IN THE CASE OF: BOARD DATE: 27 April 2022 DOCKET NUMBER: AR20210009669 APPLICANT REQUESTS: award of the Combat Action Badge (CAB). APPLICANT'S SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD: * DD Form 149 (Application for Correction of Military Record under the Provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1552) * Request for Congressional Assistance * 88th Regional Readiness Command, Orders 04-307-00341, 2 November 2004 * Automated Record Brief, 7 January 2018 * DD Form 214 (Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty) for the period ending 6 January 2006 * U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) Memorandum (Request for Award of the CAB), 8 July 2019 * DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action), 7 January 2018 * DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement), 23 September 2005 * CAB Narrative (undated) * DA Form 2823, 13 August 2005 (Staff Sergeant (SSG) * Headquarters, 88th Regional Readiness Command, Orders 06-035-00070, 4 February 2006 (SSG * DA Form 2823, 16 August 2005 (Sergeant (SGT) * Headquarters, 88th Regional Readiness Command, Orders 06-035-00072, 4 February 2006 (SGT * Headquarters, 88th Regional Readiness Command, Orders 06-035-00073, 4 February 2006 (Specialist * Statement, undated * Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 100th Training Division (Leader Development) Memorandum for Record (Applicant), 16 May 2021 (SSG * Statement, undated (SSG FACTS: 1. The applicant did not file within the 3-year time frame provided in Title 10, U.S. Code, section 1552(b); however, the Army Board for Correction of Military Record (ABCMR) conducted a substantive review of this case and determined it is in the interest of justice to excuse the applicant's failure to timely file. 2. The applicant states he submitted his CAB recommendation packet in January 2018 and it was disapproved in July 2019. The award was disapproved because it was not submitted in theater and stated he was not engaged by the enemy. He provided evidence stating he was engaged by the enemy, along with statements and orders from others involved in the incident who were subsequently awarded the CAB. 3. 88th Regional Readiness Command Orders 04-307-00341, 2 November 2004, ordered him to active duty for mobilization in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom for 545 days effective 5 November 2004. 4. On 13 August 2005, SSG rendered a sworn statement wherein he states that on 31 May 2005 while coming back from Logistical Support Area (LSA) Anaconda, the convoy he was in received small arms fire. The attack came from the directions of 3 o'clock and 5 o'clock. Upon seeing the tracer rounds in front of the convoy, they tried to determine if their convoy was receiving fire. The applicant radioed to confirm they were receiving small arms fire and they reacted in accordance with their rules of engagement. Their gunner tried to positively identify where the attack was coming from. He reported that he was unable to tell from where the shots were being fired. They accelerated out of the point of contact. 5. On 16 August 2005, SGT rendered a sworn statement wherein he states: a. On 31 May 2005, their combat logistics patrol was engaged by the enemy with small arms fire. His truck, being the rear truck, had a good view of the convoy as the attack unfolded. Tracer rounds came in from multiple directions and were bouncing off the pavement and guard rails around their truck. The rounds were striking around their truck from 10 to 15 meters. b. The driver accelerated out of the kill zone with the rest of the combat logistics patrol. The gunner was unable to positively identify the enemy to engage. Once out of the kill zone, the incident was reported. 6. On 23 September 2005, he rendered a sworn statement wherein he states: a. On 31 May 2005, seven-gun trucks from three serials were enroute from LSA Anaconda to Camp Cedar. The order of march consisted of three-gun trucks from SGT serial, one gun truck from SSG serial, and three gun trucks from SGT serial. He was riding with SSG . b. While traveling in their convoy, they began receiving small arms fire. Their gunner could see the tracers, but was unable to correctly identify the direction from where they were being fired. He called across the radio to report seeing the tracers. The other gun trucks reported seeing the same. All the trucks then had knowledge they were receiving enemy fire from the directions of 3 o'clock and 5 o'clock. c. Their gunner was placed in a safe position since they were unable to identify the exact location from where the shots were being fired. For the safety of his fellow Soldiers and innocent lives that might be in the area, they did not fire any rounds. d. After about 15 seconds, the convoy escaped the kill zone. Once beyond the kill zone, the incident was reported. There were no casualties. 7. On 6 January 2006, he was released from active duty to the control of his U.S. Army Reserve troop program unit. His DD Form 214 shows he served in Kuwait/Iraq from 29 December 2004 to 9 December 2005. 8. Headquarters, 88th Regional Readiness Command, orders awarded the CAB as follows: * to SSG in Orders 06-035-00070, 4 February 2006 * to SGT in Orders 06-035-00072, 4 February 2006 * to Specialist in Orders 06-035-00073, 4 February 2006 9. On 7 January 2018, he completed DA Form 4187 requesting award of the CAB. His request was void of endorsements through the first general officer in his chain of command. 10. On 8 July 2019, HRC disapproved the applicant's request for award of the CAB for service performed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The HRC memorandum (Request for Award of the CAB) states the documentation submitted in support of the request does not provide sufficient justification to warrant retroactive approval for the event. In addition, there is no evidence showing he was engaged by the enemy or return fire. 11. In his undated statement, he provides justification for not submitting his request for award of the CAB while in theater wherein he states: a. In 2005, he was cross leveled with another unit and deployed. During his deployment he was assigned to conduct convoy security missions. One incident in particular occurred on 31 May 2005. They were engaged by the enemy with indirect fire and responded in accordance with the rules of engagement. b. Multiple Soldiers involved in this particular incident completed the CAB recommendation packet. However, just before this incident, the commanding officer, executive officer, and one of their chief warrant officers were all relieved of their duty positions due to inappropriate behavior. This led to a delay in submission of their CAB recommendation packets. In the fall of 2005, they received a new commander. The new commander instructed all of them to submit their CAB recommendation packets when they returned stateside since he felt they were too close to going home and the CAB recommendation packets would not be approved before departing. c. After his deployment, he returned to his original Reserve unit. Since he was the only Soldier cross-leveled, he lost contact with everyone he was deployed with and never submitted his CAB recommendation packet. Years later he reconnected with some of the Soldiers. He discovered they had submitted their original CAB recommendation packets and were awarded the CAB. 12. On 16 May 2021, he requested the assistance of his Congressional representative wherein he states: a. In 2005, he was deployed to conduct convoy security missions. During the deployment, he was engaged by the enemy multiple times. One particular incident occurred in May 2005. He and several others attempted to submit their CAB recommendation packets for that incident. However, their company commander, executive officer, and chief warrant officer were all relieved of their positions due to inappropriate behavior. This led to a delay in being able to submit their CAB recommendation packets since they did not have a company commander. Once they received a new company commander, they were instructed to submit their requests for their CABs after they returned home since they were close to leaving theater. b. He returned to his original unit and lost contact with all of the Soldiers he deployed with since he was the only one from his unit who was cross-leveled (Individual filler). He submitted his CAB recommendation packet and moved on with his life. c. Years later, he caught up with those Soldiers and discovered they submitted their packets and were all approved for award of the CAB. He then submitted his CAB recommendation packet for the first time. The CAB recommendation packet sat on the unit administrator's desk for over a year. He was told it was being processed. A new unit administrator took over and finally submitted the CAB recommendation packet. d. His request for award of the CAB was disapproved by HRC. It was disapproved because it was not awarded in theater and because there was no evidence showing he was engaged by the enemy. 13. On 16 May 2021, SSG provided a memorandum for record, relaying the event that occurred during deployment, wherein he states: a. The applicant and the rest of the Soldiers immediately completed an incident report and actions review, and the paperwork for qualifying for award of the CAB. Unfortunately, due to the company leadership's failure to comply with the rules of engagement while in theater, several key personnel were relieved of command, resulting in the delay of processing of the CAB recommendations. b. After the unit returned from deployment, Soldiers inquired about the status of their CABs and the replacement command instructed them to resubmit their requests as a result of the initial command's failure. The applicant went back to his original Reserve unit. Through no fault of his own, his command staff did not submit another CAB recommendation packet for him, nor did they contact the in-theater command for guidance on how to proceed. The applicant is the only Soldier from that convoy who was not awarded the CAB. 14. An undated statement from SSG states: a. The applicant should have been awarded the CAB during his service in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2005. However, due to certain events and behaviors, their commanding officer, executive officer, and chief warrant officer were all removed from their leadership roles in their unit. This delayed the administrative process of officially awarding the applicant the CAB he rightfully deserves. b. It was not until months later that they were officially given appropriate leadership, but were instructed to delay submitting their CAB recommendation packets. Those members who stayed with the unit submitted their packets together after returning home from deployment and were all awarded CABs. BOARD DISCUSSION: After reviewing the application, all supporting documents, and the evidence found within the applicant's military records, the Board found that relief was warranted. The Board carefully considered the applicant's record of service, documents submitted in support of the petition and executed a comprehensive and standard review based on law, policy and regulation. The Board found at no fault of the applicant, his leadership while deployed were relieved and upon arrival of his new leadership, the applicant was instructed to submit their CAB packets stateside upon their return to do the lengthy process. Upon review of the applicant’s petition and available military records, the Board determined the Soldiers who were engaged by the enemy with indirect fire during the convoy along with the applicant, did as instructed by his chain of command upon return stateside and received their CAB. The Board determined there was sufficient evidence to support award of the Combat Action. Furthermore, the Board agreed based on the witness statements and the endorsement from his chain of command the applicant met the criteria for award of the Combat Action Badge. Therefore, the Board granted relief. BOARD VOTE: Mbr 1 Mbr 2 Mbr 3 X X X GRANT FULL RELIEF : : : GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF : : : GRANT FORMAL HEARING : : : DENY APPLICATION BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION: The Board determined the evidence presented is sufficient to warrant a recommendation for relief. As a result, the Board recommends that all Department of Army records of the individual concerned be corrected by amending his DD Form 214 by awarding him the Combat Action Badge. I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case. REFERENCES: 1. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 1552(b), provides that applications for correction of military records must be filed within 3 years after discovery of the alleged error or injustice. This provision of law also allows the ABCMR to excuse an applicant's failure to timely file within the 3-year statute of limitations if the ABCMR determines it would be in the interest of justice to do so. 2. Army Regulation 600-8-22 (Military Awards) prescribes Army policy, criteria, and administrative instructions concerning individual and unit military awards. The CAB is intended to serve as a companion to the Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB) and Combat Medical Badge (CMB) to recognize the greatly expanded role of non-infantry Soldiers in active ground combat. a. The requirements for award of the CAB are branch and military occupational specialty (MOS) immaterial. Assignment to a combat arms unit or a unit organized to conduct close or offensive combat operations, or performing offensive combat operations, is not required to qualify for the CAB. However, the CAB is not intended to recognize Soldiers who simply serve in a combat zone or imminent danger area. Battle participation credit alone is not sufficient; the unit must have engaged or been engaged by the enemy. b. A Soldier must be personally present and under hostile fire while performing satisfactorily in accordance with the prescribed rules of engagement in an area where hostile fire pay or imminent danger pay is authorized. c. A Soldier must not be assigned or attached to a unit that would qualify the Soldier for the CIB and/or CMB. For example, an infantryman (MOS 11B) assigned to a corps staff is eligible for award of the CAB. However, an infantryman assigned to an infantry battalion is not eligible for award of the CAB. d. Retroactive awards of the CAB are not authorized prior to 18 September 2001. Retroactive award of the CAB is authorized for fully qualified individuals. (1) The wartime command retains wartime awards approval authority for 12 months after redeployment and can approve award of the CAB for Soldiers who deployed with their command, and qualified for, but did not receive the CAB during the deployment. (2) Soldiers redeployed more than 12 months or reassigned to a command other than their wartime command and who qualified for the CAB while deployed may request award through command channels to the Commander, HRC. Applications for retroactive award to active-duty Soldiers and Reserve Component Soldiers will be forwarded through command channels to the first general officer (for endorsement) to HRC for processing. The first general officer in the chain of command of the Soldier recommended for award of the CAB may disapprove the recommendation. //NOTHING FOLLOWS// ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont) AR20210009669 1 ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1