IN THE CASE OF: BOARD DATE: 24 February 2023 DOCKET NUMBER: AR20220003889 APPLICANT REQUESTS: through counsel: * removal of the general officer memorandum of reprimand (GOMOR), 19 September 2019, from his Army Military Human Resource Record (AMHRR) * a personal appearance hearing before the Board APPLICANT'S SUPPORTING DOCUMENT(S) CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD: * DD Form 149 (Application for Correction of Military Record under the Provisions of Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 1552) * Self-authored Memorandum, 5 April 2022 * Counsel's letter, 5 April 2022, with evidentiary documents labeled and organized as enclosures * Enclosure 1 – Colonel (COL) (Retired) Affidavit, 8 June 2020 * Enclosure 2 – Headquarters, Eighth Army Memorandum (GOMOR), 19 September 2019 * Enclosure 3 – GOMOR Packet (63 pages) * Enclosure 4 – Joint Publication 4-0 (Joint Logistics) (excerpt – page xi and Appendix P (Operational Contract Support) (page 1 only) * Enclosure 5 – Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) – Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) Memorandum (Nonpunitive Letter of Concern), 26 May 2019, with auxiliary document * Enclosure 6 – Applicant's Affidavit, 11 June 2020 * Enclosure 7 – Applicant's OER and Awards * Enclosure 8 – Memoranda for Record * Enclosure 9 – SOJTF-OIR Memoranda (Assignment as Headquarters Company Commandant, SOJTF-OIR and Delegation of Signature Authority), 24 July 2018 and 1 September 2018 * Enclosure 10 – Photographs of the Blue Dome * Enclosure 11 – Manual for Courts-Martial (Article 92 excerpt) * Enclosure 12 – Applicant's Sworn Statement to Investigating Officer (IO), 18 April 2019, with auxiliary document * Enclosure 13 – Army Techniques Publication 4-10 (Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support), 18 February 2016, Appendix G (page G-1 only * Enclosure 14 – Army Techniques Publication 1-06.1 (Field Ordering Officer (FOO) and Pay Agent (PA) Operations), 10 May 2013 (excerpt – 8 pages) * Enclosure 15 – 408th Contracting Support Brigade, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, Memorandum (FOO Policy and Standard Operating Procedures), 6 September 2018 (pages 1 and 5-8 only) * Enclosure 16 – Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) Report, 18 February 2020 * Enclosure 17 – Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 2805 (excerpt) * Enclosure 18 – Applicant's Orders to Active Duty * Enclosure 19 – Applicant's GOMOR Rebuttal Memorandum, 27 September 2019 * Enclosure 20 – Lieutenant General (LTG) Memorandum ((Applicant) Reprimand Removal Support Memorandum for Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR)), 2 December 2021 * Enclosure 21 – Department of the Army Suitability Evaluation Board (DASEB) Docket Number AR20200006057, 8 September 2020 FACTS: 1. The applicant states the DASEB failed to conduct a full and fair review of his request. The DASEB's decision was not rationally based on the facts in the record. Therefore, he appeals the DASEB's decision to this Board. a. He enclosed a memorandum in support of this appeal drafted by his counsel. This memorandum and its enclosures demonstrate the allegations in the GOMOR are untrue and unjust. He notes to pay particular attention to the affidavit provided by COL at enclosure 1. COL is an experienced logistician with the training and knowledge necessary to render an informed opinion regarding his responsibility and his authority as it relates to the construction project and the FOO Program at issue. COL knowledge and experience stands in stark contrast to the judge advocate who conducted the Army Regulation 15-6 (Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers) investigation underlying the GOMOR. b. He has also included a memorandum of support from LTG the current Commander of Eighth Army and the successor to the now retired imposing authority, LTG . LTG concurs with COL expert opinion and supports removal of the GOMOR from his AMHRR. c. He would like to appear before the Board. 2. Counsel states: a. Introduction. (1) The applicant requests removal of the GOMOR from his AMHRR (see enclosure 2). The Commander, Eighth Army, placed the GOMOR in the applicant's AMHRR after receiving a copy of an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation. The investigation had been conducted during the applicant's prior assignment in Baghdad, Iraq, and was in regard to the Blue Dome construction project (see enclosure 3). That investigation was conducted by an IO with a conflict of interest and who lacked the expertise or experience to conduct a fair investigation. (2) Placement of the GOMOR in the applicant's AMHRR was an injustice. An experienced Army logistician, COL (Retired) reviewed the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation as well as relevant doctrine and regulations and concluded that the applicant "did not have a duty to manage a renovation project which doctrinally and practically should have been the responsibility of the SOJTF-OIR J4 (see enclosure 1, page 2, of affidavit)." COL explains in his affidavit, "As the Headquarters Commandant, [Applicant] was entitled to rely upon the expertise of the FOOs and contracting officers to maintain accurate and complete records... (see enclosure 1, page 4, of affidavit)." (3) COL is the first Army logistics expert to review the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation (see enclosure 3). The IO makes allegations against the applicant which are contrary to doctrine as well as COL practical, real-world experience. The author of the GOMOR compounds the IO's errors and takes them further, alleging the applicant was derelict for failing to supervise/manage a construction project he was not able or responsible to supervise and manage. (4) LTG the current commander of Eighth Army, concurs with COL analysis and conclusions based on the facts (see enclosure 20). LTG is the successor in command to LTG who imposed the GOMOR. LTG conducted his own review of the GOMOR, the matters in support of the reprimand, and the applicant's submission to the DASEB. In the enclosed memorandum, LTG explains: "Based on my review of the facts and circumstances, I support removing [Applicant's] GOMOR from his AMHRR...I believe the intended purpose of the reprimand has been served and it would be unjust to keep the GOMOR as part of his permanent record. Removal of the reprimand would be in the best interest of the Army." (5) The DASEB decision does not appear to be based upon a full and fair review of the facts in the record (see enclosure 21). Instead of analyzing the evidence presented, the DASEB opinion summarily dismisses COL analysis and the evidence presented because the imposing authority did not provide a letter of support (see enclosure 21, paragraph 3b). LTG memorandum resolves that issue. In its Record of Proceedings, the DASEB recites information from both the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation and COL affidavit, and then summarily reaches the conclusion that "Counsel/appellant have not provided clear and convincing evidence to support the removal of the GOMOR." The DASEB gave no explanation as to why the board chose to disregard COL expert opinion and instead affirm the conclusions of a flawed Army Regulation 15-6 investigation. (6) The DASEB failed to consider the factual connection, or lack thereof, between the applicant's position as Headquarters Commandant and the problems with the Blue Dome construction project. COL affidavit, supported by LTG memorandum, demonstrates the lack of such a factual connection. (7) The applicant respectfully requests that this Board look to that key issue of whether the applicant justly found to have failed to supervise/manage the Blue Dome construction project. The applicant respectfully requests that this Board look to the facts as outlined in this brief, COL affidavit, and LTG memorandum and find that issuing the GOMOR was an injustice. The GOMOR should be removed from the applicant's AMHRR. b. Facts and Analysis (see attachment for full details). (1) The applicant fulfilled his duties as the Headquarters Commandant. (a) In May 2018, the applicant deployed as an activated Reservist for a year- long assignment with the SOJTF-OIR headquarters. The SOJTF-OIR is a subordinate command of the Combined Joined Task Force (CJTF)-OIR and the U.S. Central Command. He was assigned to the SOJTF-OIR Headquarters located at Forward Operating Base Union Ill, Baghdad, Iraq. (b) Part Ill of the applicant's officer evaluation report (OER) for that time period states his principal duty title as "HQ [Headquarters] Commandant" and his significant duties and responsibilities as: Serves as the Headquarters' [sic] Company Commander to the Commanding General. Coordination of logistical and personnel support for Servicemembers and Coalition Forces. Primary hand receipt holder for SOJTF-OIR property book to include primary accountable official for all Servicemembers [sic] and DOD Civilian's [sic] weapons, ammunition and sensitive items. Responsible for all movement and billeting management of personnel associated with the SOJTF-OIR Joint Manning Document (JMD). Primary liaison Officer [sic] between base agencies and unit. Overseer of infrastructure related matters to include minor compound engineering. (c) The duty description does not mention managing a construction project or the FOO Program. The enclosed OER demonstrates that the applicant performed very well in his position. The applicant received and signed the OER on 20 August 2019, several months after receiving the nonpunitive letter of concern. (d) According to the Deputy J1/Strength Manager who served concurrently with the applicant, "the commandant position is a notional position falling directly under the Chief of Staff (CoS) direction with duties of host nation coordination and support." The headquarters cell, "consisted of an OIC [officer in charge], Senior Enlisted Advisor, and Junior Enlisted Command Drivers and Supply Clerks." None of the personnel serving as FOOs fell under the authority or supervision of the headquarters commandant. (e) The applicant was never given the duty of supervising the Blue Dome construction project because that duty was beyond the scope of what a company-grade officer in his position and with his experience could be expected to perform. The applicant received no initial OER counseling or any subsequent written or verbal instructions to manage the Blue Dome construction project or the FOO Program. (f) In memoranda dated 24 July 2018 and 1 September 2018, the CJTF-OIR Commander, Major General (MG) stated: In accordance with AR [Army Regulation] 25-50 [Preparing and Managing Correspondence], para[graph] 6-1, I delegate signature authority to [Applicant] to accomplish his assigned duties as Headquarters Company Commandant. If in doubt, [Applicant] shall contact me to ensure the correspondence he signs on my behalf expresses my will. This delegation of authority includes but is not limited to transactional matters involving logistical and supply support for personnel assigned or attached to Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. (g) The delegation memoranda do not address management of construction projects or management of the FOO Program. The memoranda do specifically identify "logistical and supply support for personnel…" The language, "includes but is not limited to" does not mean the applicant can be held responsible for managing a construction project; the SOJTF-OIR had a fully staffed J4 section for that purpose. Furthermore, the IO found that "FOOs and PAs were trained and appointed." FOO purchases "were made with the approval and assistance of contracting officers..." (h) The OER and awards at enclosure 7 illustrate that the applicant served successfully with SOJTF-OIR according to the SOJTF-OIR Commander, MG . In the nonpunitive letter of concern, 26 May 2019, MG writes: "You were a valuable and respected member of this Command." Contrary to the allegation in the GOMOR, the applicant fulfilled his duties as the Headquarters Commandant. (2) The J4, not the applicant, had the duty to manage the Blue Dome construction project. (a) The GOMOR alleges that "From December 2018 through March 2019… [Applicant] mismanaged the renovation project of the SOJTF-OIR Headquarters." (b) The IO described the Blue Dome project as "a repair and renovation project of a building to serve as the SOJTF-OIR Headquarters building." The building formerly served as a shopping center for U.S. Forces (see enclosure 10 for pictures of the Blue Dome building). The total amount expended on the Blue Dome project was $826,398.21. (c) The applicant "did not have a duty to manage a renovation project which doctrinally and practically should have been the responsibility of the SOJTF-OIR J4 (see COL affidavit)." COL (Retired) explains in his affidavit: A Headquarters Commandant or even a Headquarters Commander may be expected to manage minor engineering projects relating to the upkeep of a base camp. However, the Blue Dome Construction project was not minor base camp engineering. A project of the size and complexity of the Blue Dome renovation (approximately $800,000) should not fall under the authority of a Headquarters Commandant of a Special Operations Joint Task Force. (d) In the absence of a specific directive to take on the management of such a project, it is unreasonable and unjust to retrospectively assign blame on the applicant for mismanaging a project he had no responsibility or ability to manage. "The J4, not a HQ [Headquarters] Commandant, possesses the expertise and resources to manage a project the size of the Blue Dome." (e) COL expert opinion is consistent with joint doctrine. The executive summary to Joint Publication 4-0 (Joint Logistics) states that operational contract support (OCS) is a core logistics function. "OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining…construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations (see enclosure 4)." The applicant, as a captain (CPT) and non-logistician, could not have reasonably been expected to possess the knowledge, training, or experience necessary to be tasked to manage a project the size of the Blue Dome construction project. Furthermore, the headquarters cell, composed of one CPT, a gunnery sergeant, and some enlisted drivers and clerks, is not resourced for such an undertaking. COL explains:? On JTF and SOJTF staffs such as SOJTF-OIR, these functions are the responsibility of the J4 Directorates, not the Headquarters Commandant. In my experience, the J4 is assigned the responsibility for oversight and management of construction projects in a Special Operations Joint Task Force as is required by JP [Joint Publication] 4.0. As logisticians, the members of the J4 staff are familiar with how to leverage and manage both contracting support as well as the use of FOOs, and they would also be school-trained in how to integrate all of the logistics functions into a base camp construction project." (f) The SOJTF-OIR J4 was resourced to manage construction projects. The J4 section included an Occupational Contracting Support Integration Cell (OCSIC). The OCSIC personnel would attend the working group meetings (see enclosure 6). (g) The applicant had no duty to manage the construction project as alleged in the GOMOR. The J4 section possessed the expertise and the personnel to perform this function as doctrine required. The dereliction of duty allegation against the applicant is unjust and unsupported by the facts, policy, and doctrine. (3) The Board should remove the GOMOR from the applicant's AMHRR because he had no duty to manage the Blue Dome construction project. (a) The GOMOR states: "You are hereby reprimanded for dereliction in the performance of your duties, in violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From December 2018 through March 2019, as part of Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), you mismanaged the renovation project of the SOJTF-OIR Headquarters." However, as explained above and in COL affidavit, the applicant had no such duty. (b) The Manual for Courts-Martial, part IV, paragraph 18, Article 92, lists the elements which must be proven before finding that a Soldier was derelict in his duty: "(a) That the accused had certain duties; (b) That the accused knew or reasonably should have known of the duties; and (c) That the accused was (willfully) (through neglect or culpable inefficiency) derelict in the performance of those duties (see enclosure 11)." The investigation failed to establish any of these elements. The IO, without supporting documents or evidence, alleges the applicant had a duty to manage the Blue Dome project. (4) The Board should remove the GOMOR from the applicant's AMHRR because he had no duty to supervise and manage the maintenance of FOO Program records. (a) "As the Headquarters Commandant, [Applicant] was entitled to rely upon the expertise of the FOOs and Contracting Officers to maintain accurate and complete records..." per COL affidavit. However, the GOMOR alleges that the applicant "failed to provide proper oversight, supervision and management resulting in the violation of the Field Ordering Officer (FOO) policy." (b) The IO found "that the FOO/PA procedures in place at the time were substantively followed in that MELs [mission essential letters] and legal reviews were consistently used. FOOs and PAs were trained and appointed, and payments were made for materials after delivery was completed." The "numerous and substantial procedural deficiencies...were numerous documents that could not be located, even though they certainly existed at some point." (c) In the applicant's statements to the IO, he explained, "As the Company Commander, I do not have the details on the material process and ordering process. All information presented to me came in the form of a completed MEL ready for my signature (see enclosure 12)." This was an accurate statement of his responsibility to validate the items to be purchased as mission essential. (d) The applicant fulfilled his role in the process and relied upon his teammates to do the same. FOO purchases in connection with the Blue Dome project "were made with the approval and assistance of contracting officers...." The IO found "the entire process was being monitored and assisted by a Contracting Officer's Representative." The FOOs, supervised by the contracting officers, were responsible for maintaining the missing documents. (5) The GOMOR unjustly blames the applicant for a systemic, long-term accountability program at the SOJTF-OIR. (a) The SOJTF-OIR has had a long-term problem with keeping accountability of documents because senior leaders have apparently failed to put the necessary systems in place. For example, in February 2020, the DODIG released a report titled: "Audit of the DoD's Accountability of Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Syria, DODIG-2020-061 Audit." The report explains, "The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD properly accounted for, and stored Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) equipment designated for Syria (CTEF-S)…" (b) The first finding of the DODIG report states: "SOJTF-OIR personnel did not account for the budgeted $715.8 million of CTEF-S equipment for FYs [Fiscal Years] 2017 and 2018 from procurement through divestment in accordance with DoD Instruction 5000.64 and Army Regulation 735-5 [Property Accountability Policies]. For example, SOJTF-OIR personnel did not maintain comprehensive lists of all equipment purchased and received. This occurred because SOJTF-OIR personnel allowed multiple entities involved with CTEF-S [Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund Equipment Designated for Syria] equipment to store records in numerous locations instead of designating a central repository for all supporting accountability documentation (see enclosure 16)." (c) The DODIG report recommends "that the Commander of SOJTF-OIR develop a central repository system for all documentation required to support CTEF-S equipment requested on the memorandum of requirement through the entire divestment process." This finding and recommendation is startlingly similar to the finding and recommendation of the IO regarding the management of the Blue Dome project: "There should be a central repository and a specific person or position responsible for ensuring that all required documentation is maintained for FOO/PA teams where a review or audit can be easily completed." (d) The applicant is being unjustly blamed for a systemic logistics failure for which he had no responsibility. He had neither the training nor the experience that would have allowed him to identify and resolve the document accountability problem. (6) The IO found that no "specific person or position" had been given the responsibility for maintaining the missing documents but still blamed the applicant for the missing documents. (a) Army Techniques Publication 1-06.1 assigns responsibility for maintaining copies of documents relating to FOO Program purchases to the G8/J8. Army Techniques Publication 1-06.1 states: The G-8 certifies if funds are available for a purchase, clears FOOs, and maintains records of completed purchases for potential audits. Since the G-8 is also responsible for reporting obligations and expenditures and maintaining files, the FOO must provide the G-8 all supporting documentation in order to clear. The G-8, as the records keeper, maintains copies of all documents associated with a purchase. (b) The Army Regulation 15-6 IO confirmed the SOJTF-OIR was resourced with a J8. (c) By recommending that the applicant take the blame for the disorganized records keeping in the FOO Program, the IO ignored or was unaware of Joint and Army doctrine. The IO's recommendation shifts responsibility from the J4, from the contracting officers, from the FOOs, and from the J8 to the most junior staff officer in the Blue Dome Working Group. This is an injustice which the Board should remedy by removing the GOMOR from the applicant's AMHRR. (7) The Board should remove the GOMOR from the applicant's AMHRR because the GOMOR makes allegations that were not findings of the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation, have never been investigated, and are contrary to doctrine and the facts. (a) After asserting that the applicant was derelict in his duties for failing to manage the renovation of the SOJTF-OIR Headquarters and that he "failed to provide proper oversight, supervision and management," the GOMOR makes additional, more specific allegations against him: (1) Allegation: "Moreover, you improperly authorized payment for 19 separate FOO purchases totaling $116,379.00…" This allegation does not appear in the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation. (2) Allegation: "despite knowing you were missing the requisite supporting documentation." The Army Regulation 15-6 investigation does not find that the applicant knew that documents were missing at the relevant time. (3) Allegation: "When you were notified of these deficiencies, you signed a commander's clearance memorandum stating that the purchases were proper and that all documents were present and correct. This was a blatantly false representation." This was not a finding of the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation.. (b) The presumption of regularity in the filing of a GOMOR does not relieve Eighth Army from the obligation to investigate and substantiate the specific allegations of the GOMOR. Enclosure 3 is the entire packet which accompanied the GOMOR issued on 19 September 2019. It is reproduced in precisely the same order as it was presumably provided to Eighth Army and then to the applicant. No other documents were provided to support the GOMOR. (8) The Board should remove the GOMOR from the applicant's AMHRR because the IO, as a legal advisor to the Blue Dome Working Group, had a conflict of interest that disqualified him from conducting the investigation. (a) In support of his finding that the applicant was responsible for supervising and managing the Blue Dome project, the IO stated: "[Applicant]…played a substantial coordination and management role as a part of the Blue Dome working group." The IO did not mention that he had also participated in the Blue Dome Working Group as a representative of the SJA [Staff Judge Advocate]. We know the IO attended the meetings because he is the source of the assertion that "[Applicant]...played a substantial coordination and management role as a part of the Blue Dome Working Group." We know the IO is testifying from personal knowledge because this information does not appear elsewhere in his investigation (see enclosure 3). (b) The IO blames the applicant for losing track of legal reviews that the IO's office should have had on their hard drives. The IO or members of the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate should have had copies of the legal reviews because they would have written them. (c) The IO had a bias, even if unconscious, in favor of finding that his office provided adequate legal advice to the Blue Dome Working Group. At minimum, there is an appearance of a conflict of interest which undermines the credibility of the IO's findings. A reasonable member of the public, as well as other Soldiers, viewing the facts and circumstances has reason to doubt the IO's objectivity. (d) Title 10, U.S. Code, section 2805, requires Secretarial approval for minor military construction projects costing more than $750,000. The IO makes no mention of this requirement – or that the Blue Dome project may have violated this statute (see enclosure 17). (9) Because the SOJTF-OIR Commander disposed of the allegations, issuance of the GOMOR by the Eighth Army Commander was unjust. (a) In April 2019, the applicant completed his assignment with SOJTF-OIR and was demobilized, returning to his place of residence while also continuing with periodic Reserve duty at the U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, FL (see enclosure 6). (b) The Army Regulation 15-6 findings and recommendations are dated 22 May 2019 (see enclosure 3). (c) The nonpunitive letter of concern is dated 26 May 2019. The letter states it is intended as a "corrective measure" and "does not become a part of [Applicant's] official record." The letter concludes by stating the applicant was "a valuable and respected member of this Command. I have full faith and confidence that you will learn from this experience and become a more proficient officer" (see enclosure 5). The IO delivered the letter to the applicant via email on 14 June 2019 and stated: "As explained in the Letter of Concern…[MG is not seeking to file permanent record, but wanted you to learn from the experience." (d) Also, in May 2019, the Army ordered the applicant to active duty as a Regular Army officer. His orders directed him to report for active duty no later than 28 August 2019. In late August 2019, the applicant reported to the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, Eighth Army, Camp Humphreys, South Korea. About 3 weeks later on 19 September 2019, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, issued the GOMOR, which is the subject of this request for relief. (e) MG made his intent clear when he issued the nonpunitive letter of concern: he intended the letter as a corrective measure that would not become part of the applicant's permanent record. The plain language of the letter shows MG intended to dispose of the IO's recommendation with a local reprimand. Although the letter of concern states: "It does not become a part of your official record," Eighth Army received a copy of the letter and included it in the packet accompanying the GOMOR (the letter is located at page 40 of enclosure 3). Enclosure 3 is the entire packet accompanying the GOMOR and is now part of the applicant's AMHRR along with the GOMOR. Whoever sent the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation to Eighth Army also sent the letter of concern. An unidentified individual who disagreed with MG Rdisposition of this case took it upon him or herself to send the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation and the letter of concern to Eighth Army. (f) Under these circumstances, issuance of the GOMOR is contrary to the guidelines in Army Regulation 600-37 (Unfavorable Information), paragraph 3-5f, which states in pertinent part: (3) If/when a former commander or supervisor discovers misconduct warranting a reprimand, an admonition, or censure without having previously stated in writing the intent to impose a reprimand, he or she may – (a) Send pertinent information to the Soldier's current commander for action. (b) Personally initiate and process a memorandum of reprimand, admonition, or censure, as if the former command or supervisory relationship continued. In such cases, the current commander must be familiar with relevant information about the proposed reprimand. (g) MG chose the last option. He was the applicant's former commander and he chose to personally initiate and process the letter of concern as if the applicant were still assigned to SOJTF-OIR. (h) General officers have wide discretion in issuing GOMORs. However, in this case, an unidentified individual chose to forward the matter to Eighth Army in contravention of MG expressed intent. MG not Eighth Army, was familiar with the relevant circumstances as required by the regulation. MG had a clear understanding of the facts on the ground and could weigh those facts against the applicant's potential for continued service to the Army after having observed his duty performance for a year. (i) The applicant raised this issue among others in his rebuttal to the GOMOR (see enclosure 19). He accepted orders to active duty believing that he had an equal opportunity to pursue a successful military career. Instead, shortly after reporting for active duty in the Regular Army, he received a career-ending GOMOR for an issue that had been resolved by MG That is unjust. Justice and a reasonable interpretation of the regulation requires removal of the GOMOR from the performance folder of the applicant's AMHRR. 3. The applicant was appointed as a Reserve commissioned officer of the Army in the Finance Corps in the rank/grade of second lieutenant/O-1 effective 9 May 2009. He was promoted to the rank/grade of CPT/O-3 effective 21 December 2012. 4. 76th U.S. Army Reserve Operational Response Command, Salt Lake City, UT, Orders VC-136-0001, 16 May 2018, ordered him to active duty as a member of his Reserve Component unit (U.S. Army Reserve Element, U.S. Special Operations Command, Detachment 50, MacDill Air Force Base, FL) to report to Fort Bliss, TX, to mobilize in support of OIR with a reporting date of 31 May 2018 for a period of 365 days. 5. Headquarters, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Bliss, TX, Orders RC-156-0010, 5 June 2018, ordered him to deploy in a temporary change of station status in support of OIR on or about 8 June 2018. 6. U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Fort Knox, KY, Orders A-05-900714, 13 May 2019, ordered him to active duty in the rank of CPT with assignment to the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade, Korea, with a reporting date of 28 August 2019 to fulfill an active duty requirement in a voluntary indefinite status. 7. U.S. Army Human Resources Command Order 121-141-RE31-2, 21 May 2019. appointed him in the Regular Army in the rank of CPT effective upon execution of his oath of office. 8. Although not in his AMHRR, the applicant provided SOJTF-OIR memorandum (Findings and Recommendations of Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation of the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding FOO/PA Purchases for Headquarters Company, SOJT-OIF), 22 May 2019, that states (see attachment): a. The applicant became the subject of an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation on 8 March 2019, wherein an IO was appointed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding FOO/PA transactions conducted by the Headquarters Company that related to the Blue Dome construction project and potential irregularities noted by the Regional Contracting Office Taji with three specific purchases and potentially fraudulent documents. b. Summary. The investigation revealed that there was a substantial lack of management resulting in confusion and lost documentation. This led to misguided attempts to improperly produce supporting documentation in order to clear purchases that were already made. However, there is no evidence to indicate that there was any misconduct, theft, or misuse of Government property. All the purchases of construction materials using FOO were for validated requirements for both the existing SOJTF-OIR Headquarters buildings and the Blue Dome project. The total amount expended on the Blue Dome project was $826,398.21, which is below the approval authority of SOJTF-OIR. There was spending of 11 percent over the original total, $744,285.15, of the two executed contracts to acquire materials for the Blue Dome project, which is under the 20-percent allowable overage without seeking further approvals. The FOO purchases were made with the approval and assistance of contracting officers and a contracting officer representative; however, delays in delivery of materials resulted in procedural violations of the FOO Program in that they were not "cash and carry'' transactions. c. Recommendations. (1) SOJTF-OIR review and substantially improve its policies and procedures for staffing, approving, and documenting FOO/PA purchases. There should be a central repository and a specific person or position responsible for ensuring that all required documentation is maintained for FOO/PA teams where a review or audit can be easily completed. The directorate that likely is the best lo oversee knowledge management for FOO/PA teams is the J8. The J8 could create a shared folder that can be accessed by all FOO/PA teams to store the documents they create as they draw and spend Type I and II operational funds to further the SOJTF-OIR mission. (2) Master Sergeant should be considered for adverse administrative action. While Master Sergeant was trying to adapt and overcome, making up for deficiencies that he did not cause, forging documents is never the right answer. While he did not commit or attempt to commit fraud, or make any improper purchases, his actions fall below the standards of a senior noncommissioned officer. (3) The applicant should be considered for adverse administrative action. No one had more responsibility for the process and the deficiencies, than the applicant. It is clear that he was the one directing the FOO/PA process and working directly with the Regional Contracting Office. He was the single and central touch point for all the persons involved throughout the entire time period. There was a complete lack of supervision and oversight of the FOO/PA process despite his responsibility fulfilling the role of the commander in the process. Furthermore, the applicant is a finance officer who should be fully aware of the importance of completely and accurately documenting these types of transactions. His actions fail to meet the standard of an officer in his position. (4) This investigation should be forwarded to the 408th Contracting Support Brigade for lessons learned to improve their policies, procedures, and training, as well as for potential further investigation into whether the MELs that were approved and cleared were done so properly, if the 408th Contracting Support Brigade determines such further investigation is warranted. All but one of the invoices either definitively or more likely than not had an MEL signed by a warranted contracting officer approving the purchase. The contracting officer who terminated the Blue Dome contract and descoped it by almost $150,000 acknowledged that the items would be re-procured through other means, and the Contracting Officer's Representative from that partially terminated contract specifically assisted SOJTF-OIR with the procurement of those items through the FOO process. 9. The SOJTF-OIR memorandum from MG (Nonpunitive Letter of Concern), 26 May 2019, shows MG issued the applicant a letter of concern as a result of an Army Regulation 15-6 investigation and stated: Reference (a) [Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation, 22 May 2019] is the record of an investigation by MAJ U.S. Army, to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the use of Field Ordering Officer (FOO) procurement procedures by HQC, SOJTF-OIR. Reference (a) identified a substantial lack of appropriate oversight and management of the FOO program. You nominated and appointed the personnel; you certified the actions of the FOOs as responsible and ethical in the Commander's Clearance Memorandum and clearly had overall command responsibility. As the HQC [Headquarters Company] Commandant, I delegated my signature authority to you in order to accomplish these tasks. It is clear from the investigation that you failed to fulfill this responsibility. Accordingly, you are hereby administratively cautioned pursuant to references (b) [Rules for Courts-Martial 306, Manual for Courts-Martial] and (c) [Army Regulation 600-37]. This letter, being nonpunitive, is addressed to you as a corrective measure. It does not become a part of your official record. You are advised, however, that in the future you will be expected to exercise greater care in the performance of your duties in order to measure up to the high standard of performance of duty required of all Military Officers. You were a valuable and respected member of this Command. I have full faith and confidence that you will learn from this experience and become a more proficient officer. 10. The applicant was honorably released from active duty in the rank of CPT by reason of completion of required active service on 30 May 2019 and transferred to his Reserve unit. He completed 4 years, 10 months, and 6 days of net active service during this period. His DD Form 214 (Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty) shows in: * item 12f (Foreign Service) – 10 months and 13 days * item 18 (Remarks) – "SERVICE IN IRAQ 20180608-20190420 [8 June 2018 through 20 April 2019]" 11. The applicant executed a DA Form 71 (Oath of Office – Military Personnel) on 28 August 2019 for appointment in the Regular Army Finance Corps at Camp Humphreys, Korea. 12. The applicant was issued a GOMOR by the Commander, Eighth Army, Korea, on 19 September 2019, wherein LTG stated: You are hereby reprimanded for dereliction in the performance of your duties, in violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). From December 2018 through March 2019, as part of Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), you mismanaged the renovation project of the SOJTF­OIR Headquarters. Specifically, you failed to provide proper oversight, supervision and management resulting in the violation of the Field Ordering Officer (FOO) policy. Moreover, you improperly authorized payment for 19 separate FOO purchases totaling $116,379.00, despite knowing you were missing the requisite supporting documentation. When you were notified of these deficiencies, you signed a commander's clearance memorandum stating the purchases were proper and that all documents were present and correct. This was a blatantly false representation. Your actions have fallen exceptionally short of what is expected of an officer, particularly a Finance Corps officer, in the United States Army. You failed to demonstrate exemplary conduct, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 7233 [Title 10, U.S. Code, section 7233], in that you did not show yourself to be a good example of honor and a steward of public funds, and you failed to be vigilant in inspecting the conduct of all persons under your authority. You have significantly compromised your ability to serve honorably and effectively as an officer in the United States Army. This reprimand is administrative and not punishment pursuant to the UCMJ. In accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 600-37, I am considering filing this reprimand in your Army Military Human Resource Record. You have ten duty days to submit any written matters in extenuation and mitigation. If you fail to respond within the time allowed, I will assume that you elect not to submit matters and will take final filing action without your input. 13. The applicant acknowledged receipt of the GOMOR on 20 September 2019 and submitted rebuttal matters on 27 September 2019 (see enclosure 19). He requested not filing the reprimand in his AMHRR. He apologized for the actions that lead to the events, but noted there were several factors involved that were either misleading, absent, or did not cover the full basis of the material involved. He addressed procedural and material errors in the GOMOR and the Army Regulation 15-6 processing and verbiage. He stated he does not believe that his actions demonstrated any wrongdoings, mismanagement, or illegal authorizations. 14. After carefully considering the matters submitted in rebuttal, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, directed filing the GOMOR in the applicant's AMHRR on 7 November 2019. The applicant acknowledged the filing by memorandum on 13 November 2019. 15. A review of the applicant's AMHRR shows the GOMOR, 19 September 2019, with allied documents is filed in the performance folder. 16. The applicant petitioned the DASEB for removal of the GOMOR, 19 September 2019, from his AMHRR. On 8 September 2020 in Docket Number AR20200006057, the DASEB by unanimous vote determined the overall merits of the case did not warrant removal of the GOMOR. 17. Counsel provided the following evidence in addition to those documents discussed above: a. Enclosure 1 contains an affidavit and résumé from COL (Retired) 8 June 2020, a subject matter expert on contracting support, including managing contracting and operational fund support while deployed in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Horn of Africa (see attachment). After his review of the IO's findings and recommendations and accompanying exhibits, he concluded, in effect: (1) The investigation unjustly and unreasonably holds the applicant accountable for a lack of proper management and supervision of the Blue Dome construction project. The applicant was not derelict in the performance of his duties because he did not have a duty to manage a renovation project which doctrinally and practically should have been the responsibility of the SOJTF-OIR J4. (2) The applicant, as a CPT and non-logistician, could not have reasonably been expected to possess the knowledge, training, or experience necessary to be tasked to manage a project the size of the Blue Dome construction project. (3) The Blue Dome Working Group, which is referenced by the report, should have been led by the J4 directorate and should have included representatives from the J4 (including engineering), Staff Judge Advocate, Contracting, and J8. (4) The IO failed to properly address a number of issues in his findings and recommendations. These failures lead him to conclude the IO lacked the expertise and experience to conduct such an investigation and failed to enlist the expertise necessary to reach reasonable conclusions concerning the applicant's culpability. (5) The staff advising the Eighth Army Commanding General compounded this failing by making unsupported allegations in the GOMOR. If they had leveraged the expertise necessary to make such judgments, they would have reached very different conclusions. (6) Also, several shortcomings in the investigative report and the GOMOR lead him to conclude the applicant was unjustly blamed for the failures of others. He listed numerous shortcomings, which included violations of statutes, violation of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, incorrect assertions made by the IO, as well as the fact that the IO himself participated in the Blue Dome Working Group, which raised the likelihood that the IO could have been subject to a conflict of interest. As a member of the group that made validation decisions regarding the construction of the facility, the IO's role as the legal advisor makes him a potential respondent to the investigation. (7) The GOMOR alleges the applicant ''improperly authorized payment for 19 separate FOO purchases totaling $116,379." The IO states the "[Applicant] filled the role of Commander for every relevant FOO transaction, signed every MEL, and also played a substantial coordination and management role as a part of the Blue Dome working group." Even if true, these statements do not lead to the conclusion that the applicant improperly authorized payments. By signing the MELs, the applicant was not authorizing payment, he was certifying that the items to be purchased were mission essential. The applicant had no fiscal authority to authorize the obligation of U.S. Government funds. The FOOs received their authority to obligate U.S. Government funds directly from the contracting officer. The applicant signed MELs and the IO stated he found none of the purchases to be improper or out of scope for the mission. If the applicant, in his role as Headquarters Commandant (signing for the SOJTF-OIR Commander), certified that the items to be purchased were mission essential and the subsequent investigation verified this judgment, then he fulfilled his duties. Signing the MELs was entirely appropriate. b. Enclosure 3 contains the GOMOR allied documents that include the Army Regulation 15-6 findings and recommendations and the nonpunitive letter of concern, 26 May 2019. c. Enclosure 4 contains excerpts from Joint Publication 4-0 that outlines definitions regarding supply, logistics, and operational contract support, as well as a general process guidance in determining and planning for operational contract support. d. Enclosure 6 contains the applicant's affidavit, 11 June 2020, wherein he stated: (1) As the Headquarters Commandant, his immediate supervisor was the Chief of Staff, a British officer in the rank of colonel. He was never directed to supervise or manage the FOOs or the FOO Program. The FOOs were supervised by the contracting officers or their supervisors from their sections. He had no authority to authorize payments and he never served as a contracting officer or FOO, nor has he received any contracting training. (2) He departed Iraq in mid-April 2019, went through a demobilization site, and returned to his residence in Florida in early May. He received orders to active duty after being selected for the "Call to Active Duty Program." He received the letter of concern on 14 June 2019 via email from the IO, along with a copy of the findings and recommendations without exhibits attached. He further received his OER in August 2019. He was placed on orders to Korea in late August 2019. He subsequently reported to the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade and met with the brigade commander who gave him the GOMOR. e. Enclosure 7 contains: (1) the applicant's OER covering the period 1 April 2018 through 30 April 2019 showing he was evaluated as the Headquarters Commandant, SOJTF-OIF, Iraq. His rater was the Chief of Staff and his senior rater was MG . His performance was evaluated as "Proficient" and his potential as "Highly Qualified." His OER did not mention any negative comments or the facts and circumstances surrounding events that led to the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation; and (2) the Defense Meritorious Service Medal Certificate and Joint Service Achievement Medal Certificate for his service as the Headquarters Commandant, SOJTF-OIR, in Iraq. f. Enclosure 8 contains memoranda for record, 25 September 2019 and 26 September 2019, explaining the composition of the Headquarters Commandant Cell and had no responsibility or authorization for delegation of the FOOs or the FOO Program. g. Enclosure 9 contains two SOJTF-OIR memoranda (Assignment as Headquarters Company Commandant, SOJTF-OIR and Delegation of Signature Authority), 24 July 2018 and 1 September 2018, signed by MG assigning the applicant as the Headquarters Company Commandant, SOJTF-OIF, but retaining the ultimate responsibility for everything the command does or fails to do. h. Enclosure 10 contains photographs of the Blue Dome. i. Enclosure 11 contains an excerpt from the Manual for Courts-Martial showing the statute pertaining to Article 92 (Failure to Obey Order or Regulation). j. Enclosure 12 contains the applicant's sworn statement to the IO, 18 April 2019, with an auxiliary document concerning questions related to the MELs, FOOs/PA and the Blue Dome project. k. Enclosure 13 contains Army Techniques Publication 4-10 (Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operational Contract Support) Appendix G (page G-1 only), 18 February 2016, that discusses the role of the FOO. l. Enclosure 14 contains Army Techniques Publication 1-06.1 (FOO and PA Operations), 10 May 2013 (excerpt – 8 pages) that describes the FOO, PA, and contracting officer, and the micro-purchase team and process overview. It also describes the duties and responsibilities of each position. m. Enclosure 15 contains the 408th Contracting Support Brigade, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait memorandum (FOO Policy and Operating Procedures) (pages 1 and 5-8 only), 6 September 2018, which provides procedures, guidance, duties, and responsibilities of stakeholders (FOOs, FOO Manager, and/or designated contracting officers) within the FOO Program. n. Enclosure 16 contains DODIG Report 2020-061, 18 February 2020, an audit for accountability of equipment and procurement of DOD assets in Syria and Iraq that discuss issues with SOJTF-OIF. o. Enclosure 17 contains an excerpt from Title 10, U.S. Code, section 2805, which describes statutory requirements related to unspecified minor construction. p. Enclosure 20 contains LTG memorandum ((Applicant) Reprimand Removal Support Memorandum for ABCMR), 2 December 2021, wherein he states: I reviewed the general officer memorandum of reprimand, dated 19 September 2019, that was permanently placed in [Applicant's] Army Military Human Resource Record (AMHRR) by my predecessor. I have also reviewed the evidence in support of that reprimand and all matters provided in rebuttal by [Applicant], including an affidavit from COL (R) [Retired] dated 8 June 2020. I understand that [Applicant's] Department of the Army Suitability Evaluation Board (DASEB) was denied 8 September 2020. [Applicant] requested my support after the DASEB decision was finalized. Based on my review of the facts and circumstances, I support removing [Applicant's] GOMOR from his AMHRR. I find that [Applicant] was no more culpable than leaders above him in their supervisory responsibility. I believe the intended purpose of the reprimand has been served and it would be unjust to keep the GOMOR as part of his permanent record. Removal of the reprimand would be in the best interest of the Army. [Applicant] has established a solid record of performance and demonstrated outstanding character while serving in Eighth Army. If this matter was presented to me as the Commander of Eighth Army for a filing decision today, I would direct the reprimand be placed in the officer's local unit file and destroyed after 18 months. Keeping the reprimand in the officer's file would be unjust. 18. The applicant is currently serving in the rank of CPT assigned to the 101st Financial Management Support Unit, Fort Campbell, KY. BOARD DISCUSSION: 1. The applicant's request for a personal appearance hearing was carefully considered. In this case, the evidence of record was sufficient to render a fair and equitable decision. As a result, a personal appearance hearing is not necessary to serve the interest of equity and justice in this case. 2. After reviewing the application, all supporting documents, and the evidence found within the military record, the Board found that relief was warranted. The applicant’s contentions, the military record, and regulatory guidance were carefully considered. a. The evidence of record shows the applicant was reprimanded for dereliction in the performance of his duties, from December 2018 through March 2019, while part of Special Operations Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (SOJTF-OIR), he mismanaged the renovation project of the SOJTFOIR Headquarters, by failing to provide proper oversight, supervision and management resulting in the violation of the Field Ordering Officer policy and improperly authorizing payment for 19 separate FOO purchases totaling $116,379.00, despite knowing you were missing the requisite supporting documentation. The applicant acknowledged receipt of the reprimand and in his rebuttal to the GOMOR, he requested the imposing officer direct no filing of the GOMOR. He apologized for the actions that led to the GOMOR and contended several factors involved in the matter were misleading, absent, or did not cover the full basis of the material involved. The imposing officer considered the GOMOR, the circumstances of the misconduct, all matters submitted by the appellant in defense, extenuation, or mitigation, as well as the recommendations of the subordinate commanders, and directed the GOMOR be filed in the applicant’s AMHRR. b. The Board noted that the investigation that led to this GOMOR contains many inconsistencies. Given the applicant’s duty description on his OER, it is unclear to the Board how the AR 15-6 reached a conclusion that the applicant had a duty to manage a renovation/construction project which should have been the responsibility of the J-4. Likewise, it is unclear how the applicant was derelict for failing to supervise/manage a construction project that he was not able or responsible to supervise and manage. c. The Board also noted that the current commander of Eighth Army, a successor in command to the imposing general officer conducted his own review of the GOMOR, the matters in support of the reprimand, and the applicant's submission to the DASEB. Based on his review, of the facts and circumstances, he supports removing the applicant’s GOMOR from his AMHRR. d. In order to remove a GOMOR from the official record, the burden of proof rests with the applicant to provide evidence of a clear and convincing nature that the document is untrue or unjust, in whole or in part, thereby warranting its alteration or removal from the AMHRR. Based on the evidence, the Board determined that although the GOMOR is true, it is clearly unjust and should be removed from his records. ? BOARD VOTE: Mbr 1 Mbr 2 Mbr 3 :X :X :X GRANT FULL RELIEF : : : GRANT PARTIAL RELIEF : : : GRANT FORMAL HEARING : : : DENY APPLICATION BOARD DETERMINATION/RECOMMENDATION: The Board determined that the evidence presented was sufficient to warrant a recommendation for relief. As a result, the Board recommends that all Department of the Army records of the individual concerned be corrected by removing the general officer memorandum of reprimand (GOMOR), 19 September 2019, from his Army Military Human Resource Record (AMHRR). I certify that herein is recorded the true and complete record of the proceedings of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records in this case. ? REFERENCES: 1. Army Regulation 15-185 (Army Board for Correction of Military Records) prescribes the policies and procedures for correction of military records by the Secretary of the Army acting through the ABCMR. The ABCMR begins its consideration of each case with the presumption of administrative regularity. The applicant has the burden of proving an error or injustice by a preponderance of evidence. The ABCMR may, in its discretion, hold a hearing (sometimes referred to as an evidentiary hearing or an administrative hearing) or request additional evidence or opinions. Applicants do not have a right to a hearing before the ABCMR. The Director or the ABCMR may grant a formal hearing whenever justice requires. 2. Army Regulation 15-6 (Procedures for Administrative Investigations and Boards of Officers), 1 April 2016, establishes procedures for conducting preliminary inquiries, administrative investigations, and boards of officers when such procedures are not established by other regulations or directives. Paragraph 5-2 states IOs may use whatever method they deem most efficient and effective for acquiring information. Although witnesses may be called to present formal testimony, information may also be obtained by personal interview, correspondence, telephone inquiry, or other informal means. 3. Army Regulation 600-37 (Unfavorable Information), 10 April 2018, sets forth policies and procedures to ensure the best interests of both the Army and Soldiers are served by authorizing unfavorable information to be placed in, transferred within, or removed from an individual's AMHRR. a. An administrative memorandum of reprimand may be issued by an individual's commander, by superiors in the chain of command, and by any general officer or officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the Soldier. The memorandum must be referred to the recipient and the referral must include and list applicable portions of investigations, reports, or other documents that serve as a basis for the reprimand. Statements or other evidence furnished by the recipient must be reviewed and considered before a filing determination is made. b. A memorandum of reprimand may be filed in a Soldier's Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) only upon the order of a general officer-level authority and is to be filed in the performance folder. The direction for filing is to be contained in an endorsement or addendum to the memorandum. If the reprimand is to be filed in the OMPF, the recipient's submissions are to be attached. Once filed in the OMPF, the reprimand and associated documents are permanent unless removed in accordance with chapter 7 (Appeals). c. Paragraph 3-5 (Filing of nonpunitive administrative memoranda of reprimand, admonition, or censure) states: (1) Authority to issue and direct the filing of such memoranda in an officer's local file is restricted to: (a) the recipient's immediate commander or a higher level commander in the chain of command (if such commander is senior in grade or date of rank to the recipient); (b) the designated rater, intermediate rater, or senior rater, under the officer evaluation reporting system; or (c) the general officer (to include one frocked to the rank of brigadier general) who is senior to the recipient, or an officer who exercises general court-martial jurisdiction over the recipient. (2) A memorandum, regardless of the issuing authority, may be filed in the AMHRR, and managed by the U.S. Army Human Resources Command or the proper State Adjutant General (for Army National Guard personnel) upon the order of a general officer (to include one frocked to the rank of brigadier general). The general officer directing filing must exercise general court-martial convening authority over the recipient, be the designee or delegate of the individual exercising general court-martial convening authority over the recipient, been a filing authority from the recipient's losing command pursuant to paragraph (f)(1) below, or be the chief of any designated special branch pursuant to Title 10, U.S. Code, section 3064, acting pursuant to their statutory authority over members of their respective special branches. Memoranda filed in the AMHRR will be filed in the performance folder. d. Paragraph 7-2 (Policies and Standards) states that once an official document has been properly filed in the OMPF, it is presumed to be administratively correct and to have been filed pursuant to an objective decision by competent authority. Thereafter, the burden of proof rests with the individual concerned to provide evidence of a clear and convincing nature that the document is untrue or unjust, in whole or in part, thereby warranting its alteration or removal from the OMPF. e. Paragraph 7-3c (Filing Authority to Redress Actions) states an officer who directed filing an administrative memorandum of reprimand, admonition, or censure in the AMHRR may request its revision, alteration, or removal, if evidence or information indicates the basis for the adverse action was untrue or unjust, in whole or in part. An officer who directed such a filing must provide the DASEB a copy of the new evidence or information to justify the request. 4. Army Regulation 600-8-104 (Army Military Human Resource Records Management), 7 April 2014, prescribes Army policy for the creation, utilization, administration, maintenance, and disposition of the AMHRR. The AMHRR includes, but is not limited to the OMPF, finance-related documents, and non-service related documents deemed necessary to store by the Army. a. Paragraph 3-6 (Authority for Filing or Removing Documents in the AMHRR Folders) provides that once a document is properly filed in the AMHRR, the document will not be removed from the record unless directed by the ABCMR or other authorized agency. b. Appendix B (Documents Required for Filing in the AMHRR and/or Interactive Personnel Electronic Records Management System) shows memorandums of reprimand, censure, and admonition are filed in accordance with Army Regulation 600-37. //NOTHING FOLLOWS// ABCMR Record of Proceedings (cont) AR20220003889 1 ARMY BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1