraph 1-5c (Characteristics of Command Leadership) states the commander is responsible for establishing leadership climate of the unit and developing disciplined and cohesive units. This sets the parameters within which command will be exercised and, therefore, sets the tone for social and duty relationships within the command. Commanders are also responsible for the professional development of their Soldiers. b. Paragraph 2-3 (Performance Counseling) states Commanders will ensure that all members of their command receive timely performance counseling. Effective performance counseling of officers, NCOs, enlisted Soldiers, and Department of the Army civilian employees helps to ensure that they are prepared to carry out their duties efficiently and accomplish the mission. Army Regulation 623-3 (Evaluation Reporting System) and Army Regulation 690-400 (Chapter 4302 – Total Army Performance Evaluation System) contain counseling requirements in conjunction with the evaluation reporting systems. Providing regular and effective performance counseling to all Soldiers, not just those whose performance fails to meet unit standards, is a command function. All commanders will ensure that their subordinate commanders have implemented and are maintaining an effective performance counseling program. c. Paragraph 4-14b (Relationships between Soldiers of Different Rank) states relationships between Soldiers of different rank are prohibited if they: (1) compromise, or appear to compromise, the integrity of supervisory authority or the chain of command; (2) cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness; (3) involve, or appear to involve, the improper use of rank or position for personal gain; (1) (4) are, or are perceived to be, exploitative or coercive in nature; or (5) create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, morale, or the ability of the command to accomplish its mission. 6. Army Regulation 623-3 prescribes the policy for completing evaluation reports and associated support forms that are the basis for the Army's Evaluation Reporting System. a. Paragraph 1-4b(10) (Responsibilities) states each senior rater (and reviewer or supplementary reviewer, if any) understands that he or she will examine the entries on the evaluation reports to ensure that objectivity and fairness have been maintained. When doing so, he or she will keep in mind the interests of both the Army and the rated Soldier. The senior rater will also understand that if he or she notes any errors or omissions on evaluation reports, corrections must be made prior to completion and submission to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). b. Paragraph 2-10b (The Rated Soldier) states the rated Soldier will: (1) perform each assigned or implied duty to the best of their ability, always trying to improve on the accomplishment of the organization's mission. Rated Soldiers will periodically evaluate their own performance and, when in doubt, seek the advice of the rating officials in the rating chain; and (2) participate in counseling and provide and discuss with the rating chain the duty description, performance objectives (including objectives for fostering a climate of dignity and respect and preventing and eliminating sexual assault and sexual harassment in their units), academic standards, and/or course requirements with the rater, as appropriate. This counseling will occur within 30 days after the beginning of each new rating period and at least quarterly thereafter. c. Paragraph 2-14a (The Senior Rater or Reviewing Official) states senior raters or reviewing officials use their positions and experiences to evaluate the rated Soldier's performance and/or potential within a broad organizational perspective, military program of instruction, or civilian academic course standards. The senior rater's evaluation is the link between the day-to-day observation of the rated Soldier and the longer-term evaluation of the rated Soldier's potential by HQDA selection boards. d. Paragraph 2-14b(2)(3) (Requirements) states senior raters and reviewing officials will use all reasonable means to become familiar with a rated Soldier's performance. When practical, use personal contact, records and reports, and the information provided on the rated Soldier's support form and assess and evaluate the abilities and/or potential of the rated Soldier relative to his or her contemporaries. a. 7. Department of the Army Pamphlet 623-3 (Evaluation Reporting System), in effect at the time, provided procedural guidance for completing and submitting evaluation reports to HQDA and associated support forms that are the basis for the Army's Evaluation Reporting System. Table 3-5 provided complete instructions for overall performance and potential ratings. a. Part Vc states the senior rater's box marks are independent of the rater's. (1) Successful/Superior. A "1" rating represents the cream of the crop and is a recommendation for immediate promotion. (2) A "2" rating represents a very good, solid performance and is a strong recommendation for promotion. (3) A "3" rating also represents a good performance and, should sufficient allocations be available, is a recommendation for promotion. (4) Fair. A "4" rating represents NCOs who may require additional training/ observation and should not be promoted at this time. (5) Poor. A "5" rating represents NCOs who are weak or deficient and, in the opinion of the senior rater, need significant improvement or training in one or more areas. b. Part Vd states the senior rater's box marks are independent of the rater's. (1) Successful/Superior. A "1" rating represents the cream of the crop and is a recommendation for immediate promotion. (2) A "2" rating represents a very good, solid performance and is a strong recommendation for promotion. (c) A "3" rating also represents a good performance and, should sufficient allocations be available, is a recommendation for promotion. (d) Fair. A "4" rating represents NCOs who may require additional training/ observation and should not be promoted at this time. (e) Poor. A "5" rating represents NCOs who are weak or deficient and, in the opinion of the senior rater, need significant improvement or training in one or more areas. c. Section II (Terms) states the senior rater is normally the second-line rating official who is in the direct line of supervision of the rated Soldier and senior to the rater by a. either pay grade or date of rank. The senior rater's primary role is evaluating and focusing on the potential of the rated Soldier; responsible for providing a performance/ potential assessment of the rated Soldier. The senior rater obtains the rated Soldier's signature on the evaluation report or enters appropriate statement if rated Soldier refuses, is unable, or unavailable to sign. 8. Army Regulation 600-100 (Army Profession and Leadership Policy) focuses on leaders at all levels and in all cohort – officers, warrant officers, NCOs, Soldiers, and Army civilians. These leaders are trusted Army professionals who enable the Army to achieve the mission the right way. The Army defines a leader as anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, exercise diverse thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization. a. All Army professionals are leaders and have the duty of being stewards of the profession, regardless of their rank or official position of authority. Army professionals live by and uphold the Army Ethic in accomplishing the mission, doing their duty, and in all aspects of life. This applies to our day-to-day interactions, at the office, in the field, on deployment, and at home, both in person and across social media. Army professionals, as leaders, must maintain and set the example in all they do. b. All Army leaders must motivate others to do what is right – for its own sake – and understand that decisions and actions that violate the Army Ethic are not tolerated; any such action can compromise the mission and have strategic implications contrary to the national interest. 9. Army Doctrine Publication 6-22 (Army Leadership) defines toxic leadership as "a combination of self-entered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization and mission performance. This leader lacks concern for other and the climate of the organization, which leads to short- and long- term negative effects. The toxic leader operates with an inflated sense of self-worth and from acute self-interest. Toxic leaders' consistently use dysfunctional behaviors to deceive, intimidate, coerce, or unfairly punish others to get what they want for themselves."