IN THE CASE OF:  

BOARD DATE:  9 March 2022

DOCKET NUMBER:  AR20210014547


APPLICANT REQUESTS:  

*	Reconsideration of his earlier request to upgrade his bad conduct discharge 
(reflected as an under other than honorable conditions discharge on his 
DD Form 214 (Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty)
*	In effect, permission to appear personally before the Board

APPLICANT'S SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD: 

*	Request for reconsideration
*	Pew Research Center Report:  "Views on Race in America in 2019"
*	Pew Research Center Report:  "Most blacks say someone has acted suspicious 
of them or as if they weren't smart"
*	Quantum Units Education:  "Vietnam Veterans and PTSD (post-traumatic stress 
disorder)"
*	National Center of PTSD, PTSD Research Quarterly:  "Forty Years After the War:  
How are Vietnam Veterans Doing Today?"

FACTS:

1. Incorporated herein by reference are military records, as were summarized in the 
previous considerations of the applicant's case by the Army Board for Correction of 
Military Records (ABCMR) in Docket, on 1 March 2016; on 13 December 2018; and, on 
8 June 2020.

2. The applicant's wife, acting as the applicant's counsel, states, in effect, it is wrong 
that her husband, a man who served his country, cannot receive medical benefits from 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 

	a. Although it may be true that the applicant acted out while in the Army, she 
contends her husband must have had been a reason, and the Army should have taken 
the time to find out what that reason was; instead, the Army locked up her husband and 
would not allow him to reenlist. 
	b. The applicant's spouse comments that, given the state of racial justice in this 
country, she must go right back to the idea that her husband was simply "not the right 
color." She and her husband have spoken to a "couple of white guys that had an OTH 
(under other than honorable conditions) discharge, and (they) got it changed and now 
have full benefits, so why is it so hard for [applicant]?" She rhetorically asks, as bad as 
racism is these days, how much worse was it in the 1970s. She references an article, 
submitted as evidence and prepared the Pew Research Center, that describes the state 
of racism within the U.S. and adds, "I can go all the way back to the Devil's Punch Bowl, 
Natchez, MS...." (The applicant's wife is apparently referring to an 1865 episode in 
American history where the town of Natchez's population suddenly increased from 
10,000 to over 100,000, due to an influx of freed slaves. In response, the Union Army 
forced the freed slaves into concrete-walled encampments, in an area called the Devil's 
Punchbowl (so-named for the shape of the landscape). The Army forced the men to 
perform hard labor, and kept women and children confined behind the walled 
enclosures. Within one year, an estimated 20,000 men, women, and children had died 
from starvation or disease). 

	c. The applicant's spouse notes her husband is not getting any younger, and he has 
a number of serious medical conditions, to include PTSD, heart trouble, high blood 
pressure, diabetes, and orthopedic issues with his knees and back. Additionally, the 
applicant suffers from insomnia, and he jumps whenever he hears loud noises. She 
declares she does not know what else to do at this point, except to continue writing to 
the Board and asking for the Board's help to change the applicant's character of service; 
he requires medical attention and needs access to a VA hospital. The last time the 
applicant went to Washington D.C., they told him his DD Form 214 was pending; that 
was 2 years ago, and the applicant's wife asks, "What is it doing now?" She states they 
intend to fly to Washington D.C. for an appointment to get his DD Form 214 changed. 

3. The applicant provides two 2019 reports, written by the Pew Research Center, which 
detail the state of race relations, and an article, by the National Center for PTSD, that 
discusses findings from various studies being conducted to track how Vietnam-era 
Veterans have been faring, in terms of their behavioral, physical, and social health. 

4. The applicant's service records show:

	a. On 12 July 1979, the applicant enlisted into the Regular Army for 3 years; he was 
23 years old, and he entered active duty at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance 
Station in Chicago, IL. Upon completion of initial entry training and the award of military 
occupational specialty 13B (Cannon Crewman), orders assigned the applicant to a field 
artillery unit in Germany, and he arrived at his battery, on 30 October 1979. 

	b. On 8 January 1980, the applicant accepted nonjudicial punishment (NJP), under 
the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for disobeying an 
order from a noncommissioned officer (NCO), directing the applicant not to leave the 
barracks except for chow (i.e., to go to the mess hall). The applicant's DA Form 
2-1 (Personnel Qualification Record – Part II) shows, effective 12 January 1980, the 
applicant's chain of command promoted him to private (PV2)/E-2.

	c. On 8 February 1980, the applicant accepted NJP for three UCMJ violations.

		(1) The applicant's company commander charged him with failing to report for 
guard mount, disobeying an NCO's order to pick up a weapon from the Arms Room, 
and disobeying an NCO's order to sweep the hallway.

		(2) The commander's punishment included a reduction to private (PV1)/E-1 and a 
$100 forfeiture (both suspended until 8 June 1980); however, on 6 March 1980, the 
commander vacated the applicant's suspended reduction in rank.

	c. On 11 March 1980, the applicant accepted NJP for assaulting a Sergeant First 
Class (SFC), on 5 March 1980, by striking the bridge of the SFC's nose, using his 
finger; punishment consisted of 14 days' extra duty and restriction.

	d. On or about 14 April 1980, the applicant accepted NJP from his battalion 
commander for seven UCMJ violations, all occurring on 6 March 1980.

		(1) The battalion commander charged the applicant with:

*	disobeying an NCO's order to sign in at the Charge of Quarters (CQ) desk
*	kicking and damaging a door
*	assaulting a fellow private by biting the private's arm
*	assaulting another private by hitting him in the face with a door
*	assaulting a sergeant by hitting him in the chest with an elbow
*	disobeying the command of a superior commissioned officer (Captain H__ 
C. H__) by failing to stand at attention
*	being drunk and disorderly in quarters

		(2) The battalion commander's punishment consisted of a forfeiture of $220 per 
month for 2 months and 45 days' restriction and extra duty. On 21 April 1980, the 
battalion commander suspended the forfeiture until 20 August 1980.

	e. On 22 September 1980, a special court-martial, empowered to adjudge a bad 
conduct discharge, convicted the applicant of two UCMJ violations.

		(1) The court found the applicant guilty of sleeping on guard duty, on 30 April 
1980, and of assaulting a German National with the intent to commit robbery, on 11 July 
1980. 
		(2) The court sentenced the applicant to 90-days' confinement, forfeiture of 
$229 per month for 4 months, and a bad conduct discharge; the court immediately 
remanded the applicant to confinement, and orders subsequently transferred the 
applicant to the Correctional Holding Detachment (CHD) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. On 
4 December 1980, CHD released the applicant and reassigned him to the U.S. Army 
Personnel Control Facility (PCF) at Fort Knox, KY, directing a 22 December 
1980 reporting date. 

		(3) On 5 December 1980, the special court-martial convening authority approved 
the applicant's sentence and, except for the bad conduct discharge, ordered the 
sentence's execution.

	f. On 22 December 1980, orders further assigned the applicant from the PCF to a 
field artillery battery, also located on Fort Knox; he arrived at his new unit, on or about 
22 December 1980. On 3 March 1981, the applicant's unit reported him as absent 
without leave (AWOL); on 6 March 1981, the applicant returned to military control at his 
unit (3-day absence).

	g. On 12 March 1981, the U.S. Army Court of Military Review heard arguments from 
the applicant's four appellate counsels; counsel for the appellee (the Army) declined to 
file pleadings. The court subsequently affirmed the findings of guilt and the sentence in 
the applicant's case. On 21 March 1981, the applicant acknowledged the court's 
decision, and indicated counsel had advised him he had 30 days to petition the Court of 
Military Appeals for a grant of review. The applicant's available service record does not 
show whether he submitted a petition to the Court of Military Appeals; (the Court of 
Military Appeals granted reviews on a case-by-case basis).

	h. On 6 April 1981, the applicant's Fort Knox unit again reported him as AWOL; 
30 days later, on 6 May 1981, the applicant surrendered himself to military authority at 
Fort Sheridan, IL. On 29 May 1981, the PCF placed the applicant on excess leave, and 
the applicant departed for Chicago later that date. 

	i. On 22 June 1981, a special court-martial order announced the completion of the 
applicant's appellate review process and directed the execution of his bad conduct 
discharge; on 29 July 1981, the Army discharged the applicant. His 
DD Form 214 shows he completed 1 year, 9 months, and 2 days of his 3-year 
enlistment contract, with three lost-time periods, one period of confinement (19800922-
19801204) and two periods of AWOL (19810303-19810305 and 19810406-19810505). 
The form also shows the applicant was awarded or authorized two marksmanship 
qualification badges and lists the following under "Special Additional Information":

*	 Item 24 (Character of Service) – "UNDER OTHER THAN HONORABLE 
CONDITIONS"
*	Item 25 (Separation Authority) – "CHAP 11 (Dishonorable and Bad Conduct 
Discharge), AR (Army Regulation) 635-200 (Personnel Separations – Enlisted 
Personnel)
*	Item 26 (Separation Code) – "JJD" 
*	Item 28 (Narrative Reason for Separation) – "AS A RESULT OF COURT-
MARTIAL, OTHER" 

	j. On or about 17 February 2016, the applicant petitioned the ABCMR, requesting an 
upgraded character of service. 

		(1) The applicant argued the Army sent him to a retraining brigade for something 
he did not do. They accused him of fighting, but he was simply trying to get away from a 
"group of guys"; his leadership incorrectly assumed that, when the fight started, he and 
the group were together; however, the applicant never put his hands on anyone, and he 
said so during his court-martial. The applicant additionally asserted the Army did not put 
him out; rather, they sent him to the retraining brigade and, after he finished there, they 
transferred him to Fort Knox for more training. He tried to reenlist, but they denied his 
request; the captain said the applicant had a bad conduct discharge, so the applicant 
would have to apply in a few years. The applicant states he never understood why the 
Army allowed all of the others involved in the fight to go home, but he could not. After 
leaving the Army, he worked continuously; he was a security guard for more than 
20 years, then a welder, a teacher's assistance, and a driver. At the time of this 
application, he had been married for over 25 years, and he and his wife had nine 
children; he wanted to correct his records because he believed the Army wrongly 
accused him and he did not deserve a bad conduct discharge.

		(2) In a self-authored statement, the applicant provided additional details and 
arguments.

		(a) The Army failed to provide him with counsel for his court-martial and accused 
him of hitting a German National; however, the real culprits were a group of eight or 
nine individuals. The applicant's roommate was a Caucasian male, and, while 
downtown and on their way back to the bus, the applicant and his roommate observed a 
group of men, mostly black, fighting. The applicant and his roommate tried to break up 
the fight, and, in the course of trying to stop the fight, a German National hit the 
applicant on the side of the head; the applicant reacted by hitting back. When the 
German police arrived, they only arrested the black men, and "that was where the 
process began...." 

		(b) Because of the incident, the applicant could not leave the post, and his 
leadership would not allow him to travel with the basketball team; coming from Chicago 
and being a part of the Army made him feel like a "very respectable young man." At his 
court-martial, the applicant pleaded not guilty, with an explanation; he stood alone. 
Although he acknowledged he was not a perfect Soldier, he points out he was 
nonetheless willing to die his country. 

		(c) As to allegations that he kicked in a door while on CQ duty, the company's 
rules allowed women only the TV room, but drunk Soldiers were acting disorderly and 
were taking their dates into their individual rooms. The applicant told one of the Soldiers 
he could not have a woman in his room, and that he had to sign her in and go to the TV 
room; the Soldier took her in his room anyway. The applicant acknowledges he could 
have handled things better, and reacting as he did was a mistake. 

		(d) The applicant submitted seven letters of support, four of which came from a 
supervisor and three colleagues who worked with the applicant in an at-risk youth 
alternative high school program. The supervisor and coworkers lauded the applicant's 
contributions as a substitute instructional aide. The applicant additionally provided 
documents reflecting the jobs he had held following his discharge.

		(3) On 1 March 2016, the Board evaluated the applicant's evidence and reviewed 
the applicant's available service record. 

		(a) The Board's Record of Proceedings (ROP) summarized the applicant's entry 
on active duty, promotion to PV2, and his NJPs; (concerning the 14 April 1980 NJP, the 
ROP inaccurately stated the applicant had assaulted a commissioned officer, rather 
than correctly showing the charge was for disobeying the commissioned officer's 
command). 

		(b) The ROP additionally addressed the applicant's court-martial conviction and 
the appellate review, noting the applicant had acknowledged the U.S. Army Court of 
Military Review's affirmation of findings and sentence, and that he had 30 days to 
request a review (by the U.S. Court of Military Appeals), but that the record was void of 
any such request. 

		(4) After considering the foregoing evidence, the Board voted to deny the 
applicant's request, pointing out that, while the applicant's post-service good citizenship 
and work ethic were commendable, they were insufficient to mitigate his misconduct. 
The Board went on to cite the applicant's pattern of misbehavior, as demonstrated by 
his NJP actions and his periods of AWOL. 

		(a) With regard to the applicant's court-martial, AR 27-10 (Military Justice) 
required Soldiers facing courts-martial to be assigned legal representation; by Army 
Regulation, the applicant's court-martial could not have proceeded unless the applicant 
had legal counsel. Further, after hearing testimony and reviewing evidence, the court 
found the applicant guilty. The applicant had the chance to file a challenge of his trial 
results with the U.S. Army Court of Military Review, but, despite the assignment of a 
defense counsel, which the applicant acknowledged in writing, "there is no evidence 
that he used this opportunity to challenge the findings of the special court-martial." The 
U.S. Army Court of Military Review examined all the evidence and the special court-
martial proceedings and found no errors; as such, the applicant received due process 
and fair treatment, and he had "ample opportunity to present his contentions and 
evidence that he was falsely accused...." Further, the applicant had legal representation 
at his special court-martial and "had opportunity to request counsel for the U.S. (Army) 
Court of Military Review...." (The evidence of record affirms the applicant had appellate 
counsel representing him before the U.S. Army Court of Military Review).

		(b) The Board noted the applicant's DD Form 214 listed his character of service 
as under other than honorable conditions instead of bad conduct discharge; "It appears 
that this entry was normally used for BCD discharges (bad conduct discharges) at the 
time since "BCD" was not previously an authorized entry on the DD Form 214." (During 
the applicant's era of service, the Army gave conflicting guidance. The version of 
AR 635-5 (Separation Documents) then in effect listed bad conduct discharge as one of 
the authorized entries for item 24 (Character of Service); however, Table 1-1 (Types of 
Discharge Certificates) AR 635-200 stated the character of separation for bad conduct 
discharge was under other than honorable conditions). 

	k. On 25 February 2017, the applicant requested the Board reconsider its decision 
on his upgrade request. 

		(1) The applicant took issue with the evidence of record reported in the Board's 
Record of Proceedings (ROP). The applicant submitted an extract of his ROP and 
highlighted the parts he contended were wrong; in his self-authored statement, the 
applicant wrote, in effect:

		(a) The date given for his promotion to PV2 was questionable, since it occurred 
soon after an NJP for disobeying an NCO. The applicant also denied being on post on 
the date listed for the applicant's assault of the SFC; however, the applicant went on to 
disclose that that SFC was gay and kept "coming at me..." The applicant affirmed he 
himself was not gay and, "I don't have anything against gay people." As to the NJP 
pertaining to the assaults of two fellow Soldiers, a sergeant, and a commissioned 
officer, and the drunk and disorderly charge, the applicant contended, in notes on the 
ROP, that he would not have been able to fight two people at once, and he was not 
drunk. The applicant then addressed the assault charge for which the court-martial had 
convicted him. He maintained he was not trying to rob anyone, and, besides, he was 
dressed in white; committing such a crime would not make sense (presumably, because 
his white clothing would have been soiled during a fight). He felt the Army punished him 
for no reason, but, as a young black man, he was dealing with a lot of prejudice at that 
time. 

		(b) The applicant went on provide details about his childhood; his mother and 
father had divorced, and his mother remarried. The applicant's stepfather made it clear 
he did not want the applicant and the applicant's older sister there; he only cared about 
their baby sister (their stepfather's daughter). The applicant disclosed that his mother 
would beat him and his older sister with extension cords and made them eat their food 
on the back porch. He and his sister would periodically visit their biological father in 
Indiana, but they never told him of their mother's abuse because they knew they would 
later have to return to their mother's home. While the applicant was home with his 
mother, he was scared to go to sleep, as she would unexpectedly come into his room; 
he also reached the point where he had to live in the school to keep warm. Once, their 
mother put the applicant and his older sister out of the house and into the snow; they 
had to huddle under the house (to get out of the weather). The applicant later went to 
sleep at Stagg Stadium, and Mr. M__ allowed the applicant to sleep on a cot; Mr. M__ 
spoke to the applicant's mother, after which the applicant's father retrieved the applicant 
and his older sister. Unfortunately, his father died of bone cancer, and he and his sister 
had to go back to their mother. 

		(c) One day, as he and his older sister were playing in the attic, the applicant fell 
through the floor; they discovered jars of money and, after both received a beating, their 
mother and stepfather locked the attic door. The applicant's mother subsequently used 
the money to buy cars, a house, and a corner store, but she never shared any her 
newfound wealth with the applicant and his sister. Ultimately, the applicant left to live 
with his stepmother and, after graduating from high school and entering college, the 
applicant got into trouble with the law. The judge gave the applicant a choice of joining 
the military or going to jail, and the applicant opted for the Army, adding he had selected 
the Army because he thought he could make a difference. The applicant concluded by 
stating he thought the Army would give him a fair chance, but, as things turned out, he 
believes his leadership treated him unjustly, and racism and discrimination played 
significant roles. 

		(d) The applicant submitted civilian medical records, which are not available for 
review, as well as information about his many prescriptions. The applicant's wife also 
included a letter, in which she confirmed, along with other medical conditions, the 
applicant had received a PTSD diagnosis; she stated the applicant had incurred PTSD 
after seeing his roommate killed in front of him, "but, for some reason, you guys don't 
speak on that." The applicant's spouse rhetorically asked, "If (the applicant) was a 
Different Color, would you have Evaluated him or gave him a Bad Conduct? In the early 
70s, you know that it was so much racism going on, and it's still going on, but people try 
to hide it." She affirmed that, for years, her husband was hesitant to talk about what had 
occurred while he was on active duty, but he eventually disclosed that they had accused 
him from trying to rob a German National. However, the applicant told her the charge 
was false, and, rather than supporting the applicant, the Army took the German 
National's side. Then, despite having witnesses swear that the applicant was not part of 
what took place, the court found him guilty. The applicant's spouse gave additional 
examples of what she saw as injustices against her husband, and declared the Army 
was wrong to give the applicant a bad conduct discharge; she argued the Army looked 
only at the applicant's color, but not the good things he had done for our country. Now, 
the applicant was over 60 and just wanted to have a decent life; he was only asking for 
this upgrade so he could receive what his service had earned him. She closed, stating, 
"Right is right, no matter what color you are, and we are not going to give up on what we 
believe in" and on their efforts to upgrade the applicant's character of service. 

		(2) On 14 December 2017, a psychologist from the Army Review Boards 
Agency's (ARBA) medical staff provided a medical advisory. The ARBA psychologist 
noted the applicant's available Service Treatment Records showed no psychiatric 
problems, and the VA's Joint Legacy Viewer was void of any treatment by the VA. In 
addition, while the applicant and the applicant's wife mentioned a PTSD diagnosis, they 
had not offered any supporting medical documentation. Based on the available 
information, the psychologist concluded that, while on active duty, the applicant met 
medical retention standard (as outlined in AR 40-501 (Standards of Medical Fitness)). In 
addition, the record did not reasonably support that PTSD or other behavioral health 
conditions existed during the applicant's military service, but, even if the applicant had 
incurred PTSD on active duty, his PTSD would not have mitigated the applicant's violent 
offenses.

		(3) On 21 December 2017, ARBA provided a copy of the medical advisory 
opinion for the applicant's review and comment. In February 2018, the applicant's wife 
provided a written rebuttal, in which she stated they had moved and her husband had a 
new doctor; the applicant would soon see the doctor about his PTSD. A doctor in North 
Carolina had provided the applicant's initial PTSD diagnosis, but he was no longer 
working there. The applicant's spouse pointed out, however, that the applicant had a 
number of other medical conditions requiring attention; this included Hepatitis C, which 
she asserted resulted from Army medical staff giving the applicant shots without 
changing needles between patients. The applicant's wife acknowledged the applicant's 
medical records probably did not show his PTSD, and she argued the Army should 
have evaluated him to learn why he was so angry; according to the applicant's mother, 
the applicant already had anger issues when he was a child. 

		(4) In or around June 2018, the applicant forwarded the Board a letter from a 
Licensed Clinical Social Worker (LCSW), with a Masters in Social Work (MSW); the 
LCSW confirmed the applicant's PTSD diagnosis and recommended further 
psychotherapy for the applicant.

		(5) On 13 December 2018, the Board reassessed its previous decision, and 
voted to deny relief. The ROP addressed each of the applicant's contentions regarding 
ROP errors; (on this occasion, the ROP correctly indicated the applicant had disobeyed 
a commissioned officer's command, vice assaulted the officer).  
	l. On 19 October 2019, the applicant filed a second request for reconsideration; he 
argued he was a young black man, and people of color did not receive the same 
treatment as other Soldiers. He reiterated earlier arguments and stated all he was 
asking for was an upgrade so he could receive VA medical care. The applicant 
recounted an incident where he had gone to a VA hospital and was in the process of 
obtaining an appointment, but a person at the hospital cancelled the appointment after 
seeing the applicant's DD Form 214; she told the applicant she had canceled the 
appointment because he was "pending." On 8 June 2020, ARBA administratively closed 
the applicant's request because he had not submitted any new evidence. 

5. Army Regulation (AR) 15-185 (ABCMR), states an applicant is not entitled to a 
hearing before the Board; however, the request for a hearing may be authorized by a 
panel of the Board or by the Director of ABCMR.

6. The applicant's wife, acting as the applicant's counsel, states, in effect, it is wrong 
that her husband, a man who served his country, cannot receive medical benefits from 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).

	a. Court-martial convictions stand as adjudged or modified by appeal through the 
judicial process. In accordance with Title 10, U.S. Code, section 1552, the ABCMR is 
not empowered to set aside a conviction. Rather, the law only authorizes the Board to 
change the severity of the sentence imposed in the court-martial process, and then only 
if clemency is determined to be appropriate. Clemency is an act of mercy or instance of 
leniency to moderate the severity of the punishment imposed.

	b. The ABCMR is not authorized to grant requests for upgraded characters of 
service solely to make someone eligible for Veterans' benefits; however, in reaching its 
determination, the Board can consider the applicant’s petition, his evidence and 
assertions, and his service record in accordance with the published equity, injustice, or 
clemency guidance.

7. MEDICAL REVIEW:

The Army Review Board Agency (ARBA) Medical Advisor reviewed the supporting 
documents and the applicant’s military records. The Armed Forces Health Longitudinal 
Technology Application (AHLTA), Federal Electronic Health Record (FEHR) & Health 
Artifacts Image Solutions (HAIMS) was not in use at the time of his service. The 
applicant did not provide any medical documentation for review with his current 
application. His previous application contained documentation of a PTSD diagnosis. A 
review of JLV indicates he completed lab work on 12 Mar 2019 but has no other 
assessment or treatment in the VA. He does not have a service-connected disability 
rating.  In accordance with the 3 Sep 2014 Secretary of Defense Liberal Guidance 
Memorandum and the 25 Aug 2017, Clarifying Guidance there is documentation to 
support a behavioral health diagnosis at the time of his discharge. He met retention 
standards at the time of his discharge. PTSD is not a mitigating factor for assault with 
intent to commit robbery which led to his court martial conviction and discharge. 
    a.  Kurta Questions
(1) Did the applicant have a condition or experience that may excuse or mitigate 
the discharge?	
   (a) Yes
(2) Did the condition exist or experience occur during military service?   
   (a) Yes
(3) Does the condition or experience actually excuse or mitigate the discharge?
   (a) No
(4) Does the condition or experience outweigh the discharge? 
   (a) No
BOARD DISCUSSION:

1. After reviewing the application and all supporting documents, the Board found that 
relief was not warranted. The Board carefully considered counsel’s statement, the 
applicant's record of service, documents submitted in support of the petition and 
executed a comprehensive and standard review based on law, policy and regulation, 
and published Department of Defense guidance for liberal and clemency determinations 
requests for upgrade of his characterization of service. The Board determined there is 
no evidence the applicant has a service-connected disability rating. Upon further review 
of the applicant’s petition, available military records and medical review, the Board 
concurred with the advising official finding PTSD is not a mitigating factor for assault 
with intent to commit robbery, which led to his court martial conviction and discharge. 
Furthermore, the Board determined this type of misconduct is not part of the natural 
history or sequelae of PTSD and does not affect one’s ability to distinguish right from 
wrong and act in accordance with what is considered right.

2.  The Board determined there was insufficient evidence of in-service mitigation to 
overcome the misconduct. The applicant’s service record exhibits numerous instances 
of misconduct during his initial enlistment period for 1 year, 9 months, and 2 days of his 
3-year enlistment contract, with three lost-time periods, one period of confinement and 
two periods of AWOL. The Board determined the applicant’s discharge characterization 
is warranted as he did not meet the standards of acceptable conduct and performance 
of duty for Army personnel to receive an honorable discharge. Based on this, the Board 
determined relief was not warranted and denied relief.

3. The applicant’s request for a personal appearance hearing was carefully considered.  
In this case, the evidence of record was sufficient to render a fair and equitable 
decision.  As a result, a personal appearance hearing is not necessary to serve the 
interest of equity and justice in this case.


BOARD VOTE:

Mbr 1	Mbr 2	Mbr 3

:	:	:	GRANT FULL RELIEF

:	:	:	GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF

:	:	:	GRANT FORMAL HEARING

X	X	X	DENY APPLICATION


BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION:

The Board found the evidence presented does not demonstrate the existence of a 
probable error or injustice.  Therefore, the Board determined the overall merits of this 
case are insufficient as a basis to amend the decision of the ABCMR set forth in Docket 
Numbers AR20150008615, on 1 March 2016; AR20170007957, on 13 December 2018; 
and AR20200000275, on 8 June 2020.




I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the 
Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case.




ADMINISTRATIVE NOTE(S):  Not Applicable


REFERENCES:

1. Title 10, USC, section 1552(b), provides, with respect to courts-martial and related 
administrative records pertaining to court-martial cases tried or reviewed under the 
UCMJ, action to correct any military record of the Secretary's Department may extend 
only to actions taken by reviewing authorities under the UCMJ or action on the sentence 
of a court-martial for purposes of clemency. The Secretary of the Army shall make such 
corrections by acting through boards of civilians within the executive part of the Army.

2. Army Regulation(AR) 635-200 (Personnel Separations – Enlisted Personnel), in 
effect at the time, set forth the basic authority for the separation of enlisted personnel.

	a. Paragraph 1-13a (Honorable Discharge) stated an honorable discharge was 
separation with honor. Issuance of an honorable discharge certificate was appropriate 
when the quality of the Soldier's service generally met the standards of acceptable 
conduct and performance of duty, or was otherwise so meritorious that any other 
characterization would clearly be inappropriate. Where there were infractions of 
discipline, commanders were to consider the extent thereof, as well as the seriousness 
of the offense. Separation authorities could furnish an honorable discharge when 
subsequent honest and faithful service over a greater period outweighed disqualifying 
entries in the Soldier's military record. It was the pattern of behavior, and not the 
isolated instance, which commanders should consider as the governing factor.

	b. Paragraph 1-13b (General Discharge) stated a general discharge was a 
separation from the Army under honorable conditions. When authorized, separation 
authorities could issue a general discharge to Soldiers whose military record was 
satisfactory but not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an honorable discharge.

	c. Paragraph 11-2 (DD Form 259A (Bad Conduct Discharge)). Separation authorities 
could only issue a bad conduct discharge pursuant to an approved sentence of a 
general or special court-martial; in addition, the regulation required the completion of the 
Soldier's appellate review, the affirming of the Soldier's sentence, and an order to 
execute the Soldier's sentence.  

3. On 3 September 2014, the Secretary of Defense directed the Service Discharge 
Review Boards (DRBs) and Service Boards for Correction of Military/Naval Records 
(BCM/NRs) to carefully consider the revised PTSD criteria, detailed medical 
considerations and mitigating factors when taking action on applications from former 
service members administratively discharged under other than honorable conditions 
and who have been diagnosed with PTSD by a competent mental health professional 
representing a civilian healthcare provider in order to determine if it would be 
appropriate to upgrade the characterization of the applicant's service.

4. On 25 August 2017, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness issued clarifying guidance for the Secretary of Defense Directive to 
Discharge Review Boards (DRBs) and Board for Correction of Military/Naval Records 
(BCM/NRs) when considering requests by Veterans for modification of their discharges 
due in whole or in part to: mental health conditions, including Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD); Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI); sexual assault; or sexual harassment. 
Boards are to give liberal consideration to Veterans petitioning for discharge relief when 
the application for relief is based in whole or in part to those conditions or experiences. 
The guidance further describes evidence sources and criteria and requires Boards to 
consider the conditions or experiences presented in evidence as potential mitigation for 
misconduct that led to the discharge.

5. On 25 July 2018, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 
issued guidance to Military Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of 
Military/Naval Records (BCM/NRs) regarding equity, injustice, or clemency 
determinations. Clemency generally refers to relief specifically granted from a criminal 
sentence. BCM/NRs may grant clemency regardless of the type of court-martial. 
However, the guidance applies to more than clemency from a sentencing in a court-
martial; it also applies to other corrections, including changes in a discharge, which may 
be warranted based on equity or relief from injustice. This guidance does not mandate 
relief, but rather provides standards and principles to guide Boards in application of their 
equitable relief authority. In determining whether to grant relief on the basis of equity, 
injustice, or clemency grounds, BCM/NRs shall consider the prospect for rehabilitation, 
external evidence, sworn testimony, policy changes, relative severity of misconduct, 
mental and behavioral health conditions, official governmental acknowledgement that a 
relevant error or injustice was committed, and uniformity of punishment. Changes to the 
narrative reason for discharge and/or an upgraded character of service granted solely 
on equity, injustice, or clemency grounds normally should not result in separation pay, 
retroactive promotions, and payment of past medical expenses or similar benefits that 
might have been received if the original discharge had been for the revised reason or 
had the upgraded service characterization.

6. Army Regulation (AR) 15-185 (ABCMR), states an applicant is not entitled to a 
hearing before the Board; however, the request for a hearing may be authorized by a 
panel of the Board or by the Director of ABCMR.

//NOTHING FOLLOWS//
ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont)	AR20210014547


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ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS


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