



deficiencies in your performance and or conduct may result in disciplinary action and in processing for administrative separation.

3. Subsequently, you were notified that you were being recommended for administrative discharge from the Navy by reason of entry level performance and conduct as evidenced by your failure to adapt to the naval environment. You waived your right to consult with counsel and elected to submit a statement in rebuttal to your administrative separation. Ultimately, the separation authority directed your Uncharacterized Entry Level Separation (ELS) from the Navy by reason of entry level performance and conduct. You were so discharged and assigned an RE-4 reentry code on 11 August 1998.

After careful review, the Board reached the following conclusions and denied your application for relief.

The Board initially concluded you were appropriately processed for administrative separation based on your record of misconduct. While the Board carefully considered your contention for mitigation, the Board noted you did not deny the basis for your administrative separation, namely poor performance and an inability to adapt to the military environment. Additionally, the Board considered your statement to your commanding officer in which you questioned existing basic training procedures and expressed a desire to return home to your fiancé and daughter. Therefore, the Board determined the presumption of regularity applies to your administrative separation and no error exists with your uncharacterized ELS, reason for separation, and assigned reentry code.

However, because you raised the issue of mental health, the Board also requested an AO. As part of the Board's review, a qualified mental health professional reviewed your contentions and the available records and provided the Board with an AO on 11 December 2025. The AO stated in pertinent part:

There is no evidence that the Petitioner suffered from a mental health condition while in military service. He submitted a letter from a psychiatrist who diagnosed him with PTSD due to his time in service; however, the descriptions of the reported trauma – both by Petitioner and the psychiatrist – do not meet criteria for PTSD as per DSM-V-TR criteria. Furthermore, he did not cite any PTSD symptoms during separation proceedings and stated that he wanted to exit the Navy to be with his family. Additional records (e.g., active-duty medical records, post-service mental health records describing the Petitioner's diagnosis, symptoms, and their specific link to his separation) may aid in rendering an alternate opinion.

The AO concluded, "it is my clinical opinion that there is insufficient evidence of a diagnosis of PTSD that existed in service. There is insufficient evidence to attribute his misconduct to PTSD or any other mental health condition."

In response to the AO, you submitted additional supporting documentation in support of your application. After reviewing your rebuttal evidence, the AO remained unchanged.

The Board applied liberal consideration to your claim that you suffered from a mental health condition, and to the effect that this condition may have had upon the conduct for which you were discharged in accordance with the Hagel Memo. Applying such liberal consideration, the Board found insufficient evidence of a diagnosis of mental health condition that may be attributed to military service. This conclusion is supported by the AO and the fact your medical evidence does not appear to support the PTSD diagnosis. Additionally, even applying liberal consideration, the Board found insufficient evidence to conclude that the conduct for which you were discharged was excused or mitigated by your mental health condition. In this regard, the Board simply had insufficient information available upon which to make such a conclusion and recognized the same concerns raised in the AO.

In addition to applying liberal consideration to your claimed mental health condition and its potential effect upon your conduct in accordance with the Hagel Memo, the Board also considered the totality of the circumstances to determine whether equitable relief is warranted in the interests of justice in accordance with the Wilkie Memo. In this regard, the Board considered, amongst other factors, your contentions, your need for veterans' benefits, the non-violent nature of your conduct, your relative youth and immaturity at the time of your misconduct, the negative effect your discharge has had on your life, your post-service record of accomplishments, your service to your community, your mental health issues, the character references you provided for review, and the passage of time since your discharge.

The Board found that the mitigating factors were not nearly sufficient to justify any equitable relief. Specifically, the Board determined that your assigned uncharacterized ELS, reason for separation, and reentry code remain appropriate. Applicable regulations authorize an uncharacterized ELS if the processing of an individual's separation begins within 180 days of the individual's entry on active service, as in your case. While there are exceptions to policy in cases involving misconduct or extraordinary performance, the Board determined neither exception applies in your case. While the Board carefully considered the mitigation evidence you presented in support of your application, the Board believed that it would be unjust to characterize your brief period of service in the same manner as the service of the thousands of service members who, unlike you, honorably completed their enlistments without engaging in conduct warranting the early curtailment of their service. Therefore, the Board did not find an upgrade of your discharge to General (Under Honorable Conditions) or Honorable to be warranted in the interests of justice. Based on the same rationale, the Board also found no basis to grant your request to change your reason for separation or reentry code. In their opinion, such changes would also create an unwarranted and inaccurate assessment of your period of service that could potentially undermine the integrity of the Department of the Navy's personnel system.


Finally, as for your request for a name change, there is no evidence and you have provided none that the name listed on your Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty (DD Form 214) was erroneous at the time the records were created. Additionally, there is no evidence or reason to believe that retaining the current name in the records will cause any hardship or injustice. The Board's well-established precedent is to grant name change requests only when the name to be changed presents a hardship under the circumstances.

Accordingly, given the totality of the circumstances, the Board determined that your request does not merit relief.

You are entitled to have the Board reconsider its decision upon submission of new matters, which will require you to complete and submit a new DD Form 149. New matters are those not previously presented to or considered by the Board. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that a presumption of regularity attaches to all official records. Consequently, when applying for a correction of an official naval record, the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate the existence of probable material error or injustice.

Sincerely,

2/23/2026



Executive Director

Signed by: [Redacted]